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CHAP'lER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Examina. tion of contemporary analyses of the American Political 
System reveals an almost radical shift in the major emphasis of polit-
ical research, in general, and in the methodological designs'of polit-
ical scientists, in particular. Historically, political scientists have 
concerned themselves with the institutions and structures of government, 
with describing the functions and arrangements of formal governmental 
bodies, and with detailing evident behaviors and processes of political 
activity. Analyses of this nature have concentrated on specific consti-
tutional aspects of the political system - federalism, separation of 
powers, judicial review, delegations of authority, intergovernmental 
relations; on the institutional arrangements and detailed powers and 
functions of Congress, the President, and courts; on the duties, config-
uration and operations of major executive, legislative and judicial 
agencies; and on the structure and powers of relevant political actors. 
Inunersed in analyses of this na. ture were also attempts to offer a philo-
sophical justification of government, concentrating on the philosophical, 
ideological and ethical principles of democratic regimes. 
Through the development of methodological designs more closely 
aligned with principles of scientific research and through efforts to 
concentrate on explicit activity rather than institutions, the traditional, 
descriptive-institutional framework slowly gave way to a more demanding, 
albeit often sterile, analysis of specific processes and behaviors associated 
1 
2 
with governmental activity. Foremost have been studies of the sociological 
and psychological foundations of individual and group political behavior. 
Herein researchers have given attention to the deteminants of electoral 
voting and participation; to the behavior of individuals operating within 
executive, legislative, and judicial arenas; to the attitudes, opinions, 
and behavior of relevant political actors; and to emergent group proper-
ties which may not be reducible to the mere sum of individual behavioral 
patterns. 
Recently, however, political scientists have come to shift their 
energies from the study of institutions and political behavior to the 
examination of public policy - to the processes, causes, and consequences 
of government activity. Thus, rather than focusing on specific institutions 
and behavioral patterns of groups and individual political actors, contem-
porary policy analysis seeks to diagnose the actual workings of govern-
ments by concentrating on specific policy areas and program specifications. 
Policy analysis has thus come to focus on four key issues: (1) what govern-
ments do; (2) who decides what governments do; (3) why they do it; and 
(4) what difference government activity makes. 
Since governments are called upon to act throughout the whole of the 
social system - in areas of health, education, foreign relations, national 
defense, environmental protection, housing, welfare, transportation, urban 
development, social security, police and fire protection, communications, 
and so on, it is enough simply to be able to specify what governments do 
in so many diverse fields. When the analysis is expanded to include exam-
ination of why governments do what they do in each area, to specify the 
relevant political actors in each activity, and to delineate the consequences 
3 
of diverse activities for society, policy analysis begins to take on a 
most serious challenge which, when attempted, often results in research 
lacking in theoretical significance and reliability. And, though social 
scientists and policy planners have long recognized the myriad problems 
besetting governments - functional and geographic fragmentation, decen-
tralizations of power and authority, competing agencies and jurisdictions, 
the relative inability and/or unwillingness of most citizens to influence 
the policy process, and uncertain task environments, to name but a few, 
the ver.y breadth of the task and the inadequacies of present methodological 
designs have prevented political scientists from fostering a common focal 
:point of analysis and in developing an integrated and comprehensive theory 
of the policy process. 
An examination of current literature on the subject reveals that 
political scientists have instead moved without a real sense of direction 
between the product and process of governments, drawing attention to the 
particularity of each and the relationship between the two. When focusing 
on the product of politics the emphasis has been on discerning what factors, 
if any, influence the ultimate policy choices of governmental bodies. Public 
policies are themselves posited as "dependent variables" which can be ex-
plained by reference to various "independent variables" - :political, social, 
economic or technological forces in society hypothesized to be determin-
ants of public policy. Relative disparities between various state and com-
munity policies are then seen as a direct consequence of some social, 
economic, political or technological characteristic of the policy environ-
ment hypothesized to be of detennining significance. On the other hand, 
when focusing on processes of policy fomulation, overriding consideration 
4 
has been given to the ways in which particular problems become public 
problems in the process of issue identification and problem definition 
and how such problems receive attention via the formulation of specific 
policies. In so doing, many policy analysts have focused on the inter-
actions between the actors and institutions engaged in the formulation 
phase of the policy process. When the two distinct approaches are com-
bined it can be suggested that the major emphasis in present-day policy 
analysis has been to delineate the hypothesized determinants of specific 
government activity (policies) and to specify the location, source and 
configura. tion of political power in the policy process. 
Although the present analysis makes note of the limitations of such 
efforts in acquiring a full understanding of politics and public policy, 
it cannot be denied that both areas of inquiry represent legitimate con-
cerns of political scientists. The analysis of policy dete:rminants evolved 
from the awareness that there exists a general disparity between the poli-
cies pursued by different state and community governments and that such 
differences must be attributable to some social, economic, political or 
technological factor determining the availability and feasibility of specific 
policy choices. Research of this nature is founded on the fact that 
policy choices are not completely free choices. The existence of limited 
resources and incomplete information prevent policy-makers from addressing 
each and every societal problem. A choice must thus be made between com-
peting problems demanding attention, and oftentimes the selection of one 
problem precludes focusing attention on others. Secondly, a choice must 
be made from among a1 terna ti ve policy responses. And if the expenditure 
of resources are demanded, then decisions must be made regarding levels of 
5 
appropriation and allocation. Even further choices must then be made from 
among alternative means perceived capable of satisfying policy objectives, 
including the selection of the implementing body. Each phase of this 
process is beset by opportunity costs: resources expended for the allevia-
tion of one problem cannot be used for the solution of others. By focusing 
on those factors hypothetically viewed as determining what problems are 
addressed and the very nature of the policies, themselves, determinants 
analysis assumes that policy-makers are constrained from as well as en-
couraged to follow one policy position over that of others by some environ-
mental characteristic. Now, although such research has enhanced our 
general understanding of the underlying reasons for the variance in policies 
among states and communities, its narrowly confined methodological focus 
on expenditures and revenue variables and its noteworthy exclusion of im-
portant organizational and political variables has detracted from an analy-
sis of the actors involved in the formulation and implementation of the 
policies of American governmental bodies. Not only has it underscored 
the importance of politics on things political but has completely ignored 
bureaucratic variables which may have an indirect, if not independent, 
effect on the policy process. 
In addressing the question of influence and power in the policy 
process a body of research has developed which seeks to define the con-
figura. tio n of community power structures. Traditionally this has taken 
root in analyses of variations in formal and legal structures and, more 
recently and in greater detail, in defining the power relationships that 
really affect what transpires in the political decision-making process. 
Whereas some have focused on those individuals holding major formal positions 
6 
of responsibility, others have concentrated on how individuals perceive 
the power structure in their individual communities, and still others have 
analyzed how decisions are made and have thus focused on the parties directly 
engaged in fonnulating policy responses to perceived societal problems. 
Thus, of the totality of elements comprising the policy pmcess, primary 
attention has been devoted to the steps necessary for the initial formula-
tion of public policy. 
It is this writer's contention that the overriding emphasis on how 
the environment affects the policy choices of ·decision-makers and on 
specifying the precise location of political power in society have led 
political scientists to focus almost exclusively on that phase of the policy 
process concerned with the initial dete~nation of policy choices and 
with the actors involved in the preliminary formulation of public policy. 
Although these concerns have added much to our general understanding of 
the policy process, they tell us litUe about the actual application or 
implementation of public policy. They thus fail to clearly delineate the 
crucial link between policy and perfonnance. Thus lacking is a true under-
standing of how the political system succeeds or fails in transfo~ng 
policy goals, objectives, and intentions into specific and meaningful 
public services, or how well policy outcomes confonn to policy objectives. 
However, rather than ask why so much attention has been given to the 
methods and manner of policy fonnula tion, we should instead question the 
conspicuous and unfortunate absence of a viable theory of implementation. 
It has been suggested that this neglect is due in part to the "implicit 
assumption in most models that once a policy has been 'made' by a govern-
ment, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy 
7 
will be near those expected by the policy-makers. ,l The implementation 
process is thus seen as consisting of a series of rather mundane decisions 
and interactions, whereby the party or parties assigned major responsi-
bility for applying a given policy to the task environment carry out 
activities substantively and procedurally consistent with the policy ob-
jectives of elected public officials. This rather naive co~ption of 
the politics of implementation fails to capture the great gulf which 
often exists between what elected decision-makers say the policy is and 
what ultimately transpires once the policy is administered and thus de-
livered. This present analysis, on the other hand, contends that policy 
is ordinarily modified, if not actually made, in the process of implemen-
tation. This being so, it is further held that program administrators and 
bureaucrats wield an aspect of political power heretofore underestimated, 
if not ignored, by the political science community, and that bureaucratic 
and organizational factors have a significant and independent effect on 
the policy process which is relatively unexplored in current determinants 
research. 
This analysis further maintains that the public bureaucracy not only 
determines the operational content of public policies but is indeed active 
in each phase of the policy process, and that implementation analysis pro-
vides yet another means of locating the source and variety of power con-
figurations in society. Tb this end, this analysis seeks to show both 
1 Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process," 4 Policy 
Sciences (1973), 197-209, at p. 197-198; Also, see DonaldS. Van Meter 
and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual 
Framewo:tK," 6 Administration and Society, No.4 (Feb., 1975), 445-488. 
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where we have been and where future energies need to be expended so as to 
facilitate a viable conceptualization of the whole of the policy process. 
Thus, by critically reexamining, first, that portion of the litemture de-
voted to an analysis of the detenninants of public policy, and, secondly, 
that which is concerned with the location of political power in society, 
the objective will be to demonstmte how present analyses are Vtethodologi-
cally and ideologically oriented toward a single stage analysis of those 
elements common to the initial formulation of public policy. Throughout 
this analysis it will be argued that single stage analyses of the determi-
nants of policies formula ted by elected officials and of the actors deemed 
influential in the formulation and adoption of specific policies has led 
to a mdical underestimation of the power resources and the potentiaJ. 
policy-making authority of administmtors and bureaucmts, thereby creating 
an incomplete conceptualization of the policy process. 
What we are proposing is the development of a positive theory of 
policy formation - one amenable to the study of the whole of the policy 
process - from issue identification and problem definition, to the 
mobilization of resources, to the formulation of specific public policies, 
to the politics of implementation, through to the ultimate performance of 
government activity. Since governments are ultimately judged on the basis 
of what they actually do mther than by what they promise, policy analysis 
will need to consider how extensive delegations of authority to adminis-
trative agencies have created a situation in which bureaucracies (1) 
structure policy agendas, (2) define the alternatives for elected officials, 
(3) exercise significant degrees of discretion in the initial interpreta-
tion and ultimate application of statutory objectives, and (4) wield 
CHAPTER II 
CONTEMPORARY ANALYSES OF THE DETERMI:NANTS 
OF STATE AND COMMUNITY POUCIES: 
THE INSTABIUTY AND UNREUABIUTY OF PRESENT METHOOOLOGIES 
If one accepts the premise that "poll tical science is concerned with 
how various formal and informal institutions; economic, social, philosoph-
ical, and geographic conditions influence the adoption and implementation 
1 
of policy," the recent proliferation of scholarly attention to the determ.-
2 inants of state and conununi ty policy outputs is well founded. Within the 
past twenty years the study of public policy, both domestic and foreign, 
has received an unparalled proportion of the political scientist's atten-
tion, especially students of the American political system as well as those 
eager to compare the services of pluralist, democratic government with 
those of other forms of governance. This has produced several studies 
not only specifically focused upon the American policy system but a number 
1 
Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, 
Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," 25 Jour-
nal of Politics (May, 1963), 265-289; at p. 265. 
2 
Public policy, policy outputs, policy outcomes, and policy irtacts 
have been different~ally conceptualized in the ii terature. The inab~i ty 
to arrive at a common definition has created a wealth of confusion in 
inter- and intra-disciplinary communication. So as to provide greater 
clarity to what follows, we contend that public policy represents patterns 
of activity designed to produce either tangible or symbolic effects on 
the environment; policy outputs represent the service levels effected by 
these activities - the most evident manifestation of which are e:x:pendi tures; 
policy outcomes represent the ultimate performance of the policy; and 
policy impacts represent the effect such activities have on an environment. 
10 
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of cross-national surveys as well.J Unfortunately, even with a prolife~ 
a tion of scholarly interest, "no clear theory or methodology for the 
study has evolved."4 This is so even though primary attention has been 
given to those factors viewed as essential considerations inherent in the 
formulation phase of the policy process. 
When reviewing the policy literature we find that within the past 
two decades determinants analysis has emergeq as the principal device 
employed b,y political scientists for developing a theory of the policy 
process and for gauging the importance of political system variables on 
the policy choices of elected decision-makers. This concern evolved as 
an alternative to the exploration and description of the operation of 
governmental institutions that characterized traditional political science, 
and was both an attempt to document the explanatory power of political 
system variables in accounting for variations in policy choices among 
states and communities and a reaction to earlier studies by economists 
which purportedly documented the direct influence of economic factors on 
policy outputs.5 Embarldng upon non-experimental, multivariate comparative 
3 
For Example, see T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process 
(Santa Barbara, Califomia: Clio Press, Inc., 1975). 
4 
Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy(New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1975), p. 24. 
5 
For Example, see Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activ-
ity in the U.S. Since 1930 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1950); Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expen-
ditures: A Preliminary .Analysis," National Tax Journal, 14 (Sept 1961), 349-
355; G. W. Fisher, "Interstate Variat~on in State and Local Government Expen-
ditures," National Tax Journal, 17 (March 1964), 57-74; Seymour Sachs and 
Robert Harris, 11 'l'he Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures 
and Intergovernmental Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal (March 1964), 
75-85; Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and 
Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 18 (March 1965), 50-67. 
12 
research, political scientists have sought to demonstrate both the impor-
tance of political system characteristics, processes, and structures as 
detexminants of public policy, and the salience of democratic pluralist 
structures and values on the content of state and local policies. How-
ever, in so doing, political scientists have suffered from what Thomas 
Dye has termed "professional and ideological myopia."6 That is, in seeking 
to document the direct influence of politi~ factors on the policy proc-
ess, the discipline has limited its attention to governmental institutions 
and political processes. In so doing, political scientists have asserted 
the determining impact of political system characteristics without fully 
considering the range of economic, social, cultural, historical, and tech-
nological forces shaping public poliey.7 In addition, the ideological 
commitment to democratic "pluralism" has predisposed the discipline to 
transform cherished political values (e.g., participation, electoral proc-
esses and behaviors, interest group activity, and party competition) into 
determinants of the causes and consequences of public policy.8 
However, even when the prevailing professional and ideological pre-
disposition of political scientists is taken into consideration, the 
greater proportion of studies of the linkages between enviromnental con-
ditions, political system characteristics, and public policies has testi-
fied that much of the variation in state and community policy outputs is 
explained by socio-economic factors, rather than by characteristics of 
Thomas R. Dye, Policy .Analysis( University ,Ala: University of 
Alabama Press, 1976), especiallY pp. 22-24. 
7 
~·' pp. 22-23. 
s 
Ibid., p. 23. 
13 
the political system. 9 The continuing search for more precise indicators 
of the variables in question and measurement techniques amenable to the 
study of the relationship between various environmental factors and the 
policy outputs of governmental units, as well as the formulation and in-
clusion of multiple measures of policy outputs, assures us tha.t the debate 
is far from over. It also assures us tha.t the discipline will not im-
mediately recognize the narrow confines and limited utility of single 
stage analyses of the policy process. It is our contention that deter-
minants analysis, as presently employed, ( 1) neglects to consider the 
factors which may have a determining effect on multiple stages of the 
policy process; (2) fails to distinguish between factors effecting the 
initial decision-making process from those bearing upon a policy's per-
formance; and (3) ignores the effect bureaucratic and organizational 
variables have on what actually transpires within the policy environment. 
I 
Even the most cursory review of the lite~ture would indicate that 
what has most captivated the policy literature have been comparative and 
systematic analyses of. those factors assumed to be related to federal, 
state, and local provisions of goods and/or services. The dominant ques-
tion has been, "what determines the specific policy outputs of states 
and communi ties and can therefore explain variations in governmental ac-
tivity?" For example, "what relationship, if any, exists between the 
9 A brief yet comprehensive summary of this literature is pre-
sented below. 
14 
economic character of a state or community and the provision of educa-
tional assistance?"10 "What relationship exists between the structure of 
urban government and its taxing and spending policies?"ll "What influence 
does inter-party competition have on expenditures for education, health 
care services, welfare benefits, and highway improvements?"12 "What dif-
ference does it make whether a state's inhabitants are primarily urban or 
rural, educated or uneducated, ·situated near.the poverty line or the up-
per socioeconomic strata, relatively transient or settled in tenns of 
policy expenditures?"l3 "Does party identification have a significant 
10 e.g., Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activi 
United States Since 19 30; Glenn W. FJ.s er, tel"'IIJ.nan s of tate and 
cal Government Expenditures: A Preliminary .Analysis;" Glenn W. Fisher, 
"Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditures; 11 Roy 
Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Gov-
ernment Expenditures;" Otto A. Davis and George H. Haines, 11 A Poll tical 
Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditures: The Case of Muni.cipali ties;" 
Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the 
American States( Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkanslcy', "Economic 
and Poll tical Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tend-
encies and Deviant Cases," 11 Midwest Journal of Political Science (May 
1967), 173-192; Ira Sharkanslcy', "Environment, Polley, OUtput and Impact: 
Problems of Theory and Method in the .Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira 
Sharkanslcy' ( ed.), Policy .Analysis in Poll tical Science (Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1970), 61-79. 
11 
e.g., Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and 
Public Policies in American Cities," 61 .American Poll tical Science Review 
(September, 1967), 701-716. 
12 
e.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Com-
petition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," 
25 Journal of Politics (May, 1963), 265-89; Charles F. Cnudde and Donald 
J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," 
63 American Political Science Review (September, 1969), 858-866; Ira 
Sharkanslcy' and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Poll tics, Eco-
nomics, and Public Policy," 63 American Poll tical Science Review ( Septem-
ber, 1969), 867-879. 
13 
e.g., Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local 
Government Expenditures • " 
15 
impact on the fonnulation of public policies?"14 "Is there a regional 
variation in policy outputs?"l5 "To what extent can differences in polit-
ical culture explain observed variations in state and local policies?"16 
These and similar questions have long been of interest to social 
scientists in general and political scientists in particular. They also 
reflect the tendency to treat public policy, as formulated py elected of-
ficials, as the major dependent variable of interest to political scien-
tists. The role of political science has thus come to be one of finding 
and explaining the independent and intervening variables which account 
for policy differences. Readily apparent is a predominant interest in ex-
plaining the relationship between various environmental factors (economic, 
social, cultural, political, and geographic), the objectives of policy-
makers (as delineated within the formulation phase of the policy process), 
and the ultimate policy choices of the goveming body. Equally apparent 
is the failure of such efforts to account for the eventual outcomes of 
government activity. 
This is not to suggest that policy research has been totally con-
fined to the types of interests noted above. In fact, when reviewing the 
public policy literature we are confronted with a number of distinctions 
within the perspectives regarding the specifics of. policy. The once 
14 E.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Com-
petition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States." 
15 E.g., Ira Sharltansky, "Regionalism, Economic Status, and the 
Public Policies of American States," Social Science Quarterly (June, 
1968), 9-26. 
16 E.g., Daniel J. Elazar, "Marltetplace and Commonwealth and the 
Three Political Cultures," in Sharltansky (ed.), policy Anal;ysjs jn Poljt-
ical Science, pp. 171-185. 
16 
predominant school of thought urged the expansion of our understanding 
of how policies are formulated, how policies surface, and how various 
institutional arrangements are brought· into play in the several stages 
of conflict resolution. This "process approach ••• tends to focus on 
political processes within political institutions, emphasizing political 
realities more than political fonmalities and concentrating,on the be-
havior of the participants in the process."17 Policy decisions are seen 
as products of a specific process, as the output of a particular system 
18 
or subsystem. 
It can be suggested that the traditional concern for process evolved 
from and is maintained by a desire to develop a "positive theory" of the 
American political system.19 It is assumed that a better understanding 
of how policies are fomulated will improve the output of the system. 
However, there is no single blueprint formula depicting how all policies 
are made, and there does not exist any individual procedure which is 
systematically employed in cranking out all policy decisions. Process 
l7 Charles o. Jones, An Introduction to the Stud of Public Folic 
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970 , p. 2. 
18 James C. Charlesworth notes this development when he suggests 
that "political science ••• is concerned not with the potentially infinite 
content of all public decisions, but with the process by which these de-
cisions are reached." See, Charlesworth ( ed.), A Design for Political 
Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods(Phil, Pa: Amer1can Academy of Po-
litical and Social Sc1ence, 1966), p. 31. For specific descriptions of the 
policy process, see: Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke, A Strategy 
of Decision(New York: The Free Press, 1963): Lindblom, The Pol1cy-Mak1ng 
Process(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968); Lewis 
A. Froman, The Congressional Process (Boston: Lit Ue, Brown, and Company, 
1967). 
19 For a description of the nature of positive theory, see Milton 
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics(Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1953), p. 4. 
17 
analyses have consequently uncovered what often appears to be a muddled 
mass of confusion, with many demands being placed on many different as-
pects of governmental machinery, with many political actors vying for the 
acceptance of particular policy orientations, with the interrelated ac-
tivities of numerous institutions, interest groups, and a highly compli-
cated bureaucratic structure, with distinct policy goals, proposed courses 
of action, and desired outcomes. 
Due to repeated discoveries of rather dissimilar processes of policy 
formulation working in different substantive areas, an alternative ap-
proach to the study of policy has been to focus on the particular pro b-
lems perceived to be in need of a specific response b,y the political com-
munity. It has been noted that most studies of policy fom.ulation have 
usually given but scant attention to the nature of public problems; they 
20 
are ordinarily taken as given, and policy analysis proceeds from there. 
This approach is unfortunate, however, because in many respects the way 
in which policy-makers approach decision-making and the very structure of 
the policy process itself often depends upon the nature of the issue con-
fronting the policy environment. In other words, this second perspective 
holds that the particular issues under examination determine the type of 
process employed in the making of policy. Viewed in this manner policy 
issues function as independent variables and process as the dependent 
factor. Thus, whereas a process orientation views the "tangible manifesta-
tion" of policy (the policy output) as dependent upon particular processes 
20 James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making, 2nd Ed (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1975), p.~:5~:5-. ----~--
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of formulation, a policy issue perspective asserts that the type of proc-
ess employed is detennined by the issue being addressed. The underlying 
basis of this perspective can be seen in Lewis Froman's observation that 
the United States does not have a single process that systematically turns 
out all policies, but several different processes, each of which operates 
. rt• ul 21 J.n a pa. J.C ar arena. 
Although this may seem a rather trite point, it must be understood 
that there is an important distinction between the substantive area of 
policy decisions and particular policy issues. The substantive policy 
area refers to a particular aspect of the total environment. Policy is-
sues, on the other ha~d, refer to perceived problems in that particular 
substantive area. For example, energy resources, transportation, educa-
tion, taxation, foreign governments or ideologies are substantive areas 
for policy decisions. In and of themselves substantive policy areas do 
not constitute policy issues. Policy issues corresponding to the above 
named substantive areas may refer to "shortages of oil," "overcrowded 
highways," "inefficient educational facilities," "inequitable tax payment 
schedules," "spread of communism and foreign aggression," respectively. 
In other words, policy issues are problems in need of relief, primarily 
through the activity of public officials. 
We can therefore suggest that a focus on policy issues involves a 
somewhat independent concentration on the types of public problems per-
ceived as requiring government attention. One of the by-products of this 
21 Lewis Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in 
Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy(Chicago: Mark-
ham Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 41-52. 
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specialized concentr-ation has been the construction of several distir .. ct 
policy categories, each generating its own set of theoretical proposi-
tions.22 For example, Theodore J. Lowi, although not explicitly concerned 
with individual policy issues per se, has offered a typology which has 
served as the foundation for a variety of policy ~ategorizations23 The 
premise advanced by Lowi is that the anticipated outcome of 'particular 
problems (issues) greatly determines the pattern of conflict ir .. policy 
formulation from its inception until resolved by some specific policy 
decision. ¥.'hen considered in this manner there are principally thi'ee 
types of policies - distributh~e, redistributive, and regulative, each 
tending to generate its own arenas of power with special sets of a.ctoTs, 
conflict resolution points, political structures, political processes, 
elites, and 5Toup relations. 24 
Underlying Lowi 's schema are three interrelated proposi tiona: "( 1) 
The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by 
their expectations - by what they hope to achieve or get from relating 
22 Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, 
and Poll tical Theory," 16 World Poll tics (July, 1965), 677-715; Robert H. 
Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Polley: The Search for Theories and 
Roles," in Austin Ranney ( ed.), Political Science and Public Policy ( Chgo: 
Markham, 1968), 151-178; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Ail AiiaiYsis of Public 
Policies in Cities," 29 Journal of Politics (February, 1967), 94-108; 
Heinz Eula.u and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy 
Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," 62 American Poll tical Science He-
view (March, 1968), 124-143; T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy 
PrOCess (California.: Clio :t-ress, Inc., 1975); David Braybrooke and Charles 
Lindblom, A Strate~ of Decision (New York: The F'ree Press, 1963); Charles 
0. Jones, "Speculat~ ve Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution Policy-
Making," 36 Journal of Politics, No. 2 (May, 1974), 438-464. 
23 
Theodore J. Lowi, ".American Business, Public Policy, Case 
Studies, and Poll tical Theory." 
24 
Ibid., pp. 689-690. 
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to others. (2) In politics, expectations are dete:rm.ined by govermnental 
outputs or policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is deter-
mined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy 
there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship."25 
Lowi thus defines policies in terms of their "impact or expected impact 
on society." And "when policies are defined this way, there. are only a 
limited number of types; when aJ.l is said and done, there are only a 
limited number of functions that gove:rrunents ~an perfo:rm.. "26 In effect, 
due to the ephemeral nature of individual issues, single issues are in 
fact resolved on the basis of established expectations and a history of 
prior policy decisions of the same type. 27 This categorization does not 
suggest that ever,y related issue always brings about an identical policy 
response, but rather that specific poliey types are dependent upon the 
particular societal impact policy-makers hope to achieve. 
Whereas Lowi has categorized policies in terms of expectations and 
clientele, T. Alexander Smith prefers to distinguish between policies in 
terms of the degree of conflict attending the discussion and resolution 
of public problems. 28 Policies can be divided into four primary groups-
distributive, sectorally fragmented, emotive symbolic, and redistributive -
differing in terms of conflict intensity, institutional responsibility, 
and group relations. 29 
25 Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Po-
litical Theory, " p. 688. 
26 Ibid., p. 689. 
27 Ibid. 
28 T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, passim. 
29 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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(1) Distributive policies display little, if any, conflict and are 
settled qu~etly ~n executive and/or legislative committees. Party 
discipline is unaffected. 
(2) Sectorally fra~ented policies display moderate conflict among 
interests represent~ng primarily economic sectors and are resolved 
on the legislative floor b,y coalitions of legislators barg.aining 
with ministers or other bureaucrats who oversee the particular sec-
tors. Party discipline remains relatively strong in most cases. 
(3) Emotive symbolic policies display wide conflicts ,of deep inten-
sity over "way-of-life" issues in which gove:rnments refuse to stake 
out positions and in which individual legislators reject leadership 
controls over their actions. Party discipline is virtually non-
existent. 
(4) Redistributive policies display wide conflicts of deep inten-
sity between classes and are settled b,y "peak" associations of labor 
and management negotiating with presidents and prime ministers 
(legislatures are relatively quiescent). Party discipline is rela-
tively high.JO 
Although Smith credits Lowi for inspiring many of the positions ad-
vanced in his policy categories,3l we can note a marked variance in focus 
among their approaches. On the one hand, Lowi suggests that there is a 
great variety of issues confronting policy-makers, all of which cannot be 
resolved b,y the same set of political actors, group relations, institu-
tions, and political processes. And, further, what determines the partie-
ular process employed in formulating public policies is not the peculiar 
issue confronting policy-makers but, rather, the expected impact they hope 
to make on society. Since there exists a multiplicity of issues and a 
number of varying ways in which single issues may be perceived, we cannot 
30 T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, pp. 7-8. 
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"In developing my own perspective, I should say at the outset 
that I owe a profound intellectual debt to Professor Theodore J. Lowi 
of Cornell University. His work in the American policy field provided 
inspiration for many of the positions adopted in this book." See, Smith, 
p. v. 
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state with any degree of certainty that all educational issues, trans-
portation issues, communication issues, taxation issues, or any other po-
litical, economic, or social problem will be resolved according to one 
established policy-making process. However, since policy-makers ordi-
narily pursue public problems with certain objectives in mind, Lowi sug-
gests that policies be differentiated on the basis of the impact policy 
makers hope to achieve thzough proposed courses of government action. 
T. Alexander Smith, on the other hand, suggests that the nature of 
the policy-making process (the involvement of particular political actors, 
institutions, and group relations) is detezmined b,y the scope and inten-
sity of the conflict attending the resolution of policy issues. Different 
conflict relationships and not policy issues, per se, determine the nature 
of the process b,y which policy decisions are formulated. Thus, whereas 
Lowi's proposed typology concentrates on the objectives of decision-
makers, Smith's schema differentiates between policy types in terms of 
the degree of conflict attending particular public problems. Although 
concerned with different elements of an issue concentration, both policy 
classification schemes seek to improve our general understanding of the 
inner workings of the policy process. 
An important contribution of Smith's classification to the study of 
public policy is its emphasis on the manner in which processes of issue 
identification and problem definition influences the policy-making process. 
This logic is founded upon a number of prior studies in which policies 
had been categorized according to one's understanding of the problem en-
vironment. For example, David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom had pre-
viously created a four-tier public policy typology, with each element 
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corresponding to a particular relationship between two variables (under-
standing of the problem and the degree of desire for change) , each dichot-
omized into "high" and "low" categories.J2 Four specific processes are 
thus discernible: "rational," "administrative," "disjointed incremental-
ism, .. JJ and "speculative augmentation ... J4 
For example, when policy-makers have achieved a high level of under-
standing of the problem, enabling them to assess the "costs and benefits" 
of each alternative policy and to select that which promises the greatest 
"net value achievement," and when the desire for change is so great that 
the public will consciously scrutinize the details of government activity, 
processes of policy fo mula tion will follow a :ra. tional design. On the 
other hand, authority to fomulate policies affecting small or incremental 
changes on the basis of a high level of comprehension of the problem are 
ordinarily delegated to administrative agencies. Such agencies are nor-
mally perceived as expert in their area of concern and thus better able to 
satisfy policy demands than "generalist" public officials. When policy-
makers confnont a particular issue in which there exists both a low level 
of understanding of the specifics of the problem and a relatively low de-
sire for change, such issues are addressed and resolved in a piece-meal 
fashion. Ultimate policy decisions are thus approached incrementally. 
And, finally, when policy-makers have a relatively inadequate (i.e., low) 
) 
32 David Braybrooke 
66-79. 
and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, 
pp. 
JJ Ibid. 
4-J Charles 0. Jones, "Speculative 
lution Policy-Making," pp. 4)8-464. 
Augmentation in Federal Air Pol-
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understanding of the issues but the desire for change is high, the process 
by which policy is fo:rmulated is characteristic of what Charles 0. Jones 
has te:rmed "speculative augmenta.tion."J5 Federal air pollution policy-
making is representative of this policy type. For example, although there 
is a great desire for change (as measured by the scope and intensity of 
demands placed on public officials to alleviate air pollution), there is 
lacking a clear understanding of the problem and of the ways in which 
cleaner air can be achieved. Under such conditions agencies ma.y be es-
ta.blished (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency) to satisfy public 
demands for government action. However, when all is said and done, there 
is but token recognition of the problem and the government's attempt to 
set up agencies authorized to make policy is merely one method of giving 
the impression that an effective government response has been initiated. 
Once again we note an instance where issues become a basis for establishing 
a typology for increasing our understanding of the policy-making process. 
In addition to the categories thus far considered, Lewis A. Froman 
has suggested that we distinguish between "areal" and "segmental" policies 
on the basis of the soope of the issue being addressed.J6 Areal policies 
are those which evolve in response to problems encompassing entire popu-
lations (e.g., pollution and, as suggested by Froman, municipal annexa-
tion). Segmental policies, on the other hand, evolve in response to prob-
lems peculiar to particular segments of society (e.g., urban renewaJ.). 
35 Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution Policy-
Making," pp. 4)8-464. 
36 Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," 
94-108. 
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Froman thus suggests that there are certain problems peculiar to particu-
lar populations and others affecting entire settings. In practice, how-
ever, such neat boundaries are not so easily drawn. In fact, as Ira 
Sha:tkansky has so aptly noted, Froman's categories are not "mutually ex-
elusive and discrete." Whereas Froman suggests that municipal annexation 
and inter-municipal cooperation are "areal" in affecting the entire popu-
lation of a city, and urban renewal is "segmental" in affecting a portion 
of the population, the opposite may very well hold true. That is, "it 
appears likely that an annexation may affect only the neighbomood that 
is made part of the city, while an urban renewal project may affect a 
whole city through its impact on expenditures, taxes, and political con-
troversy ... 37 
As is all too well apparent, the categories noted above do not at-
tempt to present descriptions of individual issues, per se, but instead 
a Classification of how different issue characteristics determine differ-
ent processes of policy fomulation. This is not to suggest that there 
have not been attempts to categorize policy types according to some other 
scheme. Thomas Dye and Ira Sha:tkansky, for example, have attempted to 
group policies in terms of traditional nominal (substantive) categories -
education, welfare, agriculture, highways, health, natural resources, and 
public safety.38 Although such categorizations may increase our under-
standing of individual substantive areas, they contribute little to the 
37 Ira Sha:rXansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Pro b-
lems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira 
Sha:rXansky, op. cit., 61-79; at p. 62. 
38 Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and Public Policy in the 
American States; and Ira Sha:rXansky, ~ cit. 
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~evelopment of more encompassing theoretical conce~tualizatians. Much 
more useful are those studies which seek to discern the relationship be-
tween issue characteristics arLd policy types. Unfortunately, however, 
very little has been done in the way c.f testing mos~ categorizations with 
specific data. It has thus been suggested that pclicies be grouped in 
terms of their mutual covariance, discovered in a comparati v.e context. 39 
\Vhat is indeed otvious is that no single policy category has yet been de-
veloped to determine the impact different issues have on the policy ~roc-
ess. · Although the literature abounds with various classifications, there 
is lacking true empirical verification of varying theories. The fact 
that most policies evolve in response to a number of issues makes it ex-
tremely difficult to state with any degree of reliability the specific 
issue the policy is intended to resolve. An alternative strategy t.a.E: 
thus been to concer.trate on the policy's impact on the environment. 40 
Briefly stated, impact analysis refers to the analysis and evalua-
tion of policy outcomes. In contrast with an examination of the specific 
activities of political actors, impact analysis focuses on the conse-
quences of policy on the overall political system, on the economic and 
social environment, on political actors and institutions, and even on the 
39 
Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy, p. 266. 
40 
The first coLerent body of impact research was developed in the 
field of public law to assess the impact of Supreme Court decisions. This 
research is summarized in two excellent studies: Theodore L. Becker ( ed.), 
The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions (NY: Oxford, 1969); and Stephen L. 
Wasby, The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1970). 
Impact analysis in substantive areas: urban renewal - Martin Anderson, The 
Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964); public housing - Leonard 
Freedman, Public Housing (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1969); welfare-
Gilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare (Wash., D.C.: Brookings, 1971); 
selective service - James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little 
GPoups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System (Chicago: Markham, 1968). 
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policy process itself. When focusing on the consequences of govermnent 
actions, researchers seek to measure a policy's impact on the target sit-
uation or group, on situations or groups other than the target, and· on 
future as well as immediate conditions. In addition, a conscious effort 
is made to assess both direct (in te:rms of resources devoted to the pro-
gram) and indirect (including loss of opportunities to do other things) 
costs of the policy. 41 
It may be suggested that the task of assessing policy impact would 
be relatively simple if all government activity brought f~rth intended 
consequences. However, this is rarely, if ever, possible. Such an ideal 
assumes that the issue in need of government attention is clear and sin-
gular in fo:rm, that it has been perceived and defined in accordance with 
"real world" conditions, that policy-makers specify objectives in an un-
ambiguous and coherent fashion, that the means chosen are appropriate and 
designed to satisfy policy objectives with little or no spillover effects, 
and that we possess the ability to state with precision the actual impact 
of the policy. However, several factors pose as serious constraints in 
formulating policies in accordance with societal demands, as well as direct 
limitations on the overall effectiveness of policies in resolving societal 
demands. Thomas R. Dye has summarized these as follows: 
1. Some societal problems are incapable of solution because of the 
way in which the problems are defined. If problems are defined in 
relative rather than absolute te:rms, they may never be resolved by 
public policy. 
2. Expectations may always outrace the capabilities of government. 
41 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3rd Ed. (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prent1ce-Rail, Inc., 1978), p. 312. 
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). Policies which solve the problems of one gmup in s6ciety may 
create "problems" for other groups. 
4. It is quite possible that some societal forces cannot be har-
nessed by governments, even if it is desirable to do so. 
5. People adapt themselves to public policies frequently in ways 
which render the policies useless. 
6. Societal problems may have multiple causes, and a specific 
policy may not be able to eradicate the problem. 
7. The solution to some problems may require policies which are 
more costly than the pm blem. 
8. The political system is not structured for completely rational 
decision-making.42 
Impact analysis, we can reasonably argue, cannot be undertaken com-
pletely isolated from alternative perspectives on public policy. To a 
great extent the impact of a particular policy may be dependent upon the 
other phases of the policy process. How the precipitating issue is ini-
tially defined significantly determines what, if any, government activity 
develops. If the issue is defined as some particular pm blem in need of 
attention, there should then develop a purposive course of action specif-
ically geared toward alleviating the problem. Certain resources will 
then be committed which are perceived to be best suited to the problem 
at hand. The result of such activity is a particular policy output, a 
particular government action. The output of this process is intended to 
bring about certain consequences, namely, to achieve a certain objective, 
to affect a certain group, situation, or aspect of the environment. The 
effectiveness of the policy is then measured in tenn.s of its impact on 
society (i.e., what are the specific outcomes?). Did the policy alleviate 
42 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, Jrd Ed., p. JJl-JJ2. 
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the problem? Did it create new problems? Did it affect other sectors of 
the environment? Was it more costJ.y than the problem. Was the objective 
realized? Can the consequences be measured? These are questions that 
must be addressed following a particular policy output, a.nd the answers 
of which determine the relative success of the policy. Thus, the assess-
ment of policy impact is not an isolated examination but, rather, the 
final stage of the policy process. Viewed as such, we can see that there 
is (1) a precipitating problem, (2) a particular process by which a gov-
ernm.entaJ. response is fo.mulated in the form of policy, (3) a.n appropria-
tion and allocation of resources for resolving the problem, (4) a par-
ticular governm.en taJ. action or pa ttem of activity congruent with the 
policy objectives, and (5) a particular consequence of government activity 
(i.e., an impact on society). Each step is interrelated and interdepend-
ent, existing as part of the overaJ.l policy framework. 
FinaJ.ly, when we set out to measure the impact of a particular poli-
cy we may find that we are oftentimes trying to measure the immeasurable, 
which is, of course, another way of saying that not all consequences are 
subject to quantification. It is especially difficult, if not impossible, 
to give weights to individual values, attitudes, and perceptions. And, 
at a minimum, policy evaluation requires that we know what we want 
to accomplish with a given policy (policy objectives), how we are 
going to do it (programs), and what, if anything, we have accom-
plished toward attainment of the objectives (impact or outcomes, 
and the relation of policy thereto). And, in measuring accomplish-
ment, we need to determine that not only some change in real-life 
conditions has occurred, such as a reduction in the unemployment 
rate, but that it was due to policy action~ and not to other fac-
tors, such as private economic conditions. 3 
43 James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Ma.kini, p. 134-135. 
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Now, although policy :planners and analysts have sought to analyze 
the specific outcomes of governmental policies and thereby gauge both the 
intended and unintended consequences of public policies, it is important 
to bear in mind that there exists a substantial body of literature which, 
although considered a special form of impact analysis, operates at the op-
posite end of the policy framework. This second type of impact analysis, 
temed "determinants analysis," seeks to uncover the impact of various en-
vironmental factors on the u1 timate policy decisions of those entrusted 
with policy-making authority. The objective of such research endeavors 
has been to explain state and community variations in policy outputs in 
tems of various social, economic, political, demographic, institutional, 
or historical characteristic of the environment hypothetically perceived 
to have a determining impact on policy decisions. 
It should first be noted that the exa.mina tion of policy outputs re-
ceived its impetus from a myriad of studies conducted on the state level. 
Setting the framework for this literature was V. 0. Key's Southern Politics 
in State and Nation. 44 Herein Key proposed that state variations in poli-
cies addressing such issues as welfare, taxation, education, health and 
medical care, among others, were due to the varying political character-
istics of the states. Whereas mul tifactional one-party systems with lit-
tle continuity of competition tended to pursue policies benefitting upper 
socioeconomic classes, states with bifactional one-party competition tend 
to formulate policies biased toward the "have-nots."45 Similarly, in 1959 
44 (New York: Knopf, 19..51); also, see V. o. Key, Jr., American State 
Politics: An Introduction (New York: Knopf, 1956). 
45 V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 298-314. 
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Duane Lockard, focusing on the New England community, found tha.t two-
party states pursue more libel.'al policies than one-party states. 46 
Though neither study emPloyed systematic analyses of the effects of 
other potentia.lly significant variables (such a.s socioeconomic develop-
ment), both implied a. cause and effect relationship between inter-party 
competition and state policy outputs. Also noteworthy is that each neg-
lected to account for the contrary opinion that public policies are closely 
related to the economic resources available to decision-makers. For 
example, in his 19..50 study of the Trend of G9vernment Activity in the 
United States Sine~ 1900, 47 Solomon Fabricant found that over 70 percent 
of the variation in total spending among states can be explained by three 
socioeconomic characteristics: per capita. income, population density, and 
urbanization. 48 And, when broken down by functional area (e.g., highways, 
education), these socioeconomic variables continued to explain from 29 
to 85 percent of the interstate variance. Fabricant concluded that, over-
all, income was the principal deteminant, even though urba.niza tion proved 
to be most important in the areas of fire prevention, sanitation, and 
welfa.re.49 Unfortunately, however, Fabricant neglected to elaborate upon 
the varying aggregate explanatory power of his three variables. There was 
thus no attempt to explore the possible imPlications of the findings. 
Reflecting the research interests of his predecessors, Robert T. 
46 New England State Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1959). 
47 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 19..50). 
48 Ibid., p. 123. 
49 Ibid. I p. 130. 
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Golembiewski, in 19_58, presented what may be considered the first system-
atic analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and 
state political processes. Examination of his data shows significant re-
lationships between various indicators of socioeconomic development (per 
capita income, urbanization, and industrialization) and the degree of 
inter-party competition. 5J He thus concluded that (1) the greater the 
degree of socioeconomic development (and most notably urbanization), the 
greater the degree of inter-party competition, and that (2) the greater 
the degree of inter-party competition, the greater the likelihood that 
policies will be oriented toward the "have-nots ... 51 
'Ihough such scholars as V . 0. Key and Robert Golembiewski documented 
statistically significant relationships between various indicators of so-
cioeconomic development and the degree of inter-party competition, they 
failed to analyze whether inter-party competition independently affects 
the activities policy-makers pursue, or whether both inter-party competi-
tion and policy outputs are affected by socioeconomic conditions. They 
thus failed to test whether inter-party competition acts as an intervening 
variable between socioeconomic conditions and policy outputs. 
Equally perplexing is the manner in which a number of economists 
sought to extend Solomon Fabricant's research throughout the early sixties 
and which appeared in a series of articles in the National. Tax JournaJ. • .52 
5J "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political. Party Strength," ~ 
Western Political Ouarterly, 11 (1958), 494-513. 
51 Ibid., p. 510 • 
.52 Glenn W. Fisher, "Deteminants of State and Local. Government Ex-
penditures: A Preliminary Analysis;" Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State 
and Local. Government Expenditures;" Sachs and Harris, op. cit; Bahl and 
Saunders, op. cit.; and Otto A. Davis and George H. Ha~nes, "A Political 
Approach toA '!'l'm'o:cy of Public Expenditures: The Case of MunicipaJ.i ties," 
National Tax Journal, 19 (September, 1966), 259-275. 
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Although a number of new explanatory variables were added to the list and 
a1 though greater emphasis was placed on isolating various categories of 
expenditures, the highlight of this research was the discovery that the 
explanatory power of the three independent variables examined by Fabricant 
decreased over time to account for only 50 percent of the variance in total 
per capita expenditures in 1957.53 Unfortunately, however, •all such ef-
forts were overwhelmingly atheoretical and unguided by any model of the 
policy-making process. Perhaps this shortcoming somewhat accounts for how 
researchers were able to note the decreasing explanatory power of Fabri-
cant's variables without simultaneously hypothesizing that some kind of 
"threshold" effect might be occurring. That is, perhaps after a certain 
level of socioeconomic development has been reached, incremental increases 
in such areas as urbanization and industrialization are relatively unim-
portant in terms of policy outputs. 54 
Although this economic research of the early sixties discredited 
the singular importance of various socioeconomic variables in explaining 
variations in state policy outputs over time, it did add greater credence 
to Fabricant's observation that environmental variables have a differen-
tial impact across expenditure categories. Once again, however, no one 
attempted to discern why this is so.55 It can be suggested that, for the 
most part, economists have been disposed to examine the singular impact 
53 Fisher (1961), p. 352. 
54 George W. Downs, Jr. Bureauc:racy, Innovation, and Public Policy 
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. ). 
55 For example, see: Glenn W. Fisher, "Detenninants of State and 
Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," p. 3.52; and Roy 
Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Gov-
ernment Expenditures, " p • 53. . "~·'"·""..-:'~"'-.....,. 
-.. ' : ~ ,· ·.l·~~ .I<~.\ \ ':). ·. ..· Jill .. c "•,, 
; ... ~'!\ . • ' .t·~~\ ' c . ,..._ ').. 
of socioeconomic variables on policy outputs with little or no thought 
given to their theoretical significance. During the early stages of de-
te:rminants analysis researchers were not interested in constructing a 
theory of policy-making or in formulating basic strategies of social 
change. Political scientists, during this period, however, appear to 
have lacked the technical sophistication to confront the findings of the 
early economic research and, at the same time, were relatively predis-
posed to concentrate solely on process characteristics. The isolation 
of the two disciplines ended in 196), however, with an iniportant publica-
tion by Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson. :P 
D3.wson and Robinson's "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, 
and Welfare Policies in the American States" represents the first in a 
series of articles designed to test the Key-Lockard hypothesis that in-
creased interparty competition leads to a higher level of welfare ex-
penditures and that, in general, there exists a relationship between state 
and community political characteristics and policy outputs. It was their 
contention that multiple indicators of political characteristics (e.g., 
the degree of interparty competition, voter participation, Democratic and 
Republican control of seats in government, and the degree of malapportion-
ment) may not be as important in shaping policy outputs as once predicted. 
Having examined the relationship between socioeconomic conditions (income, 
degree of urbanization, and industrialization), the degree of interparty 
competition, and nine welfare policies, their initial finding was that 
policy variables are related to socioeconomic develGpment variables, and 
56 "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies 
in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), 265-289. 
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that policies are in turn correlated with socioeconomic factors. And, 
holding system variables constant, it was found that socioeconomic fac-
tors influence the political process, and that process variables influ-
ence the adoption of public policy choices along with socioeconomic con-
ditions. Finally, by holding wealth constant, they concluded that the 
effect of interparty competition on policy outputs greatly declined. It 
was thus discovered that: 
High levels of interparty competition are highly interrelated both 
to socioeconomic factors and to social welfare legislation, but the 
degree of inte:rparty competition does not seem to possess the im-
portant intervening influence between socioeconomic factors and lib-
eral welfare pro~s that our originaJ. hypothesis and theoretical 
schemes suggested. 
Unlike the earlier research endeavors of economists, Dawson and 
Robinson's study was, first of all, guided by theoretical considerations. 
The Key-Lockard hypothesis was tested, and the substantial implications 
of the negative findings raised "serious doubts about the relevance of 
many variables that most political scientists had valued for their ability 
to explain public policy • .. 58 And, secondly, their explora. tion was guided 
by a model of the policy-making process which many believed would put an 
end to research involving "the undirected statistical manipulation of any 
variables at hand." 59 
Continuing this research, Thomas R. Dye, in 1965, sought to test 
the widely shared belief that malapportionment seriously affects the policy 
51 ~·, p. 289. 
58 Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," in 
James A. Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual, 3 (1972), 1-72, at p. 6. 
59 George W. Downs, Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public Policy 
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. 5. 
choices of state legislatures.60 Past literature suggested that there is 
substantial variation between urban and rural constituencies and that mal-
apportionment, by over-representing ru.ra.1 interests, grants rurally situ-
ated interests a real advantage in policy-making. Although such scholars 
as Duane Lockard and Herbert Jacob expressed a noticeable degree of skep-
ticism on this point, many others took it to be an evident fact. 61 Con-
trolling for the effect of urba.niza tion, industrialization, .income, and 
education, Dye concluded that "on the whole, the policy choices of mal-
apportioned legislatures are not noticeably different from the policy 
choices of well apportioned legislatures. Most of the policy differences 
which do occur turn out to be a product of socioeconomic differences 
among the states rather than a direct product of apportionment practices. "62 
Again, socioeconomic conditions were found to be more significant than 
political characteristics in shaping public policies. 
In this same year Phillips Cutright, embarking upon a cross-national 
correlational analysis, found that the degree of social security coverage 
of a nation's population is highly correlated with its level of economic 
development. 63 In a similar vein, Hazold L. Wilensky's 1975 analysis of 
The Welfare State and Inequality suggested that economic development is 
the fundamental dete:rminant of welfare services, and that economic resources 
60 Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policies in the 
States," Journal of Politics, 27 (February, 1965), _:a6-60l. 
61 See, Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government 
(New York: MacMillan, 1963), p. 319; and Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences 
of Malapportionment," Social Forces, 43 (December, 1964), 256-261. 
62 Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," 
p. 599. 
63 
"Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social 
Security Programs," American Journal of Sociology, 70(March 1965), 537-50. 
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explain 83 percent of the variance among nations in the proportion of GNP 
devoted to welfare programs.64 Political factors were thus hardly notice-
able in both cross national analyses. They also suggest that political 
factors are more important for their symbolic meaning than for actually 
influencing government activity. 65 
Three additional wo:t:Ks surfaced in 1966 which not only gave greater 
impetus to policy dete~ination research, but seem to have added even 
greater confusion to the already befuddled state of the literature. In 
"The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental 
Variables in the American States, "66 Richard I. Hofferbert posed the ques-
tions: "What is the relationship between certain major structural aspects 
of state governments and the content of policies adopted in the states? 
Do socioeconomic environments of the states relate significantly to polit-
ical structures or the type of policies enacted?"67 Following the research 
activity of Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert argued that socioeconomic fac-
tors have more influence on public policies than do political process vari-
ables. Drawing almost exclusively f:rom the measures utilized by Dawson 
and Robinson, Hofferbert added to their list of political process variables 
two of his own: the degree of malapportionment in state legislative dis-
tricts and the extent of divided control of state governments (e.g., where 
the houses and govexnorship are controlled qy opposing parties). After 
having found insignificant relationships between these two variables and 
64 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1975). 
65 Ibid., p. 47. 
66 American Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), 73-82. 
67 Ibid., p. 73. 
between each of the two and welfare orientation, Hofferbert concluded: 
The line of investigation suggested here seems to justify the recent 
concentration of scholarly efforts seeking to discover the impact of 
environmental factors on the shape and operation of state politics. 
Structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan vari-
ables a separate berth, the nature of the party system and its opera-
tion do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of poli-
cies produced in the states.68 
The year 1966 also witnessed the publication of Thomas R. Dye's Poli-
tics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States,69 
which finnly established quantitative policy analysis in the mainstream of 
political science. Utilizing a theoretical fra.mewo:rK similar to that of 
Dawson and Robinson, Dye used correlation techniques to analyze the rela-
tionship between four indicators of socioeconomic development (levels of 
urbanization, industrialization, income, and education), four political 
system variables (Deqtocratic or Republican control of state government, 
the degree of interparty competition, the level of voter turnout, and the 
extent of malapportionment), and fifty-four easily quantifiable policy out-
puts (principally expenditure levels), encompassing education, health, 
welfare, highways, corrections, taxation, and public regulation, using as 
the varying factor the role of state governments in spending with respect 
to each. 
Using simple, partial, and multiple correlation analysis, Dye found 
the effect of political system characteristics on policy outputs less sig-
nificant than that of environmental conditions. A1 though he noted in-
stances in which political system characteristics did have an effect on 
policy, he found the association to be a product of the fact that economic 
68 
69 
Ibid., p. 82. 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 
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factors influence both policy outputs and poll tical configurations. The 
long honored association between political system characteristics and 
policy outputs, he thus argued, was based an a spurious relationship • 
.And, consistent with the findings of Dawson and Robinson, Dye observed 
that: 
Economic development shapes both poll tical systems and policy out-
comes, and most of the association that occurs between system 
characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influ-
ence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of 
states with different types of poll tical systems turn out to be 
largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a 
direct product of poll tical variables. Levels of urbanization, 
industrialization, income, and education appear to be more influ-
ential in shaping policy outcomes than political system character-
istics.70 
Thus, pictorially, Dye observed the following relationships. 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
l..---~~~~--~~~------~--~-----C-~-RI __ S_T-IC_S ____ '~~~ ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS >I-P-0-LI_C_Y_O_U_T-PU~T=s"""j 
Dye's more elaborate technique and the very multiplicity of his 
measures served to give further credence to the earlier work of Dawson 
and Robinson and to that of Hofferbert. He believed it was thus con-
clusi ve that "economic development variables are more influential than 
71 
political system characteristics in shaping public policy in the states." 
Although Dye's pronouncements opened a serious debate within the 
political science community regarding the insignificance of political sys-
tem characteristics on matters "political," it must be understood that his 
7o 
Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, p. 293. 
71 
~., p. 296. 
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results are somewhat more ambiguous than his rhetoric would have us be-
lieve. Indeed, in a number of areas political variables appear to have 
an independent impact worthy of further exploration. And, further, his 
research suffers from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings, 
a large part of which may be a result of his using "outputs" and "out-
comes" interchangeably. 72 In analyzing the impact of various economic 
and political variables on public policy, the dependent variable becomes 
the particular activities of governmental bodies. That is, the focus is 
on the relationship between environmental factors and what governments do 
(i.e., policy outputs). Policy outcomes, on the other hand, refer to the 
consequences of government activity and not to the activity itself. Now, 
the environmental factors which hypothetically influence policy-makers in 
their selection of issues to address and in the specification of expendi-
ture levels may or may not have a significant bearing on the final out-
come of policy actions. Much more important in understanding the out-
comes of government activity are the manner and processes of implementa-
tion, not solely formulation. 
Although such objections as those raised above can and have been 
offered, 73 and even considering the fact that environmental factors (though 
important) still left an average of almost two-thirds of the variation in 
72 For an example of the confusing shift from outputs to outcomes, 
with no attempt to differentiate the nature of the two, the reader is re-
ferred to Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, Chapter 1, 
"A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes, 11 pp. 1-19; esp., pp. 23-24. 
73 For example, see: Ira Sha:rkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output 
and Impact: Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy, 11 
in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: 
Markham Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 21-38. 
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·outputs unexplained, 74 Dy~'s findings were most disturbing to those polit-
ical scientists who continued to hold that the subject matter of their 
discipline is extremely important in understanding how policy decisions 
are made. For example, in the same year as Dye's wo:rlt, John H. Fenton 
published a report indicating a significant relationship between inter-
party competition and policy outputs independent of socioeconpmic condi-
tions. 7.5 
In each case (Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert, Dye, and Fenton) 
varying techniques and indicators of specified variables were employed. 
And, a1 though Fenton • s study expressed findings contrary to other reports 
which noted the relative insignificance of a few prominent political vari-
ables, it would appear that by 1966 findings were undisputably balanced 
in favor of "economic deteminists." Many members of the political science 
community were, to put it mildly, reluctant to refuse waving the banner 
of the importance of political factors on matters political. For example, 
writing in 1967, Ira Sha.J:Xa.nsky suggested that: 
Studies by economists have paid little attention to political vari-
ables that might influence govermnent spending. A finding common 
to several studies employing economic and political variables is 
that economic characteristics of a jurisdiction outweigh character-
istics of the political system in their influence upon expenditures. 
Yet it is likely that research techniques are responsible for these 
findings. Authors who make such findings typically use few poli t-
ical variables among their measures of po tentiaJ. influences upon 
expenditures, and they combine state and local government spending 
as their dependent variable. It is legitimate to combine state and 
local government expenditures for the purpose of studying the in-
fluences upon the state-local political system. However, the findings 
74 Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," p. 39. 
75 
"Two-Party Competition and Goverrnnental Expenditures," in Fenton, 
People and Parties in Politics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966). 
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of such research may differ from findings about the influences 
upon the expenditures of state governments, per se. 
The present study introduces new measuresOI' political char-
acteristics, it focuses on the expenditures of state governments, 
and it finds political variables to be more img>rtant than economic 
variables with respect to state expenditures. 7 
What were these neglected political variables that Sha:tKa.nsky found 
to be associated with the level of spending? Cryptically stated, eight 
such variables were addressed: (a) previous expenditures, (b) federal. aid, 
(c) tax effort, (d) revenue allocated to the £tate, (e) revenue from non-
local sources, (f) state employees per 10,000 population, (g) per capita 
personal income, and (h) population size. Further, by means of step-wise 
regression, Sha:r:kansky found that "contrary to the findings of previous 
research, there is little positive association between measures of economic 
development and state expenditures per capita ... 77 There are, however, 
several questions which need to be addressed concerning Sharkansky's study. 
Although Sharkansky specifies that variables ~-f measure several 
features of state politics previously ignored in professional journals, 
one is hard pressed to accept his interpretation and conceptualization of 
variables ~-~ as political system or even "political" variables. All ex-
cept "the number of state employees per 10,000 population" are, by no real 
stretch of the imagination, considered as measures of economic development, 
or at least as the quantity and source of government resources. By in-
eluding these measures in his analysis and by labelling them "political 
factors," Sha:rkansky has (inadvertently) presented evidence of the greater 
76 Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State 
Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," Midwest 
Journal of Political Science, 11 (1967), 173-192; at p. 174. 
77 Tbjd,, p. 178. 
importance of economic conditions in explaining variations in government 
spending. 7S 
Especially confusing is the manner in which some scholars (such as 
Sharkansky) conceptualize "outside money" (such as federal aid) as a poli t-
ical variable which offsets the effect of economic resources on state 
policy. Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that such economic :re-
sources as federal aid are dependent upon a number of political decisions 
made at the federal level, thereby leading some to categorize such funding 
programs as "political variables." Or, perhaps it exemplifies the profes-
sional and ideological predisposition of political scientists to preempt 
the effect of economic :resources on state policies. James C. Strouse and 
Phillip Jones have suggested that political scientists have seen fit to 
label federal aid as a "political variable" rather than an "economic re-
source" so as to demonstra. te the increasing importance of politics in ex-
plaining variations in state policy.79 However, as Thomas Dye so aptly 
reasoned, "the importance of economic resources, whether derived from 
within the state or from the federal government, in shaping state policy 
cannot be altered by conceptual relabeling of packages. ,.SO 
Now, it has already been noted that the explanatory power of three 
principal environmental variables - income, population density, and urban-
ization - declined from 72 percent in 1942 to slightly over 50 percent in 
78 It should also be noted that variable "a," previous expenditures, 
could also have been environmentally detennined, and would in any case ac-
count for a large proportion of the variance. 
79 James C. Strouse and Phillip Jones, "Federal Aid: The Forgotten 
Variable in State Policy Research," Journal of Politics. J6 (February, 
1964), 200-207. 
So Thomas R. Dye, Policv Ana1ysis. p. )8. 
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1951.81 EspeciaJ.ly evident is the decline in the explanatory power of 
these three variables in the areas of welfare (from 45 percent in 1942 
to 11 percent in 1951) and health (from 72 percent in 1942 to 44 percent 
in 1951).82 Although it can be suggested that this decline may be attri-
buted to the fact that some kind of threshold effect might be occurring, 
Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris attribute the decline to the intervening 
effect of federal grants-in-aid.83 Federal grants (as forms of "outside 
money") free state and local. government officiaJ.s from constraints imposed 
by their own linli ted resources. And, as Thomas Dye observed when he rep-
licated the Sachs and Harris study for the year 1970, the inclusion of 
per capita federal grants-in-aid as independent variables greatly increases 
the proportion of explained variance relative to that explained by income, 
education, and urbanization. 84 For example, when federal aid is included 
as an independent variable in explaining state variations in welfare poli-
cies, the proportion of explained variance increases from 17 to 48 per-
cent.85 For all other fnnctions, however, "per capita income remains the 
most important detenninant of expenditures even after the federal aid 
variables are added. "86 As a fom of fnnding which supplements the resources 
available to the states, federal aid mirrors the commonly held conceptual-
ization of an economic variable, not a "political factor" as offered by 
81 . 
See, Infra., p. 32. 
82 
·Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Detenninants of State and 
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds, " op. cit. 
83 --Ibid. 
84 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, pp. 284-288. 
85 Ibid., p. 288. 
86 Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Detenninants of State and 
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," p. 207. 
some. 
Other studies during 1967 also attempted to examine the relationship 
between environmental factors, political conditions, and policy outputs. 
In one such study, Ira Sha:rkansky tested the assumption that the amount 
of money spent in any one locality is a true measure of the nature of the 
services provided. 87 Sha:rkansky hypothesized that three measures most 
likely to have an influence on public services are (1) combined state and 
local government expenditures per $1,000 of personal income, (2) combined 
state and local government expenditures per capita, and (3) combined state 
and local expenditures for each major function as a percentage of total 
expenditures. His initial reasoning was that "if the level of government 
spending actually reflects the quality and quantity of. public services, 
then each of these spending measures should show a positive relationship 
with service indicators."88 His findings, however, ran contrary to pre-
vious expectations: "government spending does not exert a pervasive influ-
ence upon the nature of public services."89 
Now, drawing from another context, Sharkansky made the following 
distinction between public policy, policy outputs, and policy impacts: 
In brief, public policy represents actions taken by government; 
policy outputs represent the service levels which are affected 
by these. actions; and policy im~8ts represent the effect which 
the service has on a population.9 
87 
States," 
88 
"Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American 
American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 1066-1077. 
Ibid., p. 1067. 
lems 
89 Ibid., p. 1074. 
90 Ira. Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Prob-
of 'Iheory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," p. 6). 
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For example, state governments pursue a number of activities in the areas 
of education, public welfare, public safety, and transportation, among 
others. Each activity is allocated a certain level of funding and the 
perfonnance of each activity is assessed in tenns of some quantitative or 
qualitative criterion. Since it is often argued that most policies fail 
to attain their objectives due to insufficient funding, Shatkansky sought 
to test the hypothesis that government spending is positively associated 
with policy achievement. However, the discovery that the level of govern-
ment spending does not reflect the quality or quantity of public services 
carries with it substantial implications for consideration by policy-
makers. Indeed, if govenunent expenditures do not affect the u1 timate 
success or failure of government policies, then a program's performance 
must be measured in texms of its overall effectiveness, not in tenns of 
its initial budget allocations. '!be general finding that increased spending 
in the field of education does not noticeably improve the quality of educa-
tion in the city (as measured by such factors as teacher-pupil ratio, exam-
ination scores, median education levels, percent graduating secondary 
schools, and percent receiving college credits), recommends that increased 
attention be given to the activities of those administrators responsible 
for implementing the policies formulated by elected public officials. For, 
indeed, our contention is not only that program effectiveness depends 
upon the willingness and capacity of administrators and bureaucrats but 
that, collectively, administrators and career bureaucmts have greater 
influence over the policy-making process and in determining the ultimate 
outcome of public policies than any other single class of individuals, in-
cluding elected public officials and economic elites. 
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It would thus appear that by 1967 no definitive word had yet been 
spoken. In most studies, the amount of variance left unexplained by the 
arsenal of environmental and political variables thus far considered great-
ly surpassed that which was explained. Further, although there have been 
moments when various factors have proven significant in explaining varia-
tions in state policies, they have also proven rather unstable both across 
policy categories and from one time period to another. And thirdly, the 
studies thus far considered have been of limited utility to those respon-
sible for policy making and to those interested in bringing about social 
change. Indeed, prescriptive concerns have rarely been evident in the 
determinants litera tu:re. Perhaps this deficiency flows from the na tu:re 
of the explanatory or independent variables included in determinants analy-
sis, or from the way such variables are hypothesized to relate to state 
and community policies, or perhaps even from the pessimism which naturally 
emanates from the sterility of the find.ings.91 This is especially evident 
in political science - primarily because the influence of political vari-
ables have proven less important than economic resources in explaining 
policy variations among states. However, as far as most political scien-
tists were concerned, the debate was far from over. 
For example, although the greater proportion of determinants :re-
search has noted the paucity of the relationship between political system 
characteristics and state and local policy outputs, a study undertaken by 
Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler in 1967 suggested that political 
9l For a most insightful critique of determinants analysis following 
the general argument developed here, see: George W. Downs, Jr., Bureaucracy, 
Innovation, and Public Policy, pp. 9-13. 
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refonn can change the complexion of city taxing and spending patterns, as 
well as the very responsiveness of city government.92 In an analysis of 
200 American cities of 50, 000 or more, the authors found that refonned 
cities (i.e., cities with manager governments and at-large, non-partisan 
elections) tend to tax and spend less than unreformed cities (i.e., cities 
with mayor-council governments and ward constituencies). Of particular 
importance to political scientists was the finding of the greater respon-
siveness of refonned cities to the socioeconomic composition of their 
populations. That is, refonned cities were found to pursue policies in 
the interests of the community, rather than biased toward select economic 
and social elites. Reformism was thus seen as the means Qy which to re-
move the spoils system and its Qy-products from the policy process. 
In measuring responsiveness, Lineberry and Fowler divided their sam-
ple cities on the basis of three criteria: government type, election type, 
and constituency type. These variables were further subdivided into types 
of governance (mayor-council, manager, and commission); types of elections 
(partisan and non-partisan); and constituency types (district and at-large). 
They then proceeded to make a comparison of the means and standard devia-
tions of socioeconomic characteristics of reformed and unreformed cities. 
The independent variables used in the analysis were population, class com-
position, and the homogeneity of the city. And, finally, each independent 
variable was similarly subdivided into several indicators of the phenomenon, 
with statistical operations perfonned on each relationship. 
92 Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public 
Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (Sept., 
1967), 701-716. 
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Interpretation of their data indicates that many significant cor-
relations exist between taxing and spending policies and income, educa-
tional, occupational, religious, and ethnic characteristics of the popu-
lation of unreformed cities, whereas no such relationship holds true for 
reformed cities. If not careful, one can easily misconstrue their findings. 
What Lineberry and Fowler detected was that unreformed cities are more 
responsive to various socioeconomic factors and to the enduring conflicts 
of political life than are reformed cities. Our first inclination would 
probably be to suggest that governments should be responsive to such fac-
tors. However, as Lineberry and Fowler observe, unreformed cities are 
responding to "artificial" cleavages (e.g., race, religion, and ethnicity), 
and not to the overall policy needs of the city. Reformed cities, on the 
other hand, are relatively immunized from social conflicts. Thus, social 
cleavages are not reflected in public policy. As they conclude, "nonpar-
tisan elections, at-large constituencies, and manager governments are as-
sociated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts 
of political life."9J 
Encouraged by the findings of such research, Richard I. Hofferbert 
and Ira Shaikansky continued their efforts into the latter years of the 
1960s, each time testing new hypotheses and utilizing new techniques and 
alternative indicators of the variables under question. In 1968 Hofferbert 
again tested the relationship between economic resources, political factors, 
and public policies - this time examining the period 1890-1960. 9~ Echoing 
93 Ibid., P• 715. 
9~ "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States, 1890-1960," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (August, 1968), 401-~18. 
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the findings of previous research, Hofferbert's study indicated that a 
long-term analysis of public policies reveal.s a pattern whereby economic 
resources are initially the strongest determinant of the types of policies 
initiated by the states, but that the relationship lessens in importance 
with the passage of time. This much was already known. As communi ties 
develop economically, they gradually come to free themselves from the con-
straints imposed b,y the initial shortages of economic resources. Able to 
muster the funds necessary to carry out a number of separate activities, 
policy-makers are better able to loose themselves from some of the initial 
problems of choice, and can initiate new policies and programs in other 
areas. However, choices still must be made concerning the degree of change 
to enact in previous programs, as well as what new issues will receive a 
place on the policy agenda. The implication of Hofferbert' s analysis is 
that once economic development reaches the point that limited resources 
no longer pose a crippling constraint the attitudes and behavior of policy-
makers take on new significance in explaining the variance in state poli-
cies and spending patterns. 
In another context, (again reflecting the professional and ideolog-
ical predisposition of political scientists), Ira Shatkansky and Richard I. 
Hofferbert suggested that political system characteristics have not proven 
significant in determining state and local public policies because of prob-
lems inherent in the conceptualization and measurement of the central vari-
ables.95 By locating other multiple measures of the independent variables, 
9 5 Ira Shatkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State 
Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Re-
view, 63 (September, 1969), 867-880. 
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they reasoned that: 
Because we deal with factors and not isolated variables, we can 
speak with improved precision of which dimensions of policy re-
spond to what dimensions of politics and economics. Our findings 
show that different social and economic characteristics have dif-
ferent relevance for policies, and their relevance varies between 
substantive areas of policy. Furthennore, central. features of 
state politics are important for sgme policies, even when socio-
economic variation is controlled. 9 , 
Now, although Sha.rkansky and Hofferbert are indeed warranted in as-
serting that no single, unidimensional independent variable is sufficient 
in explaining policy variations among particular governmental units, and 
in noting that the detennining factors vary according to the particularity 
of the policy area, they still fail to capture the significance of bureau-
crats and bureaucratic variables on the policy-making process. It is now 
well known that many key policy decisions are made by bureaucrats rather 
than by legislators or other elected officials. Since the comparative 
state policy literature has thus far neglected to include bureaucratic or 
organizational factors as major independent variables, it should come as 
no great surprise that political variables often fail to have a significant 
independent effect on state and local policy. 
Further, although the greater percentage of studies concerned with 
the detenninants of policy outputs have been undertaken at the state level, 
several have sought to analyze the relationship between political system 
characteristics, socioeconomic conditions, and policy outputs, measured as 
an aggregate of state and local activities. It has been and is most dif-
ficult to assert with complete certainty tha~ all hypothesized relation-
ships are equally true for both state and local environments. However, 
96 w..a..,' p. 867. 
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Amos Hawley's study of the association between urban renewal policies and 
socioeconomic cha.ra.cteristics of cities and Maurice Pina:rd's study con-
earning flouridated water supplies, suggest that socioeconomic conditions 
constrain the policy initiatives of both state and city governments.97 
Similarly, the relationship between political system characteristics 
and state and local policy-making has also received the attention of those 
researchers interested in the policy choices of urban decision-makers. 
For example, Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian have suggested that 
local governments ordinarily assume one or more of the following roles: 
(1) promoting economic growth; (2) providing or securing life's amenities; 
(3) maintaining (only) traditional services; and (4) arbitrating among 
competing interests.98 They then P~ceeded to analyze the effect diffe~ 
ent governmental types have on the specific role or function assumed by 
policy-makers. In particular, they found that policies of economic growth 
and a.meni ties are generaJ.ly supported by middle and upper class communi ties 
and opposed by low-income indi vidua.l,s. Caretaker policies (i.e., those 
intended to provide minimal public services and low tax burdens), on the 
other hand, are preferred by low-income citizens, small cities serving 
ruraJ. areas, and by working class communities. Furthennore (a) nonparti-
sanship reduces the working class vote and the forces supportive of care-
taker government; (b) by increasing the aggregate effect of low-income 
voters, ward elections strengthen caretaker government; (c) to the extent 
97 Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Services," Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology (January, 1963), 422-431; Maurice Pinard, "Struc-
tural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of 
Flouridation," American Journal o:f Sociology (March, 1963), 513-526. 
98 "Community Types and Policy Differences," in James Q. Wilson 
(ed.), City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968). 
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that cohesive ethnic blocks strengthen the worldng class vote, caretaker 
government is likewise strengthened; and (d) professional city managers 
support values associated with economic growth. And, finally, it was 
found that the economic climate of the city is insufficient in itself in 
determining the direction of civic policies. All in all, the policy 
choices of urban society are dependent upon the value orientations of 
decision-makers. 99 
Although we have not considered any of the studies in great length, 
and though we have presented but a small kernel of the studies acknowledged 
as major contributions to the policy literature, enough has been noted in-
dicating that this research area is in a relative state of nux. No final 
word has been spoken. No systematic body of knowledge exists. What has 
thus far been established, however, is the beginning of a policy science. 
As Thomas R. Dye rightly observed: 
Policy research is still very exploratory; no body of literature 
can be thought of as the final word in understanding public policy. 
But systematic policy research to date is sufficiently challenging 
to the traditional professional concerns of political science, and 
to the long standing assumptions of democratic pluralist ideology, 
to warrant a serious reconsideration of the traditional assumptions 
of our discipline.lOO 
However much we assent to Dye's pronouncement that "policy research 
is still very exploratory," and that the literature of policy determination 
99 Ibid., p. 36. Also, see: Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City 
Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in Wilson (ed.), 
City Politics and Public Policy, pp. 37-65; Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, 
"Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," American Political Sci-
ence Review, 62 (March, 1968), pp. 124-144; Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, 
Labyr~nths of Democrac : Ada tations Link es Re resentation and Policies 
in Urban Politics New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973 ; Robert Eyestone, The 
Threads of Public Policy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). 
100 Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 55. 
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challenges the tradi tiona.l concerns of political science and the assump-
tions of democratic pluralist ideology, we cannot help but be somewhat 
cynical of the utility of the research findings to date. The suggestion 
that public policies are influenced b,y the economic resources available 
to decision-makers is analogous to saying that an individual's spending 
decisions are also a function of his or her available resources. And the 
response to each is the same - "So What~" Of greater theoretical interest 
is the observed variations between policy outputs of cities with similar 
socioeconomic characteristics. Through ordinary observation we can note 
two equally affluent or "poor" cities which may easily differ in terms of 
street conditions, lighting, protected crossings, paik facilities, side-
walks, museums, libraries, as well as other physical traits, readily ob-
served with but scant examination. Why would we expect cities with sim-
ilar socioeconomic characteristics to differ in policy responses to similar 
community needs? 
Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau addressed their research endeavors 
to the very conditions noted above.101 In an analysis of 88 cities in the 
San Francisco Bay region, the authors suggested that differences in meeting 
common environmental challenges are due to the fact that different cities 
are in different stages of urban policy development. By computing an ag-
gregate measure of each city's "policy profile," with the medians for plan-
ning and amenities expenditures used as determining factors, Eyestone and 
Eulau constructed a typology of policy development consisting of five 
stages: retarded, emet=@nt, tra.psjtiona1, maturing, and advanced.102 To 
101 
"City Councils and Policy Outcomes: DevelopmentaJ. Profiles," in 
Wilson (ed.), Cjty paJi+ics and Public policy, pp. 37-65. 
102 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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control for the effects of economic resources on policy orientations, the 
88 cities were further subdivided into two groups, "using the median of 
per capita assessed valuation for all cities as the dividing line between 
high and low resource capability. ,.lOJ And, finally, )04 councilmen were 
interviewed and questionaires compiled to determine the value orientations 
of policy-makers. Among the many significant findings were: 
Policy orientations of policy-makers concerning development and scope 
of government activities are not related to city size, growth, or re-
source capability. 
The more favorable the policy-makers' orientation toward development, 
the more developed the city is likely to be. 
Regardless of size, growth, or resource capability, the more favor-
able the policy-makers' orientations toward development, the more 
developed the city is likely to be.l04 
We are thus informed that "the relationships we have been able to demon-
strate will help restore the political scientist's belief in the importance 
of politicians in the policy process."l05 
In a similar fashion, in I.al:)yrj nths of Demo era C¥, Heinz Eulau and 
Kenneth Prewitt reported that their comparative analysis of 82 city coun-
cils in the San Francisco Bay region uncovered significant relationships 
between the goals, perceptions, and policy orientations of city councilmen 
d bl . d•t . th . •t• f , . d •t• 106 I an pu l.C expen 1. ures m e1.r c1. 1.es or pJ.annl.ng an amen1. 1.es. n 
particular, it was found that councilmen enter public office with estab-
lished attitudes concerning the past and present policy orientations of 
lOJ 
104 
Ibid., p. 47. 
Ibid., PP• 52-5J. 
105 6 Ibid., p. 5. 
lo6 Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy; AdB.l;)-
tations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. passim. 
the city's governmental. structure. Such attitudes may be either "factual" 
expressions of what the city had in fact accomplished or attempted, or 
they may be more or less "normative" assessments of how well the city had 
confronted the problems {as they see them). These attitudes, in turn, are 
transmitted with the private person when he/she assumes his/her public 
role as a member of the city cot.mcil. Individuals thus assume public of-
fice with_various policy preferences and perceptions concerning the future 
role of government. Now, although these personal preferences may be some-
what modified during the course of his/her interactions with other members 
of the council, each council ultimately develops a recognized policy orien-
tation agreeable to the greater proportion of councilmen. These "images" 
ultimately determine the types of policies pursued by the city.107 
Since previous research noted significant variations both between 
. 
states and between communities, first, in terms of the policies pursued 
by different states and communities, and, secondly, in terms of the degree 
of commitment exhibited b.Y policy-makers of different states and communities 
within substantive policy areas (as measured b.Y expenditure levels), the 
relationships uncovered b.Y Eulau and Prewitt are certainly important con-
tributions to the policy literature. This is especially evident when we 
take into consideration the great amount of variance left unexplained b.Y 
the economic and political system variables traditionally employed in de-
terminants research. Unfortunately, the independent effect of council-
manic attitudes on city policies is far from certain. This is so because 
the authors also found significant relationships between councilmanic 
l07 Ibid., especially Chapter 27, "Policy Maps: II. Images and 
Positions, "W:.549. 
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attitudes and characteristics of city populations and between population 
characteristics and policy decisions. Without testing the proposition 
that councilmanic attitudes independently affect city policies we cannot 
infer that political ideologies are, in fact, important policy determinants. 
However, in The Threads of Public Policy, Robert Eyestone systemat-
ically compared councilmanic attitudes, images, and ideologies with certain 
environmental variables (e.g., population density, growth rate, per capita 
expenditures, assessed property value, city size, tax rate, and revenues 
from property taxes, among others) to gauge their relative impact on pub-
lic policy •108 When councilmanic attitudes on .. development problems," 
nzoning problems," and "amenities improvements" are utilized in the same 
multiple regression problem on amenities with density, property value, 
city size, and growth xate, population density proves to be the best pre-
dieter of city policies. In fact, whereas population density explains 
72%, ;13%, and 72% of the variation in amenities expenditures in "Core 
Cities," "Suburbs," and "Fringe Cities," respectively, the combined total 
variance e:Jg>lained by councilmanic attitudes on zoning problems, develop-
ment problems, and amenities improvements for the three groups is 2.9%, 
8.1%, and 6.6%, respectively.109 Councilmanic attitudes regarding the 
"future role of government," on the other hand, were found to be independ-
ently related to planning expenditures in "Core Cities" and "Suburbs" 
108 Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy, especially, 
pp. 146-149, Tables 6-1 to 6-J. 
l09 Ibid., p. 146-147, esp., Table 6-1. The three elements of the 
urban realm typology are defined as follows: "Core Cities" - 'traditional 
core and preautomotive industrial cities, prairie cities and noncentric 
cities; "Suburbs" - railroad suburban cities and noncentric residential 
cities; and "Fringe Areas" -urbanizing cities and nonmetro cities" (p.133). 
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(explaining 12.3% and 46.0% of the total variance, respectively), and 
councilmanic attitudes on zoning problems were found to be independently 
related to planning expenditures in "Fringe Cities" (explaining 67 .• 6% 
of the total variance).110 
Although it can be argued that "councilmanic attitudes seldom stray 
far from the constraints placed upon them by the environment, ,lll it would 
appear that the policy preferences of decision-makers may very well be of 
determining influence on public policy. This is especially evident when 
we consider the fact that the constraints posed b,y limited economic re-
sources have been shown to diminish over time, thus making it possible for 
city policy-makers to increase their efforts in some substantive policy-
areas and to begin new activities in areas previously neglected. All other 
things being equal, policy-makers come to have greater latitude in choosing 
from among alternative policy areas and from among competing strategies of 
action. And, ultimately, the goals, perceptions, and policy positions of 
policy-makers play an integral role in the decision-making process. 
Whether or not councilmanic attitudes independently affect public 
policy is, of course, an empirical issue. And, although available evidence 
does not clearly demonstrate the independent impact of attitudes on policy 
decisions, it must be remembered that the San Francisco Bay region project 
(of which these studies were a part) was carried out during a limited time 
dimension: 1966-1967. Councilmanic attitudes were thus correlated with 
public policies and environmentaJ. conditions at a single point in time. 
110 Ibid., pp. 148-149; especially Table 6-2. 
111 Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 76. 
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No effort was made to measure the impact of changes over time. It cannot 
be denied that many attitudes are influenced by environmental conditions 
and that as the environment changes so do attitudes, but what is the re-
lationship between councilmanic attitudes and public policy when important 
environmental factors (such as the level of economic development) remain 
relatively static? What thus appears necessary are longitudinal, compara-
tive analyses of the relationship between the_goals, perceptions and policy 
orientations of policy-makers and public policy, and not research designs 
confined by a limited (two-year) time dimension. 
Even taking into consideration the possible shortcomings of the San 
Francisco Bay region project, the significance of its findings (by Eulau 
and Prewitt and by Eyestone, in particular), at least for our present pur-
pose, is the reported importance of the value orientations of policy-makers 
in detennining the form and content of public policy. They thus equally 
allude to the importance of understanding the linkages between power con-
figurations in American society and the types of policies pursued by de-
cision-makers. However true this may be, (as our analysis will suggest) 
studies of community power structures have not sufficiently distinguished 
between overt and implicit (covert) exercises of power, nor have they ade-
~uately analyzed the power relations which ensue after the initial formu-
lation of the policy. The major point of contention is that the growth 
and resources of bureaucracy (on all levels of government), and the power 
inherent in processes of policy implementation, have placed administrators 
and career bureaucrats in the limelight of. the policy process - a role 
greatly underestimated in contemporary policy research. This criticism 
applies to both the determinants research thus far considered, as well as 
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to community power studies - to which we now turn. 
CONCLUSION 
Within the past twenty-five years, social scientists, policy analysts, 
and publicists have shown a relentless interest in accounting for the sig-
nificant variations which purportedly exist in state and community policies. 
This research has progressed from the initial atheoretical efforts of a few 
economists - who operated without a clearly defined model of the policy 
process - to the complex multivariate designs of later economists, polit-
ical scientists, and sociologists. However, even when guided by useful 
models and previous research, most researchers have been constrained by the 
professional and ideological predispositions of their discipline, even 
though such disciplinary blinders have been shown to result in rather 
sterile and limited findings. Whereas economists have shown an inordinate 
inclination toward documenting the independent influence of economic vari-
ables on state and community policies, political scientists have been in-
clined toward political system characteristics and sociologists toward en-
viromnental and sociological factors in their analyses of variations in 
state and community policies. Each discipline has thus been concerned 
with demonstrating the determining influence of its disciplinary interests 
on the policy choices of decision-makers. 
However, when such disciplinary biases are controlled, it is evident 
that most researchers have reported the greater explanatory power of state 
and community economic conditions over that of political system variables 
in determining the policy activities of decision-makers. And, although 
6l 
some political process variables appear significant in at least some policy 
areas, their effect often appears to be a by-product of economic resources. 
Political scientists have, however, found at least some consolation in the 
knowledge that the goals, perceptions, and attitudes of policy-makers may 
very well be important determinants of such policy areas as development 
and amenities expenditures. Unfortunately, however, their independent ef-
fect is far from certain. 
It is equally difficult to gauge the ultimate significance of what 
we do know about policy variations among states and communities when we 
consider the fact that almost two-thirds of the variance is yet unexplained. 
This is not to suggest that the policy literature should be soundly crit-
icized for failing to explain all of the variance - indeed, to do so would 
be impossible without a research design employing an insurmountable number 
of factors, and even then the study would suffer from both theoretical and 
conceptual insignificance - but rather to suggest that researchers (espe-
cially political scientists) have failed to consider a number of variables 
which may have a significant and independent effect on governmental policies. 
For example, there is an extensive body of literature emphasizing 
the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy decisions are being 
made by public bureaucracies; and, yet, bureaucratic or organizational 
variables are grossly underrepresented (if not nonexistent) in most de-
tenn.inants research. Although a number of reasons may be suggested for 
this omission, it would seem that most omissions can be attributed to prob-
lems of cost and time, the inability to quantify all bureaucratic variables 
in the same manner as is done with per capita income, tax receipts, levels 
of federal aid, voter participation, party competition, and the number of 
state and local employees, as well as the researcher's unfamiliarity with 
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most areas being addressed. A1 though these factors all possess at least 
some merit, an even more significant reason for this neglect appears to 
be the t;aditionaJ. concerns of political scientists with the legislative 
and/or policy-making process. This has led to a disproportionate analy-
sis of fonnaJ. bodies of decision-making and a resultant neglect for the 
ways in which bureaucracies influence the policy process. 
Why this has occurred is not so easy to answer. In a preliminary 
fashion, however, let it be suggested that the once held politics-adminis-
tration distinction still appears to hold some persuasive power. According 
to this view, politics is the concern of elected public officiaJ.s who are 
entrusted with responsibility for formulating public policies, and proc-
esses of administration reside within the province of bureaucracies that 
implement those policy decisions. If this is so, bureaucracies do not de-
termine the policy decisions of state and communities - instead, they merely 
carry out those decisions. Quite elementary. Too elementary in fact. The 
rigid politics-administration distinction has long ago been eroded by the 
broad delegations of authority to bureaucracies which allow for administra-
tive decision-making. This being so, administrators now possess a degree 
of power in structuring the agendas and in defining the alternatives for 
elected officiaJ.s unrecorded by determinants research. Their influence 
has not been linked to policy decisions in determinants research by means 
of testable hypotheses. 
Of even greater importance is the fact that bureaucracies not only 
possess "advisory" significance, but do in fact ultimately determine what 
actually becomes of policy decisions as formulated by formal institutions 
of government. Thus, even if omitted in analyses of the determinants of 
63 
policy decisions, bureaucracies cannot be ignored in considerations of 
policy pe:rfomance - in studies of what did or did not take place after 
the policy was promulgated. 
This is not meant as a singular criticism directed at political 
scientists bent on analyzing the courses of action selected b,y decision-
makers, but also as a charge against organization theorists who at one 
time note the importance of bureaucracies and yet neglect to clearly spec-
ify what dimensions of administrative activity are important. Researchers 
are thus not only left illlguided, but recent detei.lllinants research is left 
unchallenged. Their research does not establish any reasonable guide for 
those responsible for formulating policies who must ensure the workability 
of their programs. 
Our point of contention is thus four-fold: (1) a great degree of 
variance left illlexplained by determinants research may be an artifact of 
the professional and ideological predispositions of researchers; (2) an 
even greater percentage of unexplained variance may be attributed to the 
neglect of the explanatory power of bureaucratic variables; (3) although 
interesting, b,y examining those factors hypothetically related to public 
policies, determinants research has thus far suffered from an inability 
to guide policy-makers through the complex maze of policy-making to the 
ultimate achievement of policy objectives; and (4) bureaucracies continue 
to be the unexplored variable in policy analysis. This last criticism 
applies equally well to studies of community power - to which we now turn. 
CHAPTER III 
THE STRUCTURE OF POL !TICAL POWER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
As the emphasis on public policy readily accentuates, the study of 
American politics involves an examination of how scarce resources within 
a community are distributed within the social system. The systematic anal-
ysis of policy outputs previously cited in Cnapter II give substantial 
credence to the general observation that not all people share equally in 
resource allocations, or in the decision-making process b,y which such 
allocations are made. Since the decisions b,y which allocations are made 
receive fo:rmulation in the political arena, we may wish to know what fac-
tors, if any, have a predominant influence on the fonn and content of 
policy responses to community needs; but, in so doing, care should be 
taken to examine the value orientations of individual decision-makers. 
If all decision-makers shared the same interests, reacted to similar pres-
sures, were held accountable b,y identical elements, received primacy sup-
port from the same sources, and supported a single conception of the role 
of government, then the question as to who makes policy would be largely 
irrelevant. However, this hardly being the case, one must give special 
consideration to the very structure of political power - for it is within 
the context of the exercise of power that politics takes place. 
Similarly evident in the literature of the policy process is the 
basic assumption that there exists in the community a particular power 
structure or structures that make decisions binding upon the public. There 
are, however, marked disagreements as to the specific actors and/or 
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institutions contained within a city's power structure. Equally evident 
is the fact that there does not exist a universally accepted conceptuali-
zation of the phenomenon of power, or a single method by which it is 
measured. This is unfortunate for the validity and reliability of re-
search endeavors is, at the very least, dependent upon the appropriate-
ness of the conceptualization and empirical operationalization of the 
concept being explored. Indeed, we contend that methodological and ideo-
logical differences account for the varying conclusions as to the location 
of community power. 
As a preliminary to our analysis of the literature of community 
power and of the relative power of public bureaucracies in processes of 
policy implementation, it is important that we have an appreciation for 
the ways in which "power" has been variously conceptualized and for the 
ways in which its location has been ascertained. To facilitate this ob-
1 jective, let us review the spectrum of definitions presently advanced. 
Goldhammer and Shils: A person has power "to the extent that he in-
fluences the behavior of others in accordance 
with his own intentions." 
1 
Weber: Power is the probability that one actor with-
in a social relationship will be in a position 
to carry out his own will, despite resistances, 
regardless of the basis on which this probabil-
ity rests. 
Bierstedt: Power is latent force. 
Dahl: ! has power over~ to the extent that he can 
get ~ to do something that he would not other-
wise do. 
As summarized by Paul E. Mott, "Power, Authority, and Influence," 
in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), The Structure of Community Power 
(New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 3-16; at p. 3. 
Blau: 
Lasswell and Kaplan: 
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Power is the ability of persons or groups to 
impose their will on others despite resistance 
through deterrence either in the form of with-
holding regularly supplied rewards or in the 
form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as 
well as the latter constitute, in effect, a 
negative sanction. 
Power is "participation in the making of de-
cisions. n2 
The one common element present in these definitions is the notion 
that power, to use G. David Garson's terminology, entails the exercise of 
command- as the ability to successfully impose one's will on others.3 
Does an individual, however, have to directly participate in the decision-
making process in order for one to say that he has power, as Lasswell and 
Kaplan suggest? In other words, what constitutes power and who possesses 
it? According to some, power is the possession of elected decision-makers, 
for others it signifies the possession of valued resources, while for others 
Every individual has his own q Ua.ntum of power - physical, persuasive, 
etc. - and every group has some measure of social power. Groups are 
centers of power. Some groups are centers of greater power than oth-
ers, depending on the number of people, the degree of their organiza-
tion, the relative level of their technology, the social value of re-
sources they control and the degree of their control of them, the 
transitiveness of their structural position, etc ••• 4 
2 Herbert Goldhammer and Edward Shils, "Types of Power and Status," 
American Journal of Sociology, 45 (Sept. 1939), 171-182; at p. 173; Max 
Weber, theory of Socia:! and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson 
and T. Parsons (New Yo±k: OXford Univ. Press, 1947), p. 152; Robert Bier-
stedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review, 15 
(Dec. 1950), 730-738; at p. 733; Robert A. Dahl, "Tfie Concept of Power," 
Behavioral Science, 2 (July 1957), 201-215; Peter M. Blau, Exchange and 
Power in Social Life (NY: Wiley, 1964), p. 117; H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, 
Power and SOc~ety (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 74. 
3 G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States (Lexing-
ton, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1977), p. 5. 
4 Paul E. Matt, "Power, Authority, and Influence," p. 8. For a 
similar analysis, see Carol A. Greenwald, Group Power (NY: Praeger, 1977). 
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Power is thus dependent upon a. number of factors or resources, any 
one of which alone ma.y not be sufficient to bring about the successful im-
position of one's will over that of others. Although the primary objective 
of this chapter is to indicate those resources and events which have func-
tioned to thrust the pu~ic bureaucracy into central prominence in the 
policy process, it is imperative that we first review a number of the most 
significant studies to date and delineate their methodological and ideolog-
ical assumptions and deficiencies. 
WHO GOVERNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY? 
Researchers interested in the nature of community power structures 
have been influenced b,y a body of literature which suggests that all soci-
eties are controlled b,y a small ruling class which reigns supreme over the 
nonruling ma.jority.5 For example, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, 
Gaetano Mosca asserted that: 
In all societies - from societies that are very meagerly developed 
and have barely attained the dawning of civilization, down to the 
most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people appear -
a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, al-
ways the less numerous performs all political functions, monopolizes 
power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, 
the more numerous class, is directed and controlled qy the first, in 
a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary 
and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with ma-
terial means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are 
essential to the vitality of the political organism.6 
5 For example, Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1935); Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1939); Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, The Comparative Study of 
Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19.52); C. Wright Mills, ~ 
Power Elite (New Yo:rk: Oxford, 19.56); Robert Michels, Political, Parties 
(New Yo:rk: Free Press, 1962; originally published in 1915). 
6 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 50· 
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And, in a similar fashion, a contemporary social scientist, Robert Lynd, 
has expressed the opinion that' 
It is the necessity in each society - if it is to be a society, not 
a rabble - to order the relations of men and their institutional ways 
of achieving needed ends ••• Organized power exists- always and every-
where, in societies large or small, primitive or modern - because it 
perfoms the necessary function of establishing and maintaining the 
version of order qy which a given society in a given time and place 
lives. 7 , 
This sentiment was once again echoed in no uncertain tems qy Harold Lass-
well and Daniel Lerner: "The discovery that in all large-scale societies 
the decisions at any time are typically in the hands of a small number of 
people," pays homage to a long-held belief: "Government is always govern-
S 
ment qy the few, whether in the name of the few, the one, or the many." 
Much of this elitist thinking was confirmed by Robert and Helen Lynd 
in their two studies of community power relations in "Middletown" (Muncie, 
Indiana).9 What they found was a monolithic power structure- one in which 
all facets of community life (religious, political, economic, and social.) 
were controlled by a single family. They further found that the source of 
this family's power rested upon their control of the economy through the 
labor ma.:z:ket and the extension of credit. The extent of this family's power 
is cryptically captured in the following comment by a Middletown man in 1935: 
If I'm out of work, I go to the X plant; if I need money I go to the 
X bank, and if they don't like me I don't get it; my children go to 
7 Robert Lynd, "Power in American Society, " in Authur Kornhauser 
(ed.), Problems of Power in American Society (Detroit: Wayne State Univer-
sity Press, 1957), pp. J-4. 
8 Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, The Comparative Study of 
Elites, p. 7. 
9 Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
1937); and Middletown in Transition (New Yo:rk: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937). 
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the X college; when I get sick I go to the X hospital.; I buy a 
building lot or house in the X subdivision; my wife goes down-
town to buy X milk; I drink X beer, vote for X political parties, 
and get help from X charities; my boy goes to the X YMCA and my 
girl to their YWCA; I listen to the Word of God in a X subsi-
dized church; if I'm a Mason, I go to the X Masonic temple; I read 
the news from the X mornin~ papers; and, if I'm rich enough, I 
travel via the X airport.l 
Unfortunately, however, the Lynds did not specify the methods by which 
the "X" family was identified as the center of Middletown's political 
arena. Thus they did not provide a specific methodology through which 
future studies could find direction, nor did they provide a sufficient ac-
count of the indicators used as their measures of community power. 
Lloyd W. Warner undertook a similar analysis of the power structure 
of Morris, Illinois (which he called Jonesville) in the 1940s and encoun-
tered a monolithic structure paralleling that documented by the Lynds.in 
Muncie •11 These findings were confirmed by August B. Hollingshead in his 
1949 analysis of the S8llle town (which he preferred to call Elmtown) •12 
.In brief, as these early studies report, the elitist interpretation 
of American politics contends that it is the few who have power in society, 
and that it is the preferences and values of the few that determine the 
nature of public policy.13 The following ideas are contained in elitist 
thinking about community power: 
1. Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who 
do not. Only a small number of persons allocate values for society; 
10 Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown in Transition, p. 74. 
11 Lloyd W. Warner, et. al., Democracy in Jonesville (New York: 
Harper, 1949) • 
12 August B. Hollingshead, Elmtpwn's Iouth (NY: Wiley and Sons, 1949). 
l3 Elite theory is explained at length in Thomas R. Dye and Harmon 
Zeigler, The Iron~ of Democracy, 3rd Ed. (Belmont, Calif:. Wadsworth, 1975). 
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the masses do not decide public policy. 
2. The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are gov-
erned. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socio-
economic strata of society. 
J. The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and 
continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only non-
elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted 
to governing circles. 
4. Elites share consensus in behalf of the basic values of the 
social system and the preservation of the system. In America, the 
bases of elite consensus are the sanctity of private property, lim-
ited government, and individual liberty. 
5. Public policy does not reflect demands of masses but rather the 
prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be 
incremental rather than revolutionary. 
6. Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence 
from apathetic ~sses. Elites influence masses more than masses in-
fluence elites.l 
The contention that only a small proportion of the population ever 
attains a position in society whereb,y political power may be exercised is 
particularly unsettling in a democratic society which professes an un-
wavering attachment to mass participation in the governmental process. 
Whereas elitism contends that the masses have but an indirect influence 
over the decision-making behavior of elites, an alternative perspective -
often labeled "pluralism" -maintains that although it is undoubtedly true 
that an elite few, rather than the masses, directly govern the affairs in 
America, the essentially democratic character of American society is pre-
served through a number of alternative channels: 
1. While individuals do not participate directly in decision-making, 
they can join organized groups and make their influence felt through 
14 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, )rd Ed., p. 26. 
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group participation. 
2. There is competition between leadership groups that help pro-
tect the individual - countervailing centers of power, which check 
each other and guard against abuse of power. 
). Individuals can choose between competing groups in elections. 
4. Leadership groups are not closed; new groups can be fonned and 
gain access to the political system. 
5. There are multiple leadership groups in society - "polyarchy." 
Leaders who exercise power over some kinds of decisions do not nec-
essarily exercise power over other kinds of decisions. 
6. Public policy may not be majority preference, but it is the rough 
equilibri1.ml of group influence and therefore a reasonable approxima-
tion of societyis preferences.15 
As outlined above, modern pluralism does not refer to a commitment 
to "pure democracy" in the Aristotelian sense involving direct participa-
tion by citizens in decision-making. Rather, the modern pluralist is con-
scious of the impracticality of renewing the town-meeting type of pure de-
mocracy in a highly urbanized and industrialized society. It is also rec-
ognized that American society has witnessed a great rise in giant industrial, 
financial, and commercial organizations which pose a threat to individual· 
liberty. At the same time, however, it is hoped that various "counter-
vailing" centers of power will help diminish the net power of corporations 
and safeguard the interests of the individual. Competition among business, 
labor, and government, the fragmentation of authority, the fluidity of cit-
izens in organized activity, the influence of elected public officials, pub-
lie opinion, and periodic elections are all perceived by pluralists as im-
portant detenninants of public policy and as checks on the dominant economic 
l5 Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America: Institutional Leadership 
in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1976), p. 10. 
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interests. 
Pluralists thus contend that no single interest or group dominates 
the life of a community. Rather, "different small groups or interested 
and active citizens in different issue-areas with some overlap, if any, 
by public officials, and occasional intervention by a larger number of 
people at the polls, " rules in the community •16 Although elected public 
officials hold formal positions of power in the community, actual leader-
ship includes those interested individuals and groups that concentrate 
their efforts on one or two issue-areas. Community power is thus fluid -
changing hands in accordance with .the issue being considered. 
As is readily apparent, the elitist and pluralist schools of thought 
contain quite divergent assumptions concerning politics and power in Ameri-
can society. Even more perplexing is the fact that there exists varying 
\ descriptions of who the power-holders really are even within each perspec-
tive. Thus, we are informed by some that power is held by "the power elite," 
or by "the ruling class," or by "economic notables," or by "elected deci-
sion-makers," or by "the liberal establishment," or by "the mili ta.ry-in-
dustrial complex," or by "those of reputation." And there are those who 
contend that power is not an attribute of individuals, but of institutions 
and organized interests. Further, just as there are a multi tude of inter-
ests in society there are an equal number of power-holders. 
Now, however interesting such notions may be, they are further proof 
of the literature's inability to arrive at a systematic definition of who 
16 Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa, New Jersey: 
Bedminster Press, 1964), p. 8. 
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the power-holders are, how they can be identified, how they came to power, 
and how their power is ultimately exercised or neglected. Herbert Kaufman 
and Victor Jones have credited the very elusiveness of the concept for this 
development: 
There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost 
ghostly qu.a.li ty. It seems to be all around us, yet this is "sensed" 
with some sixth means of reception rather than with the. five ordin-
ary senses. We "know" what it is, yet we encounter endless diffi-
culties in trying to define it. We can "tell" whether one person 
or group is more powerful than another, yet we cannot me~ure power. 
It is as abstract as time yet as real as a firing squad. 7 
An even more graphic reason for the present state of confusion, how-
ever, lies in the fact that not only do these perspectives differ in terms 
of conceptual and theoretical underpinnings and in terms of preferred re-
search strategies and methodologies, but that such differences have been 
elevated to the point of becoming ideological in nature.18 The implica-
tions of each school are at such great odds with those of the other that 
research very often appears to be carried out more for the sake of defend-
ing a particular point of view than for purposes of scholarship and the pur-
suit of new knowledge. Thus, after having examined this literature and the 
recent attacks and counterattacks among proponents of each school, Thomas 
J. Anton observed that "the point has now been reached where studies are no 
longer undertaken to 'discover' and 'understand' the nature of political 
systems; they are undertaken to 'disprove' another man's theories, not in 
17 Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public 
Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), p. 205; quoted in Thomas R. Dye, 
Who' s Running Amer1.ca, p. 11. 
lB Stephen P. Hencley, "The Study of Community Politics and Power," 
in Marilyn Gi ttell and Alan G. Hevesi ( eds.), The Politics of Urban Educa-
tion (New York: Praeger, 1969), 21-34; at p. 21. 
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a scientific sense, but in an ideological and political sense."19 
The fact that each school differentially defines power and employs 
rather conflicting strategies in locating its source brings into question 
what must occur for one to say that power exists at any particular time and 
place. The definitions of power previously cited emphasize those situations 
in which there exists a confrontation between power-holder a:nd person in-
fluenced; whereby the former compels the latter to behave in some manner 
he would not otherwise behave, and that to successfully control the activ-
ities of others the power-holder may activate his control of both positive 
and negative reinforcement schedules. Power relations of this sort are 
overt and thus directly observable. 
However, there are power relations of the implicit variety in which 
there does not exist a direct confrontation between power-holder and person 
influenced. Altmugh the overt exercise of power may be observed when one 
individual compels another to do something he would not otherwise do, what 
do we make of those instances when the party influenced freely cooperates 
with the will of the power holder? Individuals may very well comply with 
the will of others simply because they have been more or less indoctrinated 
to either desire or accept the norms, goals, and ideals of the power-holder. 
When power is viewed as the "production of intended effects," 20 both cate-
gories of relations would involve a power-holder and a follower. Thus, as 
19 
Thomas J. Anton, "Rejoinder," Administrative Science Quarterly, 
8 (September, 1963), p. 268; quoted in Hencley, The Study of Community Pol-
itics and Power, p. 21; also, see: T. J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and LOcal 
Politics," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (March, 1963), 425-457. 
20 
Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1938), p. 35. 
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G. David Garson apUy noted, " ••• there is no clear line between overt 
power (in which the one influenced does what he or she would not otherwise 
do) and implicit power (in which the will of the power-holder is fulfilled 
because the one influenced has been indoctrinated, trained, or socialized 
to desire or accept the same goals as the power-holder) • "21 This being 
so, power may be present even though it is not overUy exercised. Indeed, 
it can be argued that the full weight of power is wielded and felt when it 
no longer needs to be overUy exercised because "the socialization into 
obedience is complete. "22 
Unlike overt power relations, which some contend can be studied di-
rectly through a decision-making approach (which seeks to locate the par-
ties actively engaged in formulating public policies and who thus exercise 
a degree of power within the social system), the study of implicit power 
relies upon indirect measurements of power relations. Indirect measures, 
it is argued, tap the net effect of both overt and implicit power relations, 
reflects the effect of power over a multitude of decisions and social in-
teractions, considers the exercise of power in the private sector, and, in 
sum, locates the "power behind the scenes." Further, it rests on the as-
sumption that power-holders can be identified by (1) their reputations, and 
by (2) their institutional positions within the social, political, and eco-
nomic systems. 
As will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, these three 
approaches differ not only methodologically, but ideologically as well. 
21 
22 
G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States, p. 9. 
Ibid., p. 9. 
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Similarly, each approach em"ba.:rks upon its own "self -fulfilling prophecy." 
That is, each school (1) begins with the assumption that an identifiable 
power structure (or structures) exists in American society, (2) defines 
the specific configuration of the structure(s), and (3) establishes a 
methodology for identifying the power-holders consistent with its theo-
retical undeJ:l>innings. It will be noted that those who perceive an elitist 
power structure in American society employ a methodological strategy nat-
urally biased toward their theoretical commitments. Methodologically, 
this noma.lly consists of indirect measures of power relations. Likewise, 
those ideologically committed to democratic pluralism utilize research 
strategies which are methodologically biased toward finding multiple power 
sources. This normally consists of identifying those elected decision-
makers and interested individuals and groups with at least some voice in 
decision-making. 
Tb this end, the sections which follow will look first at two per-
spectives and methodologies supportive of the elitist interpretation of 
politics and power in the United States (the reputational and the insti tu-
tional) and one which finds evidence favoring democratic pluralism (the 
"power as decision-making" approach). The ultimate objective is to demon-
strate how all such strategies are not only ideologically and methodolog-
ically biased but how each fails to analyze significant power relations in 
the governmental system. Especially evident is their failure to arrive at 
a measure of bureaucra. tic influence. 
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A. The Elitist Perspective 
1. The Positional Approach 
Prior to 195J and the publication of Floyd Hunter's Community Power 
Structure, 23 the positional approach was the most widely used technique 
for identifying community power-holders. 24 In essence, when.employing 
this approach, researchers assume that those making key decisions direct-
ly or indirectly affecting the lives of most community residents are per-
sons occupying important offices or positions in the community; elected 
political leaders, business executives, higher civil servants, officials 
of voluntary associations, heads of religious groups, leaders of labor 
unions, and others in positions of social prominence are all perceived 
as holders of some degree of power in community political affairs. Meth-
odologically, the typical procedure has been to gather extensive lists 
of fonnaJ. positions of office, assign numerical values to each position 
(as a weighted value of the degree of authority possessed b,y each), assign 
the names of individuals holding each position, and compute the sum power 
score of each individual representing the number of times his or her name 
appears on the list and the level of authority of each position. Top 
1953). 
24 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of N. Carolina Press, 
Though Hunter's research added a new spaik to the power literature, 
positional assumptions have continued to receive extensive investigation. 
For example, see: Robert 0. Schulze and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The Deter-
minants of Local Power Elites," American Journal of Sociology, 63 (Nov. 
1957), 290-296; Charles Freeman and Selz C. Mayo, "Decision Makers in Rural 
Community Action," §ocial forc~s, 35 (May, 1957), 319-322; Robert 0. 
Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structures," 
American Sociological Review, 23 (Feb., 19~), J-9; M. Kent Jennings, "Pub-
lic Administrators and Community Decision-Making," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), No. 1, 18-43; and Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running 
America: Institutional Leadership in the ·United States, passim. 
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leaders are then assumed to be those with the highest scores. 
The institutional basis of power stems from the conviction that power 
is not an individual act, but rather the potential for control in any soci-
ety that is obtained by occupying various roles in the social system. In 
this sense, power is viewed as a particular relationship between two or 
more persons in which one perceives the other as possessing the potential 
for exercising some control over his conduct. Thus one individual has 
power only to the extent that he has the capacity to effect his will on 
others, including the further requirement that such a capacity is perceived 
by others as a real possibility. 
"Institutionalists" thus propose that, within any social system, power 
is simply the capacity of persons occupying certain roles to make decisions 
affecting the lives of others. Accordingly, Robert 0. Schultze has reasoned 
that: 
••• a few have emphasized that act as such rather than the potential 
to act is the crucial aspect or-pQwer.--rt seems far more soc~olog­
ically sound to accept a Weberian definition which stresses the po-
tential to act. Power may thus be conceived as an inherently-linked 
property, an attribute of social statuses rather than of individual 
persons. • • Accordingly, power will denote the capa.ci ty or pgtential 
of persons in certain statuses to set conditions, make decisions, 
andlor take actions which are dete~native for the existence of 
others within a given social system. 5 
Now, it is one thing to say that power-holders are those occupying 
certain roles and enjoying a certain status in the social system and quite 
another to specify the types of roles and statuses conducive to the exer-
cise of power. Everyone occupies some type of role in society and each 
25 Robert 0. Schultze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite 
City," in Morris Janowitz, ed. , Connnuni ty Political Systems (Glencoe: Free 
Press, 1961), 19-80; at p. 20. 
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person has a certain status relative to the rest of the community, but not 
everyone is in a position to make decisions affecting the lives of others. 
For these reasons, institutionalists contend that power is an attribute of 
social organizations, and that power-holders are those individuals occupy-
ing positions of authority in society's large institutions. And, although 
not all power is institutionalized in the manner we have come to regard 
the actions of such institutions as Congress, the Presidency, labor unions, 
civic associations, religious organizations, private clubs, and the like, 
C. Wright Mills has informed us that the truly significant power-roles are 
found only in institutional positions. 
No one ••• can be truly powerful unless he has access to the com-
mand of major institutions, for it is over these institutional 
means of ~wer that the truly powerful are, in the first instance, 
powerful. 
And, as Mills furthered reasoned, it is the position itself which makes a 
man powerful, not any personal quality, ability or motivational character-
istic of the individual; remove the person from the position and his power 
is lost: 
If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one 
hundred wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from 
the institutional positions they now occupy, away from their re-
sources of men and women and money, away from the media of mass 
communication ••• then they would be powerless and poor and uncele-
bra.ted. For power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the 
person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any person-
ality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power, requires 
access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men 
occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold 
these valued experiences.2r 
In support of this perspective for understanding community power, 
26 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), p. 9. 
27 Mills, The Power Elite, p. 9. 
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and recognizing that institutional leadership is as inherent in the corpor-
ate and public interest sectors as it is in the gover~ental sector, Thomas 
R. Dye has proposed three separate indicators of national power-holders. 28 
Operationally, elites representing each of the sectors are defined as fol-
lows: 
Corporate Sector: those individuals who occupy formal posi-
tions of authority in institutions that 
control over half of the nation's corpor-
ate assets. 
Public Interest Sector: those individuals who occupy formal posi-
tions of authority in the mass media, the 
prestigious law firms, the major philan-
thropic foundations, the leading universi-
ties, and the recognized national civic and 
cultural organizations. 
Governmental Sector: those individuals who occupy formal posi-
tions of authority in the major civilian 
and militar:Y bureaucracies of the national 
government. Z9 • 
An across-the-board analysis of institutional leadership in both the 
private and public sector examines potential sources of power within the 
whole of the social system. Dye's three-tier operationalization of power 
thus presents a more theoretically interesting and valid conceptualization 
than that of earlier studies which focused primarily on governmental struc-
tures. Researchers employing the institutional approach thus start with 
the basic assumption that key decisions affecting the lives of community 
residents are made by persons in positions of authority outside the formal 
political structure. 
Strict adherence to the institutional approach is not without its 
28 
Thomas R. Dye, Who's Rurmi America? Institutional Leadershi 
in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, ew Jersey, 19 
29 
Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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critics. First, efforts to operationa.lize a concept as elusive as an 
insti tutiona.l elite have generated discussions "over the inclusion or 
exclusion of specific actors, institutions, or positions • .,30 The selec-
tion of units and elements of analysis often appear to be detennined by 
the availability of data, apriori reasoning concerning the link between 
institutional leadership and community decision-making, and subjective 
judgments about the importance of some institutions, positions, and sec-
tors over that of others. Secondly, the validity and utility of the posi-
tional approach has been criticized because of the variation in tenninology 
employed by different associations in designating similar offices.31 In 
order to generalize their findings across institutional boundaries re-
searchers must concentrate on the responsibUi ties of each member of the 
organization, rather than on the specific ti Ues given to top ranking mem-
bers. When such is the case, misclassification becomes a real possibility. 
And, thirdly, when the relationship between institutional leadership and 
decision-making is tested as a hypothesis, rather than treated as an 
apriqri assumption, research findings to date are at best inconclusive.32 
Whereas some studies appear to support the relationship, others contradict 
it. For these reasons, the institutional approach works best when used in 
30 Dye, Who's Running America, p. 13. 
3l James E. White, "Theory and Method for Research in Community 
Leadership," American Sociological Review, 15 (February, 1950), 50-6o. 
32 Support for the relationship is offered by James E. White, .2.£!. 
_ill; Robert A. Iahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1901); 
Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 196o) • Clearly contradicting this theory is Charles 
M. Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement," 
American Journal of Sociology, 68 (May, 1963), 672-681; Robert Presthus, 
Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964). 
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conjunction with the approaches discussed below. 
For example, whereas the institutional approach concentrates on a 
person's capacity to exercise power because of the institutional position 
he or she occupies in the private or public sector of society, another 
approach, often termed the "sociology of leadership" approach, focuses 
instead on the social status of institutional leaders. A1 though both ap-
proaches start with assumptions relating position and power, the former 
concerns itself with the institutional position itself, while the latter 
concerns itself with the socioeconomic status of governing officials. 
Each, however, supports an elitist interpretation of politics and power 
in American communi ties. 
Underlying the sociology of leadership approach is the assumption 
that the overt and implicit aspects of power can both best be indicated 
by the manner in which top office-holders are relatively concentrated or 
dispersed within institutional arrangements on the basis of social class. 
If power is concentrated in the hands of the upper class, as indicated by 
the number of socioeconomic notables within the political institutior~ 
framework, then the distribution of power may be viewed as elitist. If, 
however, no such relationship is found between official governmental posi-
tion and social class, then the power distribution more closely follows 
the pluralist model. Thus the precise configuration of power structures 
is determined by the social characteristics of decision-makers. 
Although the ordinary citizen would most likely suggest that American 
politics in general and his city's political structure in particular is 
fully dominated by upper-class influentials, such opinions may result from 
a perception of an inequitable distribution of government benefits to a 
8J 
minority of citizens or from a belief in the numerical superiority of pub-
lie officiaJ..s from the upper socioeconomic strata. The sociology of leader-
ship approach, as an indirect measure of the location of political power 
in American society, seeks to find empirical support for its theoretical 
(if not ideological) commitments by first identifying the members of the 
upper class, and, secondly, by locating their positions in the political, 
economic, and social hierarchy. 
A1 though various studies by David Stanley, Dean Mann, and .Jameson 
Doig, JJ Thomas R. Dye, 34 and Robert PresthusJ5 have shown that it is the 
upper-middle, as opposed to the upper, class that is disproportionately 
represented in the formal positions of government, the institutional struc-
ture is nonetheless unrepresentative of American society at large. In ad-
dition, though these studies took some of the spaxk out of the elitist 
contention that upper class persons fully dominate the American political 
system, researchers have still been able to use a hybrid of the sociology 
of leadership approach to support the elitist argument. This is most evi-
dent when researchers focus not on the social position of those holding 
political office, but on the relationship between class origin and polit-
ical recruiting patterns. C. Wright Mills, for example, has questioned 
the validity of the traditional image of the political career pattern 
which maintains that top governing officials begin their political careers 
on the local level and proceed through a number of inte~ediate positions 
JJ Men Wh9 Govern (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967), pp. 78-79. 
J4 Dye, Who's Running America, op. cit. 
35 Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974). 
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before obtaining national-level leadership • .36 Instead, Mills found that 
top leaders ordinarily surface from business and upper-class backgrounds. 
In fact, of the top fifty governmental leaders (president, vice-president, 
cabinet members, major agency heads, and top presidential advisers) during 
the -Eisenhower administration, only 6 percent were professional politi-
cians.37 Of the remainder, clearly 75 percent of the political outsiders 
were linked with the corporate sector.38 Elitists interpreted such find-
ings as undisputable evidence of the relationship between social class and 
the degree to which one shares in the distribution of political power. 
Thus the higher the social class, the greater is one's ability to share 
in and influence the making of governmental decisions. 
This oft-cited link between social class and political power is not, 
however, without its detra.ctors.J9 It may be suggested that the sociology 
of leadership approach is too indirect an indica tor of power. Does it real-
ly make a difference if uppe~class persons hold a disproportionate number 
of social, economic, and political leadership positions in terms of the 
policy activities of local or national decision-makers? Although top lead-
ers may be unrepresentative of the class structure of American society, 
they may nonetheless formulate policies on the basis of societal needs, 
rather than on the basis of personal attributes and preferences. Noting 
the inherent limitations of an approach he himself has practiced, c. Wright 
36 Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
37 ~., p. 232. 
38 ~-
39 For example, see: John Mollenkopf, "Theories of the State and 
Power Structure Research," The Insurgent Sociologist, 5 (Spring, 197 5), 
245-264. 
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Mills has set forth with clarity the following precaution: 
We cannot infer the direction of policy merely from the sociaJ. ori-
gins and careers of the policy-makers. The social and economic 
backgrounds of the men of power do not tell us all that we need to 
know in order to understand the distribution of social power. For: 
(1) Men from high places may be ideological representatives of the 
poor and hmnble. (2) Men of humble origin, brightly self-made, may 
energetically serve the most vested and inherited interests. More-
over, (3) not all men who effectively represent the interests of a 
stra. tum need in any way belong to it. 
For the most important set of facts about a circle of men is the 
criteria of admission, of praise, of honor, of promotion that pre-
vails among them; if these are similar within a circle, then they 
will tend as personalities to become similar. The circles that com-
pose the power elite do tend to have such codes and criteria in com-
mon. The co-optation of the social types to which these common val-
ues lead is often more important than ~y statistic of common origin 
and career that we might have at hand. 
Thus, although the sociology of leadership approach sets forth evi-
dence supportive of an elite theory of American politics, even practicing 
proponents of this view (such as Mills) note the qualifications one must 
be willing to make when social class is found to be related to decision-
making roles. Even if it is true that top institutional positions are oc-
cupied by upper-class individuals, it cannot be inferred that the activities 
of these institutions are class biased. In order to do so, it must be fur-
ther shown that (1) public policy favors the upper-class minority, (2) class 
is determinative of political beliefs and practices, and that (J) other 
decision-makers are co-opted by upper-class influentials. The sociology of 
leadership approach does not provide evidence completely supporting any of 
th 't' 41 ese propos1 1ons. 
Finally, the sociology of leadership approach fails to adequately 
40 Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 280-281. 
41 These criticisms are cryptically discussed in G. David Garson, 
Power and Politics in the United States, p. 170. 
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document an elite theory of American politics primarily because, although 
numerous, upper-class influentials are a minority of top decision-makers. 
Much more numerous are those upper-middle and middle-class professionals 
(lawyers, administrators, career bureaucrats, and professional politicians) 
who may or may not be co-opted or socialized representatives of a. social or 
economic elite. This is however an empirical question in need of systematic 
analysis of how problems are perceived and defined, the manner in which 
certain issues reach the policy agenda, who is involved in formulating the 
policy response to the problem, what policy objectives are ultimately estab-
lished, what individual or body of individuals are assigned the responsibil-
i ty of program implementation, and how does the consequences of their a.cti v-
ities square with that intended by the policy-makers? 
Although socioeconomic notables have a greater likelihood of attaining 
top levels of decision-making than any other class of individuals, (thereb,y 
placing them in potentially powerful roles) this alone does not infer that 
they are, in fact, the truly powerful. Thus, Floyd Hunter, for one, has 
prOposed an alternative methodological approach focusing not on institu-
tional positions or social backgrounds, but rather on the reputations certain 
persons acquire for having the capability of exercising control over the 
policy process. 42 Although Hunter has come to conclusions consistent with 
elitist interpretations of the institutional and sociology of leadership 
approaches, the theoretical and methodological components of his reputa-
tional model have generated such debate between the elitist and pluralist 
schools of thought that it warrants a. significantly more in-depth analysis. 
42 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953). 
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2. The Reputa tiona.l Approach 
Like so many other professionals and policy analysts in the late 
1940's and early 1950's who had become greatly concerned with both the 
inability of policy-makers to develop workable programs of civic improve-
ment and with the great influx of "nonpolitical experts" in the decision-
making process, Floyd Hunter began to reflect upon the much debated ques-
tion: "who really runs our cities?" Recognizing the inability of tra.di-
tional investigations of formal institutions and agencies of local govern-
ment to account for the growing influence of political outsiders on policy 
decisions affecting the lives of community residents, Hunter sought some 
means by which the "power behind the scenes" could be identified. A1 though 
other researchers used a similar technique to study positions of status, 43 
Hunter was the first to use the reputational approach in a study of com-
muni ty power. His analysis in turn did much to popularize the elite theory 
of American politics. 
Defining power as a word "used to describe the acts of men going 
about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves 
or in relation to organic or inorganic things," and as "the ability of men 
to command the services of other men," Hunter proceeded to identify those 
roles that were both salient and centrally involved in determining the policy 
activities of "Regional City" (Atlanta, Geo:rgia). 44 Starting with the as-
sumption that the affairs of every city are in some way managed by a select 
43 For example: August B. Hollingshead, Elmtown's Youth (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1949); and Lloyd W. Warner, et. al., .Q12· .ill· 
44 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, pp. 2, 4. 
88 
few who are perceived ~ others as capable of exercising power either 
directly or indirectly within the community, Hunter hypothesized that 
such individuals must eventually acquire a reputation for power. One's 
reputation thus becomes the identifying factor. 
Although this approach has several variations, essentially it con-
sists of asking certain informants to name and rank the powe~holders in 
their community. 45 The informants may be a.n expert panel or a random sam-
ple of community residents, or they may be selected ~ what is referred 
to a.s the "snowbaJ.l" technique. The final list of reputed powe~holders 
then consists of those persons receiving the greatest number of nominations 
or of all persons whose average ranking exceeds an arbitrarily set limit. 
Methodologically, Hunter took it as axiomatic that "community life 
is organized life, and that persons occupying 'offices' and public posi-
tions of trust would be involved in some manner in the power relations of 
the community. "46 Thus ~ interviewing the top leaders in major organize.-
tions Hunter was able to formulate a preliminary sketch of institution-
alized power relations. However, since this preliminary sketch neglected 
the influence of persons outside the normal organizational chain of com-
mand, Hunter sought a. comprehensive list of reputed civic, governmental, 
business, and status leaders in Regional City. For this purpose, preliminary 
lists were provided ~ the Community Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the 
League of Women voters, newspaper editors, and civic leaders. The Community 
45 For a sample of studies that have employed the reputa.tional ap-
proach exclusively or in combination with another approach, see: Hunter, 
Community Power Structure; Schulze and Blumberg, ~· _ill.; M. Kent Jennings, 
..2.12 • ~ ; Freeman and Mayo, o..:e.: _ill. 
Hunter, Community Power Structure, p. 263. 
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Council provided preliminary lists of leaders in community affairs. The 
Chamber of Commerce provided lists of business leaders of establishments 
employing more than 500 employees and of financial houses doing the largest 
volume of clearances. The League of Women Voters provided a list of local 
political officials with at least major governmental committee chairman-
ship status. And newspaper editors and other civic leaders provided in-
formation about society leaders and leaders of wealth. 47 In all, 175 
potential leaders were identified by three preliminary lists. 
In order to reduce the four preliminary lists to the top leaders in 
each area, fourteen judges were employed to rank order the top ten leaders 
in each category. And, finally, a prepared interview schedule was admin-
istered to the twenty-three consenting persons of the list of forty. 48 One 
of the objectives of the interviewing was to elicit from the 40 reputed 
power-holders a final list of those persons (who may or may not have been 
included in the list of 40) they perceived to be the true leaders in the 
community. 
Of the final list of 40, it was disclosed that eleven served in 
top positions of private enterprise (such as owners, chairmen of the board, 
or presidents in large commercial centers) , seven in banking and investment 
finns, and five in industrial companies. Hunter thus concluded that "the 
dominant factor in political life is the personnel of economic interests." 
And that, in fact, governmental departments are essentially subservient to 
the combined interests of economic elites. 
47 Hunter, Community Power Structure, especially pp. 262-271. 
48 The properties of this schedule are presented in Hunter, £P.• cit., 
pp. 262-271. ---
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It is true that there is no formal tie between the economic inter-
ests and government, but the structure of policy-determining com-
mittees and their tie-in with the other powerful institutions and 
o:rganiza tions of the community make government subservient to the 
interests of these combined groups. The governmental departments 
and their personnel are acutely aware of the power of key individ-
uals and combinations of citizens' groups in the policy-making 
realm, and they are loathe to act before consulting and "clearing" 
with these interests • 
• • • The structure is that of a dominant policy-making g:roup 
using the machinery of,government as a bureaucracy for the attain-
ment of certain goals.~ 
These are men and women of "dominance, prestige and influence," the deci-
sion-ma.kers for the total community, "able to enforce their decisions by 
persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, force. ,50 
By examining the impression knowledgeable people have about the 
power-holders in their community, the reputational approach seeks to un-
cover what many refer to as the "power behind the scenes." That is, it 
is designed to identify those individuals exercising power who are not 
visible within the institutional and social class perspectives. However, 
like the institutional and sociology of leadership approaches, Hunter's 
preferred methodology starts with the assumption that a certain elite dom-
inates the total life of the community and then constructs a procedure 
for identifying such persons methodologically biased toward "proving" the 
initial assumption. And even if one accepts his dictum that institutions 
and formal associations play a "vi tal role in the execution of determined 
policy," but that the "fomulation of policy often takes place outside 
these formalized groupings, ,51 Hunter's methodology does not allow him to 
49 Ibid., p. 102. 
50 ~., p. 24. 
51 ~·· p. 82. 
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infer any more than that those persons outside institutions and foDmal 
associations are perceived by others as "powerful." Leadership and the 
reputation for leadership may not at all times be synonymous. 
Because this method of inquiry tends to support the belief that 
elected representatives are dominated by the interests of an economic 
superstructure, it runs counter to the traditional democratic pluralist 
ideology. In brief, pluralists have questioned the validity of the repu-
tational method on five specific points. 
First, in employing the reputational methodology, Hunter takes for 
granted precisely what he should have set out to prove, namely: Regional 
City exhibits a monolithic power structure. By asking people "what per-
sons dominate community affairs," "what are these people like," and "what 
contacts do they have with each other," Hunter assumes that his initial 
assumption of a ruling elite had already been established. This practice 
predetermined his findings and subsequent conclusions.52 
Second, there is no assurance that persons will be nominated because 
of their reputation for power, rather than for their publicized status in 
the community. There is no reason to suppose that power figures and status 
figures are one and the same. 
Third, since ordinary citizens are usually ill-equipped to speak with 
complete knowledge about actual power systems in communities, their re-
sponses are problematic and may not represent "anything more than a report 
52 Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public 
Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), No. ), 20.5-212; and Robert A. 
Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science 
Review, 52 (June, 19_58), 46)-469. 
53 Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model;" and Raymond E. 
Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," Amer-
ican Sociological ~yiew, 25 (December, 1960), 636-644. 
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of public opinion on politics."54 The relationship between perceptions 
and actual. behavior must be empirically detennined, rather than presumed. 
Fourth, even if we could reasonably assume a high correlation between 
power and the reputation for power per se, the reputational approach may 
not reliably identify leaders because of (1) the unreliability of respond-
ents, (2) vaxying conceptions of power held b,y the interviewer and re-
spondent, and (J) the discretion accorded the researcher in establishing 
the manner in which final rankings are tabulated and divided into power 
and non-power holders. If the cut off point is set too high, many leaders 
may be omitted. And if set too low, the final rank-ordered list may in-
clude followers as well as leaders.55 
Fifth, b,y failing to "specify scopes in soliciting reputations for 
influence," reputational researchers "assume that the power of their leader-
nominees is equal for all issues •.. 56 This is, however, an empirical ques-
tion which demands that analysts carefully examine a series of concrete 
decisions and note (1) the actors involved in the decision-making process, 
(2) the interactions among actors,. and (3) the constancy of participation 
across issue boundaries. 51 
Thus, although the reputational approach may identify a group that 
possesses a high potential for control, a major contention of pluralists 
is that it does not distinguish potential from actual power relations. To 
54 Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community 
Power," p. 642. 
55 Bonjean and Olson, .212· cit., at p. 205. For a discussion of 
each of these criticisms see Wolfinger, ..2J2• cit. 
56 Nelson W. Polsb,y, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Power," 
American Political Science Review, 24 (December, 1959), 796-803; at p. 797. 
51 See Part B: The Pluralist Perspective - discussed at length below. 
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do so requires that researchers concentrate on the manner in which coaJ.i-
tions are formed and decisions actually made in the policy environment. 
And finally, to the criticisms advanced b,y pluralists, students of 
public administration have been quick to note that the reputational ap-
proach has seriously underestimated the role played by the bureaucratic 
substructure.58 In particular, they have objected to Hunter's assertion 
that once consensus is reached among the ruling elite concerning the di-
rection of community activities, the struggle for control of policy de-
velopment is complete. Hunter thus mistakenly assumes that once programs 
are established and passed along to administrators, what follows is a 
simple process of abiding b,y directions. However, our major point of con-
tention is that the power to implement policy is the power to make, or 
otherwise modi.fy, policy. One can further argue that since the innovating 
ideas for many social welfare programs and community improvement projects 
come from experts in national, state, and local bureaucracies, administra-
tors and career bureaucrats are the invisible power-holders that even 
reputationaJ.ists fail to uncover. Thus, let us now turn to see if plural-
ist assumptions and methodologies fair any better. 
58 See, Kaufman and Jones, "The Mystery of Power," especially Part 
III, pp. 209-210. 
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B. The Pluralist Perspective: 
The "Decisional" or "Event Analysis" Approach 
Nelson Polsby, in a powerful critique of the elitist theory of strat-
ification, has maintained that essentially five propositions characterize 
such approaches to the study of power in American communities: (1) the up-
per class rules in the life of local communities; (2) political and civic 
leaders are subordinate to upper class influentials; (3) a single "power-
elite" rules in the community; (4) this upper class power elite rules in 
its own interests; and (5) social conflict takes place between upper and 
lower social classes.59 If one was to accept the institutional and socio-
logy of leadership approaches as empirically verifiable theories of com-
muni ty power merely because the former links power with institutional re-
sources and potentialities, and because the latter relates social class 
origin to the numerical superiority of upper class professionals in top 
leadership positions, they would be hard pressed to prove that institutional 
position and class composition alone determine the distribution of govern-
ment services and benefits. Even if institutional position and social 
class origin are regarded as potentially valuable resources of power, one 
must be attuned to the distinction between the possession of a resource 
and the actual exercise of that for which it is a resource, namely, power. 
In a similar vein, Robert Dahl, in an attack which specifically ob-
jected to the methodology of Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills, has expressed 
dissatisfaction with an approach that allows the researcher to "infinitely 
59 Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). 
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regress" in the face of empirical evidence to the cont::r:axy. And that: 
whatever else it may be, a theory that cannot even in principle 
be controverted b,y empirical evidence is not a scientific theory. 
The least that we ean demand of any ruling elite theory that pur-
ports to be more than a metaphysicaJ. or polemical doctrine is, 
first that the burden of proof be on the proponents of the theory 
and not on its critics; and, second, that there bg a clear criteria 
according to which the theory could be disproved. 0 
The model of a ruling elite was thus criticized, first for failing to dis-
tinguish between resources of power (e.g. , institutional leadership, so-
cial class origins, and reputation) and power itself, and, secondly, for 
neglecting to consider power in its situational aspects. 
The aJ. ternative view by Dahl and others of the pluraJ.ist persuasion 
is that aJ. though social and economic elites have greater influence over 
city governmentaJ. decision-making than the average citizen, they do not 
fully dominate city politics. Rather, the community power structure is 
essentially pluralistic, whereby power is widely dispersed among a number 
of decision-makers, and in which economic elites, 
far from being a ruling group, are simply one of the many groups out 
of which individuals sporadically emerge to influence the policies 
and acts of city officials. Almost anything one might say aoout the 
influence of the Economic Notables could be said with equal justice 
about a half dozen other groups in the community. Sometimes the 
notables have their way and sometimes they do not.61 
In his study of power relations in New Haven, Dahl employed what is 
commonly referred to as the decisionaJ. approach. Essentially this approach 
involves tracing the actions of leaders in regard to decision-making within 
60 Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," p. 463. 
61 Robert A. Dahl, Who Govems? Democracy and Power in an American 
City (New Haven: Yale Univers~ty Press, 1961), p. 72. AlthOugh this study 
represents the classic example of the decisional approach, other equally 
important statements of the pluralist perspective can be found in the vari-
ous studies cited in FN # 62. 
the context of sp~ific issues. 62 Pluralists thus claim that only by 
tracing the historical development of community decisions on political 
issues (via extensive interviews, attendance at organizational and commit-
tee meetings, speeches, newspaper accounts, and so on) can one hope to 
show evidence of a ruling elite. Institutional leadership, social class 
origin, and reputations do not guarantee control. Consequently, Dahl and 
other pluralists prefer methodologies designed to identify overt power 
rather than power potential. 
Underlying decisional analysis is the first and perhaps most funda-
mental presupposition of the pluralist perspective which states that "no-
thing categorical- can be assumed about power in the community. "63 Instead 
the stratification thesis (stating that some elite group necessarily dom-
inates a community) is rejected and substituted with the assumption that 
"at bottom nobody dominates in a town."64 With the matter of whether or 
not anyone at all dominates community affairs open to question, pluralists 
attempt to study specific outcomes of community conflict (as evidenced in 
particular patterns of decision-making), in order to determine whose will 
actually prevails in community decision-making. 
For example, in applying decisional analysis to power relations in 
62 Studies employing this approach include: Dahl, ..Q.E• cit.; Elaine 
Burgess, Ne ro Leadershi in a Southern Cit (Chapel Hill, N. C.: Univer-
si ty of North Carolina Press, 1 0 ; Warner Bloomberg, Jr., and Morris 
Sunshine, Suburban Power Structures and Public Education (Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1963); Robert Presthus, Men At the Top: A Study 
in Community Power (New York: OXford University Press, 1964); and Benjamin 
Walter, "Political Decision-Making in Arcadia," in F. Stuart Chapin, Jr. 
and Shirley F. Weiss, eds., Urban Growth Dynamics (NY: Wiley, 1962), 141-87. 
63 Nelson W. Polsby, "How To Study Community Power: The Pluralist 
Alternative," Journal of Politics, 22 (August, 1960), 474-484; at p. 474. 
64 Ibid., p. 475. 
97 
the New Haven community, Dahl reconstructed the historicaJ. development of 
what he perceived to be the most significant decisions.65 Included in his 
analysis were eight major decisions in the New Haven Redevelopment program 
(which was at that time the largest in the country when measured by out-
lay per capita), eight in the area of public education (which was the most 
costly item on the city's budget), and the nominations by the two political 
parties for seven elections. After having gathered data via extensive in-
terviews, attendance at organizational and committee meetings, reconstruc-
tion of newspaper accounts, and on-the-spot analysis of individual behavior 
(which was aided by the placement of intems in "strategic locations"), 
Dahl found that power was widely dispersed throughout the community, with 
no single group dominating each and every policy decision. Instead, con-
trary to stratification theory's presumption that power relations are a 
more or less permanent aspect of social structure, Dahl noted that power 
relations in New Haven are tied to issues. Since issues may be persistent 
or ever-changing, power relations may easily change in their pe~anency. 
And, furthermore, Dahl found that even those notables exhibiting at least 
some influence, did so in no more than a single issue area; no single so-
cial or economic notable proved so influential that his/her will dominated 
different decision processes. And of the persons who did appear to influ-
ence the whole of the policy process, not one was a social or economic 
notable. All such individuals were elected or appointed city officials. 
A1 though it is comforting to learn that the stratification theory of 
65 Dahl, Who Governs? Pemocra,cy and Power in an American City, ~­
sim. For a description of how particular issues are selected for study, 
see: Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Al-
ternative, esp., pp. 474-484. 
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elite dominance may not be aJ.l that vaJ.id, and that the policy process re-
ceives input from a varying number of groups and individuals, many contend 
that much less can be derived from the study of community decisions in is-
sue areas than "decisionaJ. anaJ.ysts" or pluralists suggest. 66 In fact, it 
has been proposed that decisionaJ. methodologies are deficient in at least 
. 67 sJ.X areas. 
First, "pluralists misunderstand the way influence expresses itself 
in the community. "68 That is to say, a1 though the exercise of power can 
be detected when competing groups struggle for acceptance of their particu-
lar views, the values and policy preferences of the elite are transmitted 
to nonelites by a conscious and unconscious "mobilization of bias."69 By 
creating the faJ.se impression that they share the same values as other com-
munity residents, elites are able to block many issues from becoming public 
problems in need of government action. This particular exercise of power 
will not then surface in the decision-making process. 
66 For a cryptic anaJ.ysis of research critical of the decisionaJ. ap-
proach, see: Richard M. Merelman, "On the Nee-Elitist Critique of Community 
Power, American Political Science Review, 62 (June, 1968), 451-60. Studies 
representative of this perspective include: Peter Bachrach and Morton S. 
Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review. :P (Dec., 
1962), 947-52; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An AnaJ.-
ytic Framework," American Political Science Review, 51 (September, 1963), 
632-642, and Power and Poverty: Theo:;:y and Practice (New York: OXford Uni-
versity Press, 1970); E.E. Schattschneider, Tbe Semisoyereign Peo~e (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960); and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph 
Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1960). These views will be discussed in greater length in the 
conclusion to this chapter. 
67 See, especially those sources cited in FN # 66; and Bonjean and 
Olson, ..cp • ..ci:t., pp. 284-286. 
68 Merelman, ..QP• cit., p. 4_52. 
69 Schattschneider, ..Qll• ..cit., chapters i-iii, et. 12assim. 
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Second, "pluralists are most successful in assessing power when con-
flict is occurring • .,70 However, when individuals perceive that they have 
little chance of winning a direct confrontation with the "powerful," they 
will refrain from raising issues for consideration. Thus there is "no con-
flict, no visible issue, and no decision."7l Under these conditions, the 
decisional method is of little or no utility. 
Third, "pluralists unduly stress decisions made in the governmental 
realm." 72 Even if issues are initiated, they may still be blocked from 
reaching the stage of governmental decision-making. And, even if issues 
are decided upon, various administrative constraints may prevent the execu-
tion of the decision. Power is as much a part of execution as it is of is-
sue initiation and policy formulation. Unfortunately, decisional analysis 
treats power relations as if confined solely to the policy-making process. 
Fourth, given the fact that decisional analysts seek to identify 
overt power relations (and thus confine their attention to stages of is-
sue initiation and policy formulation), they are hard pressed to justify 
the starting place for their investigation. If they assume that power-
holders can be identified by observing committee meetings and sessions of 
the executive council, they are, in effect, accepting the same relationship 
between leadership positions and decision-making common to the institu-
tional approach. Since they have no way of determining in advance whether 
or not decisions had been informally made prior to these formal meetings, 
they cannot legitimately infer that organization members, councilmen, and 
70 Merelman, .QE. cit., p. 452. 
7l Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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0 ther participants are the real power-holders. And, if interviews are 
conducted to identify informal influences, decisional analysts are sus-
ceptible to the same criticisms levied against reputationalists. 
Fifth, since no study can investigate the historical development of 
all issues and decisions, or identify the actors in each issue and decision 
area, decisional analysts must select specific cases for analysis. Whereas 
some single out what they consider to be the "most important" cases for 
analysis, others follow the preference of reputationalists in eliciting 
the judgment of community residents or "expert" informants. A degree of 
uncontrollable subjectivity is inherent in each. 
And, sixth, decisional analysis may require a substantial time in-
vestment, or (as in the case of Dahl's New Haven) the assistance of a col-
laborator with access to "highly strategic locations." 73 The study of de-
cision-making patterns may therefore be limited to single community case 
studies, rather than comparative analyses across communities and issue 
areas. For these reasons, a multifaceted analysis encompassing aspects of 
each of the alternative approaches are of greater utility than any one taken 
alone. And, then, if and only if researchers remove their professional 
and ideological predispositions and their methodological blinders which 
commit them to an almost unwavering attachment to power relations within 
the policy-making process, and proceed to measure the influence of policy 
administrators (who are normally considered outside the t:ra.di tional chan-
nels of policy-making) can even multiple approaches be of any avail. 
73 Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, p. vi. 
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CONCLUSION 
Methods of Studying Community Power: 
An Appraisal and Proposed Alternative 
How does one go about reconciling the competing conclusions drawn by 
the institutional, sociology of leadership (positional), and reputational 
approaches, which tend to uncover an elite dominating community affairs, 
and the decisional approach, which creates the impression of a pluralistic 
power distribution? Do the power structures of Regional City (Atlanta) 
and New Haven differ as significantly as Hunter's and Dahl's analyses con-
elude, or are the research findings simply an artifact of the methodologies 
employed? Would findings be significantly different if both cities were 
restudied using an aJ. ternative method of analysis. Prol:ably so. In fact, 
research findings are often a function of the research design and mode of 
instrumentation. Whereas available evidence indicates that the institu-
tional approach tends to emphasize the power inherent in organized bodies 
and the significant influence of persons of leadership status, a reputational 
approach tends to identify a monolithic power structure composed of persons 
of notoreity, a positional approach uncovers a presumed link between social 
class and decision-making, and a decisional analysis ultimately leads to 
the finding of a democratically pluralist community power structure. How-
ever, as Robert Presthus demonstrated in his analysis of two cities in New 
York, studies employing some combination of alternative strategies indicate 
that each separate approach tends to locate the sources of power in a 
relatively small number of persons. 74 
74 Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), passim. 
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It is clearly evident that studies employing the institutional ap-
preach start with the assumption that power is an attribute os social in-
stitutions, and that power-holders are those persons occupying positions 
of authority in society's large institutions. Although it seems reasonable 
to expect to find persons in roles of institutional leadership wielding a 
significant degree of control over community decision-making, this is an 
assumption to be tested rather than a statement of fact. In fact, system-
atic analysis may very well uncover that institutional leaders are merely 
carrying out the preferences of persons not normally included in formal 
membership and leadership roles. 
Equally deficient is the notion that social class representation is 
an adequate indicator of community power. What does it mean to say that 
American politics is dominated by a ruling elite comprised primarily of 
. 
members of the upper class? Is this upper class elite formulating policies 
congruent with its own self-interest, or is it one that acts on the basis 
of some utilitarian conception of the role of government? Are these elite 
(or upper class) values transmitted to upper-middle and middle-class pro-
fessionals, or is class and decision-making unrelated. Since it is often 
difficult to discover the intentions of this elite, it is relatively impos-
sible to state with any degree of certainty that they are exercising power 
or merely carrying out the will of the majority. And, further, could it 
not be suggested that an upper class elite assumes leadership on the basis 
of merit, education, ability, and overall qualifications necessary for posi-
tions of authority, which may be taken as attributes of the upper strata 
but not divided and controlled by considerations of social class. 
It is equally clear that studies employing the reputa tional approach 
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tend to select persons who are perceived b,y others as being influential 
because of their wealth, prestige, position, and/or visibility in the com-
munity. However, merely because an individual is a social or economic 
notable does not necessarily imply that he/she is actually powerful in 
settling conflicts or in allocating resources in the community. It may 
even be that the opposite holds true: social and economic notables may in-
tentionally avoid political participation for the sake of personal and busi-
ness-related interests. The underlying reason why social and economic 
notables often appear to be the centers of power in a community when in-
fluentials are identified b,y the reputational approach may simply reflect 
the prestige we assign to persons of high status. 
Although position, social class, and reputation may serve as in-
direct indicators of power, they are not equivalent to its possession. 
These attributes may place persons in situations where they have the poten-
tial for control, but we cannot assume that the supposed connections neces-
sarily hold true. Instead, many researchers have advocated an approach 
designed to identify those persons actively engaged in community decision-
making. However, this approach, too, is not without its limitations. 
Although the decisional approach notes the distinction between actual 
and potential power, it too fails to consider power in all of its manifesta-
tions. Though correct in observing that a person may possess a great many 
resources that could possibly place him/her in a position to exercise a 
degree of potential power and yet still not demonstrate an outward expres-
sion of this resource, power may be exercised in a manner other than par-
ticipation in the decision-making process. Further, as Peter Bachrach and 
Morton S. Bara.tz have suggested, the decisional methods of the pluralists 
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concentrate solely on those instances in which they are able to select 
significant decisional issue-areas for study, and thus neglect those sit-
uations in which decision-makers fail to get involved~75 Since the de-
cisional approach as employed qy Dahl sought to gauge the relative power 
of political actors on the basis of their ability to initiate and veto 
proposals, these critics cha.Ige that the power inherent in limiting the 
scope of initiation was ignored. Through the context of a "mobilization 
of bias," decision-makers can thwart latent or manifest changes to the 
status quo. Thus qy utilizing an existing bias of the political system 
(such as a precedent, a rule, a norm, or a procedure), it is possible for 
power to be exercised in the fo:rm of "nondecision-ma.king." Nondecision-
making, as an exercise of power to thwart change seekers, may be exercised 
both overtly and covertly, ranging from force, to intimidation (i.e., po-
tential deprivation of valued things), to co-option (i.e., potential re-
wards). 76 In order to account for this other "face of power," researchers 
73 These views are expressed in three specific works. See, Peter 
Bachrach and MortonS. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Sci-
ence Review, 56 (December, 1962), 947-52; Bachrach and Ba.ratz, "Decisions 
and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Re-
~. 57 (September, 1963), 632-42; and Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Pov-
erty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Also, 
for a critique and defense of their views, see: Geoffrey Debnam, "Nondeci-
sions and Power: ~he Two Faces of Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz," American Political 
Science Review, 69 (September, 1975), No. 3, 889-99; Pater Bachrach and 
Morton S. Ba.ra. tz, "Power and its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey 
Debnam," in the same issue, 900-04; and Geoffrey Debnam, "Rejoinder to 'Com-
ment' by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz," in the same issue, 90 5-07. 
76 Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz, "Power and its Two Faces Revisited," p. 900; 
and Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, pp. 47-51. 
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of de-
cisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his 
energies to creating-or reinforcing social and political-values and 
institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process 
to public consideration of only those issues which are compazatively 
innocuous to A. 
(See, Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz, "Two Faces of Power," p. 9..51. 
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would need to employ a new approach to identifying community power struc-
tures: 
Under this approach the researcher would begin - not, as does the 
sociologist who asks, "Does anyone have power?" - but by investi-
gating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution 
under scrutiny. Then, having anaJ.yzed the dominant values, the 
myths and the established political procedures and rules of the 
game, he would make a careful inquiry in which persons or groups, 
if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handi-
capped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of nondeci-
sion-making, that is, he would examine the extent to which and the 
manner in which the status quo oriented persons and groups influ-
ence those community values and those political institutions which 
tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to safe issues.77 
There is a further methodological problem inherent in the decisional 
approach which goes beyond its failure to consider aspects of nondecision-
making, and which can also be directed toward the other approaches thus 
far examined. As pointedly expressed by Nelson Polsby and repeatedly em-
phasized by Robert Dahl, the central question this approach addresses is 
"How can one tell, after aJ.l, whether or not an actor is powerful unless 
some sequence or event, completely observed, attests to his power?"7S The 
problem lies not so much with the question as it does with the boundaries 
established for observation. According to the pluralists, if we were to 
look at the sequential pattern of issue identification and policy formula-
tion, we would find that different persons have a stake in different con-
flicts and/or community issues. It would thus appear that there does not 
exist one unitary attentive public that e~ges in the making of policy 
for each and every area, and that "virtually no one, and certainly no group 
77 
78 
Also, see 
Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," p. 951. 
Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, p. 60. 
Robert Dahl, Who Governs, passim. 
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of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence re-
source."79 However, by focusing on conflict situations within the decision-
making process, or on the reputations acquired by persons perceived to be 
important in setting the political. agenda, or on the class composition of 
members of top leadership, or on persons in roles of institutional. leader-
ship, political. scientists have disproportionately examined the politics 
of issue initiation and policy formulation at the expense of other aspects 
of the policy process. Research has thus tended to underestimate the power 
resources of other actors in the process. 
If "power-holders" or "community influential.s" are viewed simply as 
those individuals directly engaged or perceived to be engaged in the process 
of setting the political. agenda and in fomulating public policies, is power 
no longer held and exercised after the initial. making of policy? Are the 
individuals authorized to implement the policy decisions of city governmen-
tal official.s simply carrying out the expressed will of the powerful and 
therefore relatively powerless in and of themselves? Both responses, we 
contend, must be made in the negative. Various foms of political. power 
may be (and are) exercised as much, if not more, after policies receive 
their initial formulation as they are before and during their stages of 
development. And the administrative branch, we further contend, exercises 
varying degrees of power during each developmental stage of policy formu-
lation and program implementation. By broadening the focus to include 
those events and actors within the implementation process, the role of 
the bureaucrat and his/her institutional. setting can be further appreciated. 
79 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 228. 
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As an initial step in such an analysis, the political, technical, and 
organizational resources of public bureaucracies warrant a further note 
of elaboration. 
CHAPTER rl 
BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLICY PERFOR1ANCE 
In the two preceding chapters we sought to show, first, the over-
riding concern of political scientists in explicating the processes of 
issue identification and policy formulation and, second, to propose that 
the dominant approaches employed in the study of community power struc-
tures are both ideologically and methodologically biased and deficient 
in drawing the needed distinction between policy outputs and policy per-
formance. They thus fail to detail adequately how policy decisions are 
transformed into public services, and consequently neglect to consider 
the potential and actual power resources of those actors responsible for 
applying and implementing the policy objectives of urban governments. 
Further, if policy is defined in the narrow sense as a "projected 
program of goal values and practices, ,.l it may be legitimate to focus on 
how policies are formulated and on the actors engaged in the process of 
establishing the objectives of government activities as a way of identify-
ing the power-holders·in community affairs. However, the question we pose 
is whether the power-holders are solely those individuals who actively 
participate in the struggle over the establishment of governmental pri-
orities, as evidenced in the politics of policy formulation. Or is it 
more meaningful to speak of policy as a "purposive course of action or 
1 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1950), p. 71. 
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or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a prob-
2 lem of concern." If the latter conceptualization is adopted, as we think 
it should be, then power must be broadened to include consideration of 
those responsible for applying policy to a given situation, and who there-
by influence the net impact (i.e., perfomance) of the policy on an in-
tended target. In applying or implementing the policy decisions of elected 
officials, policy administrators substantially modify, elaborate upon, 
or even negate the content of policy and its impact on those affected. 
Since administrators do not always apply precisely what legislators or 
other policy adopters decide, intentions and perfomance may be substan-
tially dissimilar. Since policy administrators can ultimately make policy 
in the process of implementation, the policy process cannot be fully com-
prehended without considering the power capacity of public bureaucracies. 
Although one would expect these views to be self-evident, deter-
minants analyses and community power studies have essentially ignored the 
so-called "administrative" functions of the bureaucrat in favor of the 
"political" activities of elected officials. These studies have thus 
failed to take advantage of an extensive body of theoretical and case-
study material emphasizing the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of 
policy decisions are being made by public bureaucracies. In general, 
elected officials frequently do not possess the time, information, interest, 
or expertise necessary to deal with complex social, economic, or technical 
issues. And even when legislators do possess the necessary time, knowledge, 
2 James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: Praeger Pub-
lishing Company, 1975), p. J. 
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and technical. sophistication to rationally confront community issues, the 
legislative body itself may be divided over the course of action to fol-
low in resolving perceived problems. Due to the degree of legislative 
conflict present whenever competing interests seek to have particular 
views ultimately adopted, agreement can be reached only by leaving some 
matters essentially nebulous and unsettled. Furthermore, many policy de-
cisions must be made that elected officials may consider politically un-
feasible. This is especially evident in issue areas where elected of-
ficials risk alienating a significant proportion of their constituencies 
regardless of which al terna.tive strategy they select. And some issues do 
not receive the concentrated attention of elected officials because their 
constituents are so indifferent to the outcome that there is no "political 
payoff" to be gained from addressing the pm bl.em. Under such conditions, 
elected officials have been inclined to delegate substantial policy-making 
responsibility to administrative agencies.J Unfortunately, this develop-
ment has been slighted by most features of determinants analysis and studies 
of community power structures. 
Although some form of power is unmistakably exercised whenever policy 
decisions are made by administrative bodies, it is evident that bureau-
cratic specialization grants ranking administrators a high degree of in-
fluence in structuring agendas and defining alternatives for elected of-
ficials. What is not so evident, however, is that even when policy decisions 
3 For example, see: Theodore J. Lowi, The End Of Liberalism (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in 
National Politics, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972); Rourke, 
BUreaucracy, Politics and Public Polic , 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 197 ; and Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, Jrd Ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977). 
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are made by elected officials, administrators still possess the potential 
for determining the operational content of those decisions through imple-
mentation process activities. 
For example, common sense and experience both suggest that the mere 
passage of an ordinance by the city council does not materially change the 
object of its actions. By alerting the citizenry of their awareness of 
the problem and of their desire to activate needed change, the initial 
formulation of a policy response by city councilmen contains an inherent 
symbolic significance, but in and of itself does not alleviate community 
problems. The passage of an ordinance to pave a portion of a street, or 
one that limits the speed of motor vehicles, or that defines regulations 
for the construction of buildings, does not, in and of itself, change the 
appearance of the street, regulate the speed of all drivers, or ensure 
compliance by all builders. Instead, as Carl A. McCandless suggests: 
A part of the total political process was consummated when, probably 
after a number of compromises were achieved, the council finally 
passed an ordinance, but the total process is not complete until 
some means is available to grade and pave the street, patrol the 
streets and apprehend violators of the le~ limits, and make on-
site inspections of construction projects. 
Thus, although the legal authority to initiate binding city policies 
resides within the executive and legislative departments of city govern-
ment, nonelected city administrators and career bureaucrats can determine 
their operational content. Consequently, the ultimate success of govern-
mental programs very often depends upon the ability, willingness, policy 
orientations, and other technical, economic, organizational, and political 
4 Carl A. McCandless, Urban Government and Politics (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 239. 
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resources of bureaucracies. The following two chapters a.re thus intended 
first, to present a. portra.i t of the resources available to and inherent 
within bureaucracies, a.nd second, to suggest a. conceptual framework for 
increasing our understanding of those factors which ha.ve a. potentially sig-
nifica.nt impact on the power capacity of bureaucrats during the implementa.-
tion process. 
~he Bureaucratic Phenomenon: 
Power and its Exercise 
We should note a.t the outset tha.t no policy system, no matter how 
well-developed a.nd efficient, ca.n address each a.nd every community issue 
demanding attention; nor ca.n a.ny system guarantee the ultimate and un-
qualified success of those policies which are created in response to pa.r-
· ticula.r problems. At best, policy-makers ca.n only hope that they ha.ve a.c-
curately perceived the real nature of the problem, properly assessed the 
relative weights of possible policy objectives, analyzed each a.nd every 
alternative strategy for resolving the problem, selected tha.t strategy best 
able to alleviate the problem and achieve the desired objectives with lit-
tle or no residual effects, selected the most appropriate means of imple-
menting the policy decision, and bestowed upon program administrators the 
resources necessary for ensuring policy success. Regreta.bly, but under-
standa.bly, these expectations are rarely, if ever, fully satisfied. The 
obstacles to rational policy-making are often insurmounta.ble.5 
5 For an explanation of the obstacles to rational policy-making, see: 
Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administra-
tion Review, 19 (Spring, 1939), 79-88; David Braybrooke and Charles Lind-
blom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963); Aaron Wildavsky, 
The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964). 
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Thus, in selecting a policy response to some perceived problem, 
noms of rationality dictate that policy-makers must: (1) know all of 
society's value preferences and their relative weights; (2) know all of 
the policy alternatives available; (3) know all of the consequences of each 
policy alternative; (4) calculate the ratio of achieved to sacrificed 
societal values associated with each policy alternative; and (5) select 
the most efficient policy alternative. 6 Due to problems of uncertainty, 
however, elected officials may elect to either (a) take no action at all, 
rather than risk program failure, or (b) delegate policy-making authority 
to an agency they believe is better able to satisfy policy demands. That 
is to say, when confronted with an uncertain task environment in which 
legislators may lack the necessary technical sophistication, organizational 
ability, and/or political capacity to confront community needs, noms of. 
rationality have operated to remove legislative bodies from their policy-
making obligations. And of the two possible courses of action or inaction, 
delegations of authority to administrative agencies has led to the assumed -
but unexamined - dictum that power in modern society now centers in the 
halls of public bureaucracies. 
On the other hand, even when legislators do assume full policy-making 
responsibility, the degree of uncertainty present is often such that poli-
cies tend to be formulated with incomplete knowledge of the totality of 
the problem area and of the means by which community needs may best be sat-
isfied. Policies thus tend to be couched in tems of general outlays of 
expenditures, with little or no explicit guidance as to the means b,y which 
6 See, Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy-Making Re-examined (San Fran-
cisco: Chandler, 1968), Part IV. 
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programs must be administered. Hence, one way in which bureaucracies have 
increased their overall strength in the policy process, though by no means 
the only way, is through their interpretation and implementation of vague 
and/or ambiguous policy guidelines. In so doing, policies are modified, 
if not actually made by administrators and bureaucrats. 
It should be noted, however, that legislative inefficacy is not the 
only, or the prime, reason for the advance of the administrative process. 
Rather, many consider the administrative p:rocess to be the most capable 
structure for fomulating policy responses to social, economic, envi:ron-
mental, and political complexities of modern-day government. This argu-
ment stems from the general belief that only a specialized organization 
possesses the necessary skills and expertise to make determinations con-
earning (1) what the desired outcomes of governmental activity should be, 
and (2) cause/effect relationships. In this sense, then, it is held 
that administrators and career bureaucrats, who deal with specific soci-
etal p:ro blems on a day-to-day basis, enter the policy process with the 
specialized knowledge necessary for making a rational assessment of the 
problem and for deciding how the problem can best be resolved. It is this 
property of expertise that Max Weber saw as the attribute giving bureau-
cracy its dominant station in the policy process. 
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization 
has always been its purely technical superiority over any other 
fonn of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism 
compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with 
the non-mechanical modes of production. 
Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed 
bureaucracy is always overpowering. The 'political master' finds 
himself in a position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the 
'expert,' facing the trained offieial who stands within the manage-
ment of administration.? 
7 Excerpted in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Es-
says in Sociology (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 214, 232. 
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Though it cannot be denied that fully developed bureaucratic or-
ganizations are technically superior to other fonns of organization, this 
quality alone is not sufficient in accounting for the power potential of 
bureaucracy. Technical sophistication is a valuable resource, but it is 
not a guarantee of power in decision-making. Instead, Francis E. Rou:rlte, 
in a most significant study of bureaucratic roles in policy-ma.k.ing, has 
posited that the relative strength of an organization depends upon its 
ability to achieve and maintain both internal and external sources of 
power and support. 8 Internally, the ability of an agency to exercise a 
degree of influence within the policy system depends upon its level of 
expertise. To this end, organization is itself one source of expertise. 
Men and women joined in an organization are able to pool their resources, 
their individual skills and experiences, and thereby achieve results 
individuals acting alone could not hope to accomplish. Consider a bureau-
cratic organization the size of an urban police force. It cannot be de-
nied that the total resources of a police force in tenns of specialized 
training, experiences, technology, and manpower places it in an advan-
tageous position of specifying the needs and problems of the community 
regarding law enforcement, thereby enhancing the probability that the ad-
vice given by its administrators to the city's elected representatives 
will be adopted. The same can be said regarding welfare agencies, public 
works departments, sanitation departments, public housing bureaus, fire 
departments, and highway departments, to name but a few. 
Second, the urban bureaucracy is broken down into hundreds of units, 
8 Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, 
Chapters I, II, et. passim. 
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each of which is responsible for implementing decisions, recommending 
governmental actions, and even fo%mulating policies in specific areas. 
Bureaucrats can thus give concentrated attention to specific community 
problems. Able to study a problem on a day-to-day basis, bureaucrats 
achieve a degree of technical sophistication and acquire a worlting know-
ledge of particular affairs which can only come from experience. Third, 
unlike elected public officials, bureaucrats enjoy a continuity in office 
which makes it possible for this acquired knowledge to be put to public 
service on a continuous basis. There should thus develop continuity in 
public policy which, as Peter Woll has emphasized, is a major factor for 
the continuing support given the administrative branch. 9 And fourth, 
the accumulation of specific knowledge, continuity in office, and concan-
trated attention to specific matters places administrators in the advan-
tageous position of having a monopolistic or near monopolistic control of 
the "facts." Most often the facts gathered by administrators are not sub-
ject to independent verification or disproof. Control of the facts thus 
significantly increases the power of bureaucracies in the policy process. 
We must ask, however, what specifically is this animal we call 
bureaucracy? That is, what requirements must an organization satisfy to 
be considered a bureaucracy? In response to this query, Max Weber offers 
the following defining characteristics of the bu:re~ucratic structure: 
1. "The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureau-
cratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as of-
ficial duties." 
2. "A Specified sphere of competence ••• has been ma:r:Xed off as part 
of a systematic division of labor ••• " 
9 Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, 2nd Ed. (New Yorlt: W. W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1977), p. 27. 
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3. The official. is "subject to strict and systematic discipline 
and control in the conduct of his office." 
4. All operations are govemed by a "consistent system of ab-
stract rules ••• and consist in the application of these rules 
to particular cases." 
5. "The organization of offices follows the principle of hier-
archy; that is, each lower office is under the control and super-
vision of a higher one." 
6. Officials are "subject to authority only with respect to their 
impersonal obligations." 
7. "Candidates for bureaucratic positions are selected on the 
basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this 
is tested by examinations, or guaranteed by diplomas certifying 
technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected." 
8. Being a bureaucratic official "constitutes a career. There is 
a system of promotions according to seniority or to achievement, 
or both ... 10 
It was Weber's contention that if an organization is arranged on the basis 
of specialization and hierarchical contml, and if its members look upon 
their employment as a career (thereby separating the private from the pub-
lic aspects of their lives), organization, planning, and achievement of 
organizational objectives will proceed in the most efficient manner.11 
However, to say that administrative agencies are efficient and to 
say that they have an unequivocal hold on political power in urban society 
are not synonymous declarations. When we say that the public bureaucracy 
is part of the community power structure we are, in effect, emphasizing 
its ability to have its will successfully prevail. Each department with-
in the bureaucratic network has interests it seeks to have supported by 
the urban political system. To the extent that the goals of administrators 
10 Max Weber, Essays in Sociolos;y (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
1946), 196-204; and Weber, The Tbeory of Social and Economic Or~izgtion 
(NY: Free Press, 1947), 329-336. Summary reprinted in Peter M. Blau, ..T,be 
Dvnamics of Burea.ucra.cy (Chgo: Univ. of Chgo. Press, 1955), pp. 1-2. 
11 It should be noted that organizational principles of hierarchy 
and specialization often results in the separ,ation of power from knowledge 
(in the superordinate-subordinate relationship). This must be taken into 
consideration in any discussion of the rationality of administrative de-
cision-making. 
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are accepted by or otherwise imposed upon city policy-makers, we can sug-
gest that they have been influential. To the extent that the goals of 
administrators prevail over the will of others, and to the extent that 
their activities have a direct impact on the performance and outcome of 
urban policies, we can suggest that they have the potential to exercise 
a significant degree of power in the community. Thus, on the one hand, 
administrators may influence the policy-making process by advising policy-
makers of al terna ti ve program strategies and policy objectives, and, on 
the other ha.nd, may exercise its own style of power by (1) interpreting 
vague and/or ambiguous policy statements in accordance with their own 
specific policy orientations, (2) exercising its discretion in applying 
policies in specific instances, and (3) substituting the initial objectives 
of policy-makers with their own through processes of implementation. 
Externally, the power of city administrators and career bureaucrats 
depends upon their ability to mobilize political support from either (a) 
the outside community, (b) the legislature, and/or (c) the executive 
branch.12 The greater the degree of public support for an agency's scope 
of activities, the greater is the likelihood that it will exercise a sig-
nificant degree of influence in the policy process. Furthermore, the 
delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies has shifted 
the general group struggle from the legislative to the administrative 
arena. While outside interests seek to influence agency action (and thereby 
substantially affect the direction and impact of public policies), the 
agency itself can benefit by the support of attentive groups. This is 
12 Rourke, BHreaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, Chapter II, 
"The Mobilization of Political Support, 11 pp. 42::So, et. passim. 
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especially evident in aJ.l instances in which city agencies are empowered 
to bestow benefits, in the form of city contracts, to outside interests. 
For example, city programs designed to improve the streets and high-
ways, or park facilities, or to renovate existing structures, are not only 
sought by the director of the department responsible for carrying out the 
project but also by the outside construction firms, landscapers, cement 
companies, land developers, among others, who_ stand to benefit via city 
contracts. These same parties seek to influence the policy process via 
lobbying, campaign contributions, personal favors, and of course, through 
graft. Their part in the policy process serves to enhance the power of 
the administrator responsible for the particular project. 
From the foregoing discussion, we ca.n propose that the political 
power of city administrators and career bureaucrats resides in their abil-
ity to determine the operational content of urban policies. First, since 
the public bureaucracy is considered expert in the area of its general 
jurisdiction, and have almost complete control of the facts, the advice 
and proposals of administrators are usuaJ.ly quite influential as the basis 
for decisions made by elected officials. Second, city administrators a.nd 
career bureaucrats use outside group activity to impose their will on 
city governors via lobbying, collective bargaining, public relations, and 
even through threatened and actuaJ. strikes. Third, and of even greater 
significance, is the fact that since city administrators and public bureau-
crats are delegated the authority to make decisions regarding the imple-
mentation of policies and programs, they have invariable opportunities 
for (1) fixing their details and setting the boundaries of their appiica-
tion, and (2) reshaping all or portions of those policies they personally 
120 
disapprove of, thus making policy via selective enforcement or modified 
implementation.13 
This power of discretion, i.e. , the ability of a public officer to 
choose from among alternative courses of action or inaction, is the most 
far-reaching and controversial source of administrative power, and the 
one which has received the most attention from political scientists, in 
generaJ., and administrative law theorists, in particular.14 An adminis-
trator's potential for discretion results from the fact that city policies 
and programs, as set forth in charter provisions, legislation, or executive 
orders, are presented in the most general tenns and/or susceptible to 
varying interpretations. Thus those who implement city policy decisions 
have continual opportunities for shaping the operational content of the 
policy in accordance with their own ~erception of what the program should 
accomplish. 
Remembering Weber's "ideal type," organizational behavior is guided 
and constrained by a formal body of rules and regulations. In actual prac-
tice, however, city administrators are often free to select not only from 
among desired outcomes but also from among al terna ti ve means. The ability 
to exercise discretion in those instances in which such activity is not 
strictly prohibited via clearly defined charters, legislative mandates, 
or executive orders, or restrained by fonnal checks and "codes of conduct," 
has led to the assertion that "discretion is the very lifeblood of admin-
lJ Demetrios Cara.ley, City Governments and Urban Problems (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 249. 
14 See, Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Prelimin 
Inquiry (Urbana, Ul: Uni v. of Ul. Press, 9 , et. · p:t ssim • 
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istra.tion. ,.l5 Although it is not sufficientiy clear whether the a.dm.in-
istra.tive process could function effectively without such powers, the im.-
pact of discretion on the scope and nature of bureaucratic power and on 
intended policy objectives cannot be disputed. 
The impact of administrative discretion can be seen in both the 
everyday decisions of government agencies as well as in the major unpre-
cedented, innovative, trend-setting activities of organizational life. 
Herbert Simon has classified these two types of administrative decisions 
as "programmed" and "non-programmed," respectively. 
Decisions are pDOgrammed to the extent that they are repetitive and 
routine, to the extent that a definite procedure has been wo:tKed 
out for handling them so that they don't have to be treated de novo 
each time they occur ••• Decisions are non-programmed ta the extent 
that they are novel, unstructured, and consequential.l6 
And elsewhere, James G. March and Herbert Simon have specified three va.ri-
eties of the former and one of the latter type of discretionary decision. 
First, when a program involves search activities, the actual course 
of action depends on what is found. We may regard the choice of a 
course of action after search as discretionary. 
Second, when a program describes a strategy, application of the 
strategy to specific circumstances requires forecasts or other es-
timates of data. We may regard the application of the strategy to 
select a course of action as discretionary. 
Third, a program may exist in the memory of the individual who is 
to apply it, having arrived there either as a result of extraorgani-
zational training (e.g., professional training or apprenticeship), 
or as a product of learning from experiences rather than as a result 
l5 See, Marshall E. Dimock, "The Role of Discretion in Modern Ad-
ministration," inJohnM. Gaus, Leonard. D. White, andMarshallE. Dimock, 
eds •. , The Frontiers of Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chgo. 
Press, 1936), p. 59. 
16 Herbert A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decisions (New 
Yom: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. :.S:6. 
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of fonna.l instructions. Under these circumstances we often regard 
him as behaving in a discretionary fashion.l7 
In each of these cases the decision proce~s may be regarded as highly 
"routinized" and yet discretionary in tenns of the fonn of the performance 
program or the source from which it was acquired. As such, they must be 
distinguished from the fourth meaning of discretionary: 
A program may specify only general goals, and leave unspecified the 
exact activities to be used in reaching them. Moreover, knowledge 
of the means-ends connections may be sufficiently incomplete and in-
exact that these cannot be very well specified in advance. Then dis-
cretion refers to the development and modification of th~ performance 
program through problem-solving and learning processes.l~ 
As Michael Lipsky has discussed with reference to "street level bu-
reaucrats," the most routine, everyday decisions of government agencies 
are representative of the discretionary potential of programmed acti vi-
ties. l9 Although it c~n be argued that the rank and file members of city 
bureaucracies are constrained in their activities by rules and regulations 
of the organization and that administrators of specialized departments 
can exercise a significant degree of discretion in interpreting urban 
policies and programs, Lipsky holds that, for the average citizen, the 
activities of street level bureaucrats constitute the actual performance 
of American government. These are the people that citizens turn to for 
help, and they are the people perceived to be the formal channels of 
government. 
To the average citizen, then, public policy is neither equivalent 
17 ( James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 148. 
18 Ibid. ' p. 148-149. 
l9 Michael Lipsky, "Stre~t Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of 
Urban Reform," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6(June, 1971), 391-409. 
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to what elected officiaJ.s say it is (i.e.", the verbaJ. or written declara-
tions of intent as set forth in city charters, legislative mandates, or 
executive orders), nor is it simply the proposed course of action with 
its corresponding mobilization of resources. Rather, policy manifests 
itself through a series of actions or inactions and particular patterns 
of behavior through which governing bodies seek to obtain particular ob-
jectives within a specified target population. Consequently, from the 
point of view of the citizen, who is in some way affected dally by the 
activities of governing officiaJ.s, and even from the perspective of the 
policy anaJ.yst concerned with a policy's impact on the environment, the 
most important questions are not of policy fo:rmulation, but of policy 
perfo:rmance. Thus, when the focus of analysis shifts from the politics 
of policy-making to an examination of actual and perceived policy outcomes, 
attention naturally centers on those individuals and organizations that 
can directly affect policy perfo:rmance through their chosen patterns of 
behavior. According to Lipsky (and this writer), it is the activities 
of bureaucrats that have the greatest potential for dete:rmining the nature 
of community life. 
To be sure, the manner in which policies are implemented by admin-
istrators and career bureauc::ra.ts dete:rmines in large part their ope::ra.-
tionaJ. content and their ultimate consequence. One of the basic problems 
inherent in contempo::ra.ry studies of community power structures is that in 
locating sources of community power they disregard the events following 
the fo:rmulation and adoption phase of the policy process. They thus 
neglect to account for the dete:rmining impact of bureaucracy on the whole 
of the policy process. For example, consider the opportunities accorded 
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street-level bureaucrats to make choices of significant importance: 
1. Inspectorial personnel of different departments (e.g., health, 
fire, buildings, ma:r::kets). Their largely unsupervisable failure to 
enforce regulations against violators either because of laziness, in-
efficiency, or corruption leads to highly uneven burdens of compliance 
among regulatees. If widespread enough, that failure of enforcement 
negates regulatory policies adopted~ city government altogether. 
(It may also be that various inspectors do not agree with the policy 
as promulgated; that is, they may consider the offense minor, the 
penalty too stiff, etc., and thus select to ignore the violation and, 
in the process, formulate their own conception of what the policy 
should actually promote). 
2. Welfare casewo:r::kers. Their idiosyncratic leanings of open-
handedness or t!gbt-fistedness can determine whether particular indi-
viduals will be accepted as welfare beneficiaries, what level of pay-
ments they will receive, and whether various special grants will be 
awarded or denied. 
3. Public school teachers, especially those in the lower grades 
in slum ghetto schOols. Their attitudes, friendliness, energy, de-
votion, preparation, and effort will have a large impact on whether 
the students in their classes will come to look at schools as places 
of learning or as semipunitive custodial institutions. 
4. Police officers. Their day-to-day discretionary acts decide 
not only such insignificant events as which from a massive number of 
traffic offenders actually will have to answer for their violations. 
They also determine more weighty matters: the extent and openness of 
illegal prostitution, drug-peddling, and gambling in various neighbor-
hoods; the unnecessary "stopping and friskings" and excessive physical 
force to which various parts of the citizenry, especially in slum 
areas, will be subjected; and whether, in the process of police in-
vestigations of subjects, making arrests, or controlling mass demon-
strations, various initial "incidents" will escalate into more serious 
disruptions including riots.20 
In all such cases, bureaucrats are undoubtedly making policy and exerting 
substantial influence on community affairs through their various actions 
and/or inactions. 
This recognition of the relative power of bureaucrats to shape the 
day-to-day operations of city governmental agencies and thus to directly 
20 Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of 
Urban Reform," 391-409; Caraley, .QJ2.. cit., p. 252-253. For a more in-depth 
analysis of police discretion, see: James Q. Wilson, varieties of Police 
Behavior (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Kenneth 
Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, p. 8, et. passim. 
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affect the performance of urban policies strikes at the ver.y center of our 
present a.na.l.ysis. Thl::oughout this paper we have suggested that the loca-
tion of political power in urba.n society cannot simply be viewed as a con-
stellation of actors directly engaged in the formulation and adoption 
phase of the policy process, or that it can be oompletely accounted for 
merely b.y attempting to discover those factors hypothesized to be deter-
minants of policy decisions. Research devoted to discovering those social, 
economic, demographic, and political factors responsible for particular 
policy outputs and for explaining variations among states and communi ties 
in terms of the types of policies promulgated, does not take into consider-
ation variations within communities, or the idiosyncratic tendencies of 
individual decision-makers. Research endeavors of this type thus fail 
to isolate initial factors from ultimate and determinative considerations. 
Further, Lipsky's analysis of the discretionary potential of admin-
istrative actions raises serious questions about both elitist and pluralist 
models of community power. The conclusions of both perspectives suggest 
that, first, the number of significant decision-makers is small, and that, 
second, the potential influence of these participants derives from either 
their social status in the community or from their positions of institu-
tional leadership. However, the failure of both approaches to examine the 
set of actors involved in and the consequences of policy implementation 
has led to a general neglect of the substantial institutional changes that 
have occurred within the governmental process and of the rising significance 
of functionally organized bureaucracies. Unable or unwilling to fonnulate 
and carr.y out specific policies for each and every community issue, city 
policy-makers have transferred what amounts to legislative, executive, and 
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judicial powers to administrative agencies, which a.re created, maintained, 
and distinguished from others on the basis of functional responsibilities. 
Each such agency (e.g., public housing, public wol.'ks, highways and street 
departments, heal. th and hospi taJ. boards, police, fire, and sanitation de-
partments), are bequeathed with significant degrees of governing authority 
in its own functional sphere of expertise. At the same time, each agency 
develops its own organization, identifies its own vested interests, and 
ultimately forms close ties with those special interest groups most af-
fected by its actions. 
This development has led many to reflect upon the implications of 
dm. ni t t" . d t" " t" 21 J hn J Harri ' "f a J. s ra J. ve power J.n emocra J.C socJ.e J.es. o • gan s unc-
tiona.l fiefdoms, "22 and Theodore J. Lowi' s "functional feudali ties"2J a.re 
tezms which have been coined to describe the ties between city bureauc~ 
cies and their related interest groups. The contention is that cities are 
now divided both geographically and functionally, that public bureaucracies 
are near feudal lords in controlling policy decisions affecting their par-
ticular vested interests, and that these bodies a.re unaccountable to the 
community and unaffected by electoral votes. According to Lowi, they have 
become the "new machines" in the urba.n political system: 
The new Machines are machines because they are relatively irrespon-
sible structures of power. That is, each agency shapes important 
21 For example, see: Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy in a Democra-
tic Society," in Roscoe C. Martin, ed., Public Administration and Democracy 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), 205-226. 
22 John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis (Boston: 
Li tUe, Brown and Company, 1976), Chapter V. 
23 Theodore J. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New Yol.'k: Free 
Press, 1964), esp. , Chapter VII; and ''Machine Poll. tics - old and New." 
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public policies, yet the leadership of each is relatively self-
perpetuating and not readily subject to the controls of any higher 
authority. 
The New Machines are machines in that the power of each, while 
resting ultimately upon services rendered to the community, depends 
upon its cohesiveness as a smf?-1 minority in the midst of the vast 
dispersion of the multitude.2 
If the public bureaucracy is as important in the power st:ructure of 
the community as many suggest, why does it not appear as such in the 
elitist and pluralist models of community power? The answer, we believe, 
lies in the predisposition of political scientists to focus on the more 
overt expressions of power, as demonstrated in the conflicts inherent in 
the formulation and adoption phases of the policy process, at the expense 
of the more complex process of implementation. Prior to implementation, 
the role of the bureaucrat in policy-making is relatively invisible to 
the general public. Unlike elected public officials, whose activities 
are usually attended by news reports and public debate, the role of the 
bureaucrat usually takes the less noticeable form of advising formal city 
officers. However, once public agencies are ent:rusted with full respon-
sibility for undertaking the means necessary to achieve policy objectives, 
if not even for determining both the ends and means of governmental activ-
ity, the power of bureaucracies can no longer be underestimated or b:rushed 
aside as a temporary aberration. In order to state with any degree of 
certainty the extent of such powers, it is necessary that we transfer the 
present focus of the discipline to factors operating within processes of 
policy implementation. 
24 Lowi, "Machine Politics - Old and New,"~· cit., p. 86. 
CHAPTER V 
FROM POLICY OBJECTIVES 'IQ POLICY PERFOR1ANCE: 
BUREAUCRATS AND THE IMPIEMENTA TION PROCESS 
Despite the growing awareness of the influence of public bureau-
cracies in the American policy process, systematic research attempting 
to link the activities of bureaucrats to the final outcomes of policy de-
cisions has only recently gained predominant interest. Except for those 
studies specifically concerned with bureaucm tic organization and behavior, 
few attempts have been made to critically and systematically analyze the 
implementation links between the initial formulation of policy objectives 
and a policy's ultimate outcomes (perfomance). Though many studies 
(such as those reported in Chapter IV) have alluded to the potentially 
significant power of program administrators and career bureaucrats in 
determining the operational content of policy decisions, many analysts of 
public policy seemingly support the rather naive assumption that a particu-
lar policy (P) implies or leads to specific and desired outcomes (0), 
almost as if policies are themselves self-executing and their consequences 
unfailingly predictable. 1 As Erwin Hargrove, however, aptly noted, poli-
cies do not themselves lead anywhere; instead they must be applied to the 
problem area for which they are formulated. 2 Implementation, the process 
1 This assumption is amply supported by the overriding concern given 
to the identification of those elements and actors having either direct or 
indirect influence on the policy-making process, as if once policies are 
formula ted predictable consequences will naturally ensue. 
2 Erwin Hargrove, The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation 
of Social Policy (Washington: The Urban Institute, l975), p. iv. 
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through which ini tia.l policy decisions are tra.nsfo:cned into specific 
government programs, is thus the missing link between policies and out-
comes. 
This being so, we should expect to find a rather detailed body of 
literature devoted specifically to delineating how bureaucrats have a 
deteminative impact on the policy outputs of decision-making bodies. 
However, by divorcing processes of policy fonnulation from that of policy 
implementation, researchers have thus far failed in their initial objec-
tive of formulating a positive theory of policy fomation. By neglecting 
to consider how bureaucrats and policy implementers may ultimately set the 
policy agenda. as well as carry out programs in accordance with their own 
personal policy predispositions, policy analysts have failed to bridge the 
gap between policy objectives and policy performance. Such considera. tions 
are not to be found in the litera. ture of determinants analysis precisely 
because both economists and political scientists have been unnecessarily 
bounded by the professional and ideological predispositions of their dis-
ciplines. Economists, for their part, initially set out to examine the 
policy process guided not by a theoretical framewoxk but by a. conviction 
that economic development ultimately determines the course of governmental 
actions. So strong was this conviction that most researchers did not find 
cause to examine why the explanatory power of economic factors have a dif-
ferential impact across expenditure categories or why the importance of 
economic variables seem to decrease over time. 
Political scientists, on ·the other hand, with their initial preoccu-
pation with process characteristics, did not fully capture the significance 
of socioeconomic conditions; and even when they did, almost two-thirds of 
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the variation in outputs within and between policy areas remained unex-
plained. For the most part, then, researchers interested in discovering 
why certain policies are pursued by some governmental bodies but not by 
others and why the degree of commitment varies even when they do decide 
upon similar actions have thus far neglected to identify the nature of 
the linkage between the environment and policy outputs, have not specified 
the time span in which environmental constraints are operative, and have 
not fully addressed the considerable amount of variation left unexplained 
by the environmental, political, and few organizational variables utilized 
to date) 
One may suggest that part of the explanation for the dominance of 
economic variables over the past two decades of dete:z:minants analysis by 
both economists and poli tica.l scientists is attributable more to the de-
fault of the latter than to the theoretical insight of the fo:z:mer. That 
is, regardless of their theoretical significance, political scientists 
have almost wholly relied upon such political factors as interparty compe-
ti tion, voter turnout, degree of refo:z:m possessed by govemmental struc-
tures, and party affiliation of decision-makers in measuring the extent to 
which political characteristics influence the nature of policy outputs. 
Conspicuously and unfortunately underrepresented in dete:z:minants analysis 
are indicators of bureaucratic and organizational influences on the policy 
process. Thus, although it is well recognized that ever-increasing delega-
tions of authority to public bureaucracies have undeniably t:ransfo:z:med the 
nature of American politics, the ever-expanding power of bureaucrats in 
3 See, George W. Downs, Jr., Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public 
Policy, pp. 7-9. 
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both the formulation and implementation of policy decisions is almost 
wholly absent in the policy literature. 4 
On the other hand, determinants analysis has succeeded in bringing 
to light the determinative influence of the idiosyncratic value predispo-
sitions of decision-makers on the policy making process.5 Having dis-
covered that there does not exist one single determinant of all policy 
decisions, researchers have had cause to propose that governments under-
take policy activities in line with the individual policy positions and 
value orienta tiona of those persons perceived to be influential in the 
policy-making process. This assumption has been at the root of a lengthy 
body of li tara ture devoted to discovering the power-holders in community, 
state, and national decision-making. Underlying such research is the 
belief that a so-called "power-class," consisting of individuals a,.nd 
interests capable of having their will prevail in the policy process, 
ultimately determines the very nature of governmental activity. Method-
ologically, such influentials have been identified by either their (1) 
reputations for power, (2) social class, (J) institutional position, or 
by their ( 4) direct participation in the fonnal decision-making process. 
Power has thus been equated only with those parties perceived to be of 
some influence in establishing governmental priori ties in the initial 
processes of policy-making. In this sense, the exercise of power is no 
longer considered once the preliminary conflicts governing the selection 
of particular policy positions are resolved. And, accordingly, policy 
4 For example, see Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, passim. 
5 See, Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy: 
Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Pol1c1es in Urban Politics. 
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implementation is perceived as a relatively simple process of carrying 
out rather mundane decisions consistent with a policy's original objectives. 
Thus, in neither the literature of dete:minants analysis nor in 
analyses of political power structures do we find what can be considered 
a legitimate attempt to link activities in the policy-making process with 
what ultimately transpires once administrators assume responsibilities 
of implementation. Although we would expect policy implementers to be 
of theoretical significance to both determinants research and power anal-
yses, they are not included in the methodological designs of either con-
cern. This is especially troublesome when we consider that an extensive 
and well-developed body of theoretical and case study material has re-
peatedly emphasized the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy 
decisions are being made by bureaucrats. The literature of administrative 
law and organization theory has info:med us that extensive delegations 
of authority to administrative agencies have created a situation in which 
bureaucracies structure policy agendas, define the alternatives for 
elected officials, exercise a significant degree of discretion in the 
initial interpretation and ultimate application of statutory objectives, 
and ultimately wield great autonomy in administrative decision-making. 
Despite this g:rowing body of li tara ture cognizant of the ever-in-
creasing power of the bureaucracy, determinants research severely under-
represents bureaucratic or organizational variables in its analysis and 
political power studies fail to examine how power is exercised most ef-
fectively qy those parties engaged in processes of implementation. And 
though we continue to be told that the wo:ddngs of administrators are 
important, implementation still remains the lost and neglected element in 
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the policy p:rocess. As Jeffrey Pressman and A.a:ron Wildavsky recently 
lamented, considering the fact that everything in public policy ulti-
mately revolves around processes of implementation, the absence of an 
implementation literature lies as an unsolved mystery in policy research. 6 
Their bewilderment was expressed in no uncertain terms: 
There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementa-
tion in the social sciences - or so we have been told by numer-
ous people. None of them can come up with specific citations to 
this literature, but they are certain it must exist ••• It must 
be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a 
kind of semantic illusion at wol:k here because virtually every-
thing ever done in public policy or public administration must, 
in the nature of things, have some bearing on implementation. 
Analytical study (as opposed to mere mention) of implementation 
seems so eminently reasonable that few can imagine it does not 
exist. Nevertheless, except for the few pieces mentioned in the 
body of this book, we have been unable to find any significant 
analytic woik dealing with implementation.? 
To a certain extent one cannot help but shar9 Pressman and Wildav-
sky's dissatisfaction over the direction policy studies have taken to 
date and of the secondary status accorded the actors engaged in adminis-
te:ring policy decisions. However, several factors other than short-
sightedness have accounted for this development. First, researchers have 
been inclined to support the general assumption that the greatest politi-
cal conflicts concern the manner in which particular issues are selected 
out of the host of demands for government attention. In this sense, then, 
researchers have been most interested in those conflicts inherent in (1) 
the selection of policy alternatives, (2) the specification of resource 
6 Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Beikeley: 
Univemi ty of California Press, 1973). Contained herein is a masterful 
treatment of implementation within an analytic framework combined with an 
in-depth case-study. 
7 Ibid.' p. 267. 
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commitments, and (3) the delineation of policy objectives. Studies fol-
lowing this perspective have further assumed that once such conflicts 
are resolved the resulting policy will be implemented as directed and 
that the ultimate outcomes will be near those anticipated by the policy-
makers. In holding that most of the significant conflicts ha.ve been re-
solved with the adoption of a particular policy, researchers have been 
inclined to view implementation as a series of rather simple and mundane 
decisions consistent with statutory directives. Political scientists, 
especially, have tra.di tionally confined their analyses to conflicts in-
herent in the making of policy, thereby ignoring the shift of conflict 
to the administrative arena in the process of implementation. 
Second, the general call for a scientific analysis of political 
phenomenon has led to a ra.dicaJ. proliferation of studies in which re-
searchers can employ statistical methods of contemporary social science. 
This has created an enonnous wealth of research devoted to finding cor-
relational, if not even causal (which many determinants analysts mistakenly 
assume is statistically possible) relationships between quantitative 
indicators of economic, political, and social variables and quantifiable 
policy outputs (thereby ignoring qualitative assessments of policy outputs). 
And where concepts are employed where operationalization is especially 
difficult (e.g., power and influence), researchers have used indirect 
indicators (e.g., an individual's reputation, institutional position, or 
social class) or measures which do not adequately envelop every possible 
manifestation of the concept (e.g., direct participation in the decision-
making process). Implementation analysis, on the other hand, raises 
serious methodological obstacles. The actors engaged in administering 
1)5 
policy decisions are difficult to identify, their decisions impossible 
to isolate, and the time dimension of their activities beyond boundary 
specification. Unable to clearly measure, if not identify, the signifi-
cant bureaucratic and organizational ingredients of the administrative 
process, researchers have been unable to apply contemporary methodologies 
to implementation analysis. 
And, third, policy implementation has proven to be of greater 
interest to policy-makers, who are concerned about the successful applica-
tion of their programs, than to policy analysts, who have evidenced a 
greater concern for the processes of policy formulation. This latter 
concern has created a general desire to analyze the worldngs of and inter-
actions between formal institutions of government. By focusing on the 
activities of formal governmental bodies 1 policy analysts have unwittingly 
deemphasized the role of public bureaucracies in transforming initial ob-
jectives into meaningful policy outcomes. So conceived, implementation 
is treated as an administrative, rather than as a significantly political, 
concern. Such analytic frameworks have failed to capture the dynamic 
nature of the policy process, and have thereby tended to maintain the 
long disputed constitutional and normative "politics-administration" 
dichotomy. 
However important these three factors may once have been in de-
terring policy analysts from systematically considering the politics of 
implementation as an independent variable related to the ultimate per-
formance of public policies, a review of the literature reveals that im-
plementation studies are not only on the upswing, but also that efforts 
outside the immediate realm of public policy contain bits and pieces of 
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the multi tude of factors necessary for an understanding of policy impl.e-
mentation. For the most part, however, this literature owes its emergence 
not to some general desire to increase one's understanding of the :role of 
bureaucrats in the policy process, but rather to a demand for greater ef-
ficiency in the initial making of policy. Tha. t is, starting with the 
assumption that policies fail to achieve specified objectives due to 
problems inherent in processes of administration, implementation analysis 
has recently emerged as a useful tool for policy-makers. 
For example, prior to the massive social refonn programs of the 
Johnson Administration and the accompanying decline in expectations of 
even -the most optimistic refonners, the systematic study of implementa-
tion had been relatively neglected in most a.na.lyses of public policy. 
In fact, until most recently implementation had been totally ignored by 
some, briefly mentioned by others, and defined but not analytically 
specified by still others, However, the actual or presumed failure of 
various policies in the mid-1960s and early 1970s have set in motion a 
number of efforts addressing the general question of why programs fail · 
to achieve their desired objectives in such fields as education, 8 health 
8 Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education 
Administers a Law (Syracuse: Symcuse University Press, 1968); David K. 
Cohen, "Politics and Research: Evaluation of Social Action Programs in 
Education," Review of Educational Research, 40 (April 1970), 213-238; 
Jerome Murphy, "Ti Ue I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal 
Education Refonn," Harvard Educational Review, 41 (February 1971), 3..5-
63; Jerome Murphy, State Education Agencies and Discretionary Funds 
(Lexington, Mass: Lex~ngtOn BOoks, 1974); Milbrey W. McLaughlin, Evalua-
tion and Refonn: The Elementa d Se da Educatio Act of 1 6 
Title I Cambridge, Mass: Lexington Ballinger Pub., 1975 ; Milbrey W. 
McLaughlin, "Implementation of ESEA Ti tJ.e I: A Problem of Compliance," 
Teachers College Record, 77 (February 1976), 397-415; Paul Be:rman, 
"Implementation of Educational Innovation," The Educational Forum, 40 
(March, 1976), 347-370. 
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care, 9 economic development, 10 environmental protection, 11 civil rights, 12 
and income redistribution. 13 Attempts have thus surfaced which seek to 
account for the too frequent radical gap between the intentions of policy-
makers and the actual perfonnance of adopted programs. This has pre-
cipitated a consequent shift from addressing how policies are fonnulated 
to how they are implemented (as if programs fail merely because of in-
efficiencies and decay in the implementation process). 
This shift also evidences a recent reawakening to the oft-noted 
belief that the words of a statute do not in and of themselves resolve 
conflict or precipitate change. Rather, statutory constructions set in 
motion the process whereby initial goals are tra.nsfonned into explicit 
policy decisions (outputs) which are, in turn, modified and applied to a 
particular set of conditions having certain consequences (outcomes). 
Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond have noted this pattem of activity 
in no uncertain tenns: 
9 Eugene Ba.rdach, The Skill Factor in Politics: Re eali the Mental 
Commitment Laws in California Berkeley: University of Calif Press, 1972). 
10 Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wild.a.vsky; op. cit.; Carl Van Hom, 
"Implementing CETA: The Federal Role, .. Policy Aiialysis, 4 (Spring 1978), 
159-183. 
11 A. Myrick Freeman, III and Robert H. Haveman, "Clear Rhetoric and 
Dirty Water," The Public Interest (Summer 1972), 51-65; Henry Jacoby and 
John Steinbruner, Cleam.ng the AJ.r (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1973); Charles 
Jones, Clean Air (PJ.ttsburg: Pittsburg University Press, 1975); Paul Downing 
and Gordon Brady, "Implementing the Clean Air Act: A Case Study of Oxidant 
Control in Los Angeles," Natural Resources Journal, 18 (April 1978), 237-
284. 
12 Fred Wirt, The Politics of Southe:rn Equality (Chicago: Aldine, 1970); 
Harrel Rodgers and charles BUllock, Coercion to COmpliance (Lexington, Mass: 
Lexington Books, 1976). 
13 
For example, see: Gilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare (Wash-
ington, D.C: Brookings, 1971); Theodore R. Marmor, ed., Poverty Policy 
(New York: Aldine/Atherton, Inc., 1971). 
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Very litUe may really be decided by the words of a decision or a 
statute: the enunciation of such na.tionaJ. policy may be just the 
beginning of the decisive process detemining what will happen to 
whom, and undeJ:Standing this further stage is essential to a full 
undeJ:Standing of politics .14 
For the most part this concern had initially prompted a number of 
atheoretical case studies identifying the factors threatening successful 
implementation in specific policy areas: education, health care, economic 
development, urban planning, environmental protection, civil rights and 
poverty. Al trough such studies have increased our general understanding 
of the implementation process in particular areas, their claims to genel:'-
ali ty are questionable because (1) the cases cannot easily be compared; 
(2) they apply to a specific set of circumstances; and (.3) they use tenns 
peculiar to the context and in the jargon of specific policy sectors. 
Further, most studies of implementation consider problems endemic within 
one level of a policy sector or, at most, between two levels. Such 
analyses thus fail to document and examine the whole of the complex 
chain from policy input to outcomes. And, finally, far too little at-
tention had been given to the breadth of power exercised by public bureau-
cracies in determining the operational content of policy decisions and 
thus the ultimate outcomes of government activity. 
In a sense, although it may be argued that one can construct an 
integrated model of the implementation process illuminating the significant 
role played by bureaucracies by drawing bits and pieces from the studies 
of implementation in unrelated areas, such efforts have proven info:rmative 
14 Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, The School Prayer 
Decisions: From Court Poli@ to Local Practice (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, l971), p. 1 • 
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yet inadequate. To date, attempts at integrating the findings of rather 
dispa.ra.te case studies of implementation have focused on a variety of 
factors that may either aid or hinder successful implementation, some of 
which may be manipulated by the policy framers. The argument posed by 
such conceptual framewol:ks is that in order to ensuxe achievement of policy 
objectives, policy makers must be cognizant of the multi tude of elements 
affecting the application of their policy to a particular set of circum-
stances. Policies cannot then be fomulated in a manner insulated from 
problems of implementation. Instead, various characteristics of the in-
terna.l and external environment of im.plementa tion must be made a part of 
the initial discussion concerning the setting of goals and commitment of 
resources. The output of such efforts has been the presentation of 
various recipes useful in gauging the potential realization of policy 
objectives. 
Thus far, eight major efforts have sought to provide such conceptual 
integration to the analysis of policy implementation and to thereby place 
individual and unrelated case studies within their wider sectoral context. 
In one of the initial attempts, Thomas B. Smith offered what one can de-
fine as a st:rategizing model of the implementation process. In so doing, 
Smith pmmpted a number of competing models proclaiming specific strategies 
for use by policy-makers in minimizing those disruptive tensions which can 
result in a mismatch between policy outcomes and policy expectations. 
Starting with the premise that policy implementation serves as a tension 
generating fo roe in society, Smith reasoned that in applying policies 
tensions are generated between and within four components of the imple-
mentation process: idealized policy, implementing organization, target 
group, and environmental factors. Any such tension in implementation 
may result in various transaction pa. tterns (which may further crysta.J.~ize 
into institutions) that may or may not ensure a perfect match between 
policy expectations and policy outcomes. And, finally, transaction pa. t-
terns and institutions may again generate tensions which, via feedback 
to policy-makers and implementers, may support or reject further imple-
mentation of the policy. 15 
A second effort to construct a model of policy implementation was 
undertaken two years later by Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn~ 16 Recog-
nizing the interrelationship between policy fomulation and policy imple-
mentation, they followed the pa.ttems set by Theodore J. Lowi 17 and Lewis 
A. Fmman18 in constructing a theoretical framework which takes into ac-
count the variable nature of the implementation process on the basis of 
policy types. They thus reasoned that policies can be classified by two 
distinguishing characteristics: "the amount of change involved, and the 
extent to which there is goal consensus among the participants in the 
15 Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process," Policy 
Sciences, 4 (1973), 197-209. 
16 Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn, "The Policy Implements. tion 
Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration and Society, 6(Feb. 1975), 
No. 4, 445-488. A second version of the~r framework di'Opped the two-
variable classification of policies (i.e., amount of change involved and 
degree of goal-consensus). See Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Implementa-
tion of Intergovernmental Policy," in Charles 0. Jones and Robert Thomas 
( eds.), Public Policy-Making in a Federal System, Vol. J (Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 39-62. For an application of this model 
to a specific policy area, see: Van Horn, "Implementing CETA: The FederaJ. 
Role," Policy Analysis, 4 (Spring 1978), 159-18). 
17 Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, 
and Political Theory, World Politics, 16 (July 1964), 667-715. 
18 Lewis A. Froman, "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in 
Austin Ranney ( ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Mai.'k-
ha.m, 1968), 41-52. 
141 
implementation process • .,l9 Having then fomulated a number of variable 
relationships between policy type and the execution of public policy, 
Van Meter and Van Horn set forth a systems model of the implementation 
process oonsisting of six major factors affecting progmm perfonnance: 
(l) policy standards and objectives; (2) policy resources (basically 
funds but including other forms of incentive); (3) inter-organizational 
communication and enforcement activities; (4) characteristics of the 
implementing agencies; (5) economic and social conditions; and (6) the 
20 disposition of implementers. 
Third, unlike the first two efforts which outlined a fonn of 
"strategizing behavior model" for policy makers, Walter Williams em-
ba.rlted upon an alternate route focusing on the role of the policy 
na.l t . the anal . d t f . l tat" 21 a ys 1n ys1s an assessmen o 1mp emen 1on. In so 
doing Williams presented a somewhat idealized six stage process char-
acterizing what ought to occur when major social policy decisions are 
made or when a large and complex social experiment is undertaken. 
First, decision-makers should move from preliminary specification to 
(2) identification of policy alternatives to (3) explicit policy de-
cisions. Implementation, the stage between policy decisions and 
ultimate operations, then starts with the development of ( 4) program 
guidelines or design specifications; moves to (5) what may be a lengthy 
stage of field implementation involving the worldng through of a myriad 
l9 Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process," 
p. 4.58. 
20 ~-, pp. 462-478. 
21 Walter Williams, "Implementation Analysis and Assessment," 
Policy Analysis, I (Summer 1975), 531-566. 
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of technical, administrative, staff,and institutional problems that face 
a new activity; and (6) ends when the specific experiment is ready to 
test or when the nonexperimental activity is judged fully opera. tional. 22 
Once having ouUined an admittedly abstract model of the sequence 
from policy fomulation to field operations, Williams presented four 
questions decision-makers must address when considering major program 
innovations: what is the likelihood that an innovation "1) will produce 
positive outcomes?; (2) will be accepted by higher-level decision-makers?; 
(J) can be put in place properly with available resources?; and (4) will 
be accepted by those in the field who must either implement or operate 
the innovation?"2J The function of implementation analysis then involves 
~dentifying those elements affecting decision-makers' responses to 
questions (.J) and (4). That is, implementation analysis "should investi-
gate (1) the technical capacity to implement, (2) political feasibility, 
and (.J) the technical and political strategies for implementation. "24 
Implementation assessment, on the other hand, attempts to measure the 
change in the actual outputs of orga.niza tions after the introduction of 
an innovation. 25 In all cases analysis and assessment must be undertaken 
throughout the policy process rather than after policy decisions are im-
plemented. 
Fourth, Martin Rein and Francine F. Rabinovitz have offered a 
theoretical framework of implementation emphasizing three potentially 
22 
lli£·' PP • 5.32-5.37. 2.3 Ibid., p. 551ff. 
24 ~., 5.58· p. 
25 Ibid.' p. 560. 
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conflicting imperatives confronting program administrators: "the legal 
imperative to do what is legally required; the rationaJ.-burea.ucratic 
impemtive to do what is rationally defensible; a.nd the consensual im-
perative to do what ca.n establish agreement among contending influential 
parties woo have a. stake in the outcome. "26 They thus suggest tha.t the 
politics of implementation ca.n be best understood a.s an attempt to re-
solve conflicts among these impera. ti ves • The manner in which such 
conflicts are resolved is a. function of the purposes (their clarity, 
saliency, and consistency), the resources (kind, level, and timing), 
and the complexity of the administrative process of implementation. "27 
Fifth, somewha. t akin to Rein a.nd Rabinovitz's cla.ssifica. tion of 
conflicting imperatives besetting implementers, Paul Beman has focused 
on the rational-bureaucratic and consensual imperatives in describing 
how the problem of policy failure ca.n be understood only by distinguishing 
between macro- and micro-implementation. 28 In so doing, Berman started 
with the assumption that implementation problems stem primarily from 
the interaction of a. policy with its institutional. setting. Since federal 
policy takes shape in a. highly interactive setting in which many actors 
compete for controlling voice in detennining the benefactors of government 
policy, and since policy tends to become transmuted by successive levels 
of implementing operations, local deliverers, rather than fede:ra.l 
26 Martin Rein and Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Implementa. tion: A 
Theoretical Perspective," in Walter Dean Burnham a.nd M. W. Weinberg (EDS) 
American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: MIT, 1978), 307-335; at 308. 
27 . Ibid., p. 333. 
28-
Paul Beman, "The Study of Macro- and Mic:ro-Implementa tion," 
Public Policy, 26 (Spring 1978), 157-184. 
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administrators, tend to possess the power to dete:rmine policy outcomes. 
Within the local system, on the other hand, implementation consists of 
the mutual adaptation of the local policy and local organizational 
characteristics. This adaptation inevitably leads to uncertainty in 
how policies will be implemented. In both instances, policy is repeatedly 
adjusted by federal bureaucracies resistant to change and by local service 
deli very organizations sensitive to their political environments. 
Sixth, Eugene Ba:rda.ch, concentrating on the strategizing behavior 
of various actors within the implementation process, likened implementation 
to a series of games in which program administrators and policy-makers 
compete for ultimate control of program elements necessary for realizing 
specific outcomes. 29 And, in accounting for the failure of most policies 
to achieve statutory objectives, Bardach listed: (l) dive:rsion of resources 
• 
to private actors or bureaucratic empire-building; (2) deflection of 
program goals overtime; ( 3) inability of program managers to assemble 
the necessary support because of resistance, lack of qualified personnel, 
etc., and (4) the general dissapation of energies as actors seek to protect 
turf, avoid responsibility, and enhance their reputations.J0 
Seventh, though not an explicit conceptualization of the implementa-
tion process, Richard F. Elmore has noted the futility of present efforts 
designed to explain policy failures by focusing on the process by which 
policies are translated into administrative action via implementation 
wi trout a working knowledge of how organizations work. 3t Instead of 
29 The Implementation Game (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977). 
30 ~·, Chpts 3-6; especially pp. 51-57. 
3t Richard F. Elmore, "Organizational Models of Social Program 
Implementation," Public Policy, 26 (Spring 1978), 185-228. 
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constructing a single analytic model of the implementation pzocess, the 
present body of organizational theory contains four distinct models, each 
of which maintains an alternative view of implementation and bureaucratic 
behavior. 
The systems management model treats organizations as value-maxi-
mizing units and views implementation as an ordered, goal-directed 
activity. The bureaucratic process model emphasizes the roles of 
discretion and routine in organizational behavior and views imple-
mentation as a process of continually controlling discretion and 
changing routine. The organizational development model treats the 
need of individuals for participation and commitment as paramount 
and views implementation as a process in which implementers shape 
policies and claim them as their own. The conflict and bargaining 
model treats organizations as arenas of conflict and views imple-
mentation as a bargaining process in which the participants con- 32 verge on tempomry solutions but no stable result is ever reached. 
And, finally, Paul Saba tier and Daniel Mazmanian are presenUy 
wo:ddng on what thus far appears to be the most comprehensive and analy-
tical treatment of the implementation process, especially in tenns of how 
various implementation problems affect regulatory policy objectives.33 
Starting with the basic proposition that the goal of implementation 
analysis is to identify the factors affecting the achievement of statutory 
objectives throughout the policy process, Sabatier and Mazmanian have 
identified three major independent variables opemting within the stages 
of implementation: (1) the tractability of the problem(s) being addXessed 
by the statute; (2) the ability of the statute to favorably structure 
the implementation process; and (3) the net affect of a variety of 
'political' variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives.34 
32 Ibid., pp. 185-186. 
33 ~ Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "Toward A More Adequate Con-
ceptualization of the Implementation Process --- With Special Reference 
to Regulatory Policy," MS (July, 1978). 
34 ~-' p 0 6ff. 
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Collectively and singularly these variables affect one or more of the 
five stages of the implementation process: (a) policy outputs of imple-
menting agencies; (b) compliance with policy outputs by taxget groups; 
(c) actual impacts of policy outputs; (d) pe:rcei ved impacts of policy 
outputs; and (e) major revision in statute.J5 
Unlike previous frameworks which focused almost exclusively on the 
individual st:ra.tegizing behavior of major actors in the policy process, 
Sa.batier and Mazmanian have offered a more analytic specification of 
variables affecting successful implementation. Although also concemed 
with providing basic strategies for improving program perfo:mance, they 
rejected earlier models which divorce individual st:ra.tegizing behavior 
from both socio-economic conditions and statutory variables which ulti-
mately dete:mine what, if any, actions are taken by policy implementers. 
And of the two, the manner in which statutes structure the implementation 
process by (1) the number of veto/clearance points; (2) the fo:mal access 
of various actors to the implementation process; and to some extent, (3) 
the policy predispositions of implementing officials, is most important 
for understanding the politics of implementation. 
Collectively, antecedent case studies and these efforts at conceptual 
integration provide a reasonably sufficient overview of how policy decisions 
are t:ra.nsfo:med irito explicit program outputs and of the variety of factors 
that can either assure or impede successful implementation. Along the 
way researchers have (1) identified implementation problems in specific 
policy-areas; (2) suggested how various social, economic, political, 
35 Ibid., especially Figure I, page 7. 
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historical, and cultu:ra.l factors affect the behavior of policy-makers and 
policy implementers; (3) identified the role of the policy analyst in 
determining the causes of policy failure and for suggesting ways in which 
policy-makers can improve policy perfomance; ( 4) offered blue-print 
formulas for increasing and improving individual strategizing behavior 
of actors engaged in various stages of the policy process; and (5) 
critically assessed the organizational models of social program imple-
mentation. 
Now although such efforts have looked at implementation from a 
number of alternative perspectives and have concentrated on a number of 
dissimilar variables, they nonetheless seem to converge on three areas of 
gene:ra.l agreement: (1) There seems to be a commonly held conception of 
the meaning of implementation and the nature of the implementation problem. 
(2) Researchers seem to agree that a policy's implementation problems 
derive not from its design, but rather from its :relationship to its insti-
tutional setting. (3) Most :researchers consider the study of the imple-
mentation process as a process, essential for identifying key policy 
levers in the social policy arena. 36 
For the most part, however, analyses of the politics of implementa-
tion tend to digress to the point of providing strategic portfolios for 
policy-makers, rather than analytic discussions of the interrelationship 
between policy-making and policy implementation. In addition, they a:re 
guided (at least implicitly) by a model of the policy process which can 
no longer be accepted unequivocably. In general, studies of policy imple-
mentation have focused almost exclusively on factors threatening achievement 
36 Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation," p. 159. 
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of policy objectives and in so doing have d.escri bed a myriad of factors 
that must be considered, and even controlled and manipulated by policy-
makers in the process of policy development. In addition, implementation 
problems have ordinarily been classified as problems of coordination and 
control, or of bargaining among a number of competing interests. Thus, 
rather than describing the manner in which implemente:rs ultimately deter-
mine the operational content of policy decisions and thereby exercise a 
degree of power in the policy process which may ~ beyond the control and 
manipulation of policy-makers, present conceptualizations of the imple-
mentation process assume that a number of variables affecting bw:eaucmtic 
behavior can be manipulated by policy-makers. The P9li tical, organiza-
tional, technical, and personal powers of bureaucracies have thus been 
either totally neglected (as being unverifiable or subject to change), 
simply denied, or conceived as a tempo:ra.ry aberration. 
One possible reason for the continual neglect of bureaucmcies by 
policy analysts has been the assumption of hierarchy in organizations. 
That is to say, integral to all past discussions of implementation has 
been the assumption that the closer individuals and governmental units 
are to policy formulation, the greater is their influence on policy develop-
ment and thus on the outcomes of political activity. And, from the other 
extreme, the closer they are to applying policy, the less is their direct 
influence on policy. When policy is made and implemented within a single 
organization, researchers have asstUiled that policy is set by actors at 
the top of the agency who then delegate responsibility for implementing 
their policy decisions to subordinates. And, when policy is made by 
elected bodies (e.g. , city councils) and then passed on to the head of 
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some particular department functionally related to the policy area being 
addressed, it has been assumed that (1) policy makers establish the ob-
jectives and manner of government action, (2) department heads follow 
faithfully the directives of policy-makers, and (3) members of the imple-
menting agency carry out specific p::rogra.ms in a manner consistent with 
the objectives established by superiors. 
For heuristic purposes, the assumption of hierarchy has worked 
quite well in bringing a sense of order to a rather complex and p::roblem-
atic p::rocess. If one accepts the classic Weberian contention that the 
ideal relationship between superiors and subordinates is one where poli-
cies are made by top level officials and then passed on to and faith-
fully implemented by subordinates whose discretion is acutely limited, 
then policy analysts may then have been justified in addressing their 
attention to questions of coordination, control, and compliance in im-
plementing agencies. However, several studies have shown that the re-
lationship between policy objectives of elected officials and actions of 
implementing agencies and between top level officials and actions of the 
bodies they direct are at best problematic. It is often the case that 
the intentions of policy-makers do not guide the behavior of policy-im-
plemente:rs. Thus when the assumption of hierarchy breaks down, no clear 
line can be drawn between policy-makers and policy-implementers; opera-
tionally, they become one and the same. 
For example, studies have recorded the extraordinary power of such 
"lower-participant" g::roups as attendants in mental hospitals, maintenance 
37 T.J. Scheff, "Cont::rol Over Policy By Attendants in a Mental 
Hospital," Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2(1961), 93-105. 
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worl:.ers in factories, 38 forest rangers, 39 patrolmen, 40 school teachers, 41 
and social worl:.ers42 in pursuing courses of action inconsistent with or 
in direct opposition to the policy directives of superiors that it can 
no longer be assumed that the intentions of policy declarers are always 
authoritative. Indeed, if it is true that different actors in the policy 
process not only have a degxee of authority over some aspect of the policy 
environment but also differing sets of objectives, then it cannot be 
assumed that there is one single objective governing behavior. When ob-
jectives are hard to identify, as they so often are when different parti-
cipants dominate different stages from policy development to policy im-
plementation, analyses based solely on comparisons between policy outcomes 
and initial (and somewha. t ideal) expectations tend merely to lend gxea ter 
confusion to an already complex and muddied process. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, present efforts at conceptualiza-
tion treat policy-making by lower-participants as deviations fiDm the 
general pattern. They thus posit as the norm a pattern of policy activity 
whereby elected officials or individuals highest in the fonnal chain of 
command in organizations establish policy objectives and ultimately end 
with an inventory of factors accounting for the gap between intentions 
and outcomes as realized by implementing agencies. 
38 M. Crozier, The Bureaucra. tic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1964). 
39 Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1960). 
40 James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1968). 
41 Richard Weatherley and Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucrats 
and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Refonn," 
Harvard Educational Review, 47, No. 2 (May, 1977), 171-197. 
42 T.H. Marshall, Social Policy in the 20th Century (London: 
t.T,+,.n-iT'IC>I'"\-n TTT'I-i~r..,,..l',dt.v Librarv. 1965). 
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Integral to so many case studies of the relationship between supe~ 
iors and subordinates (or between policy-makers and policy-implementers) 
has been the general conclusion that the gap between intentions and out-
comes cannot be empirically supported as a departure from some presumed 
nonn. Instead, many students of complex organizations view lowe~level 
policy-making as manifestations of a general pattern. David Mechanic, 
for one, has suggested that lowe~participants (by acquiring control over 
pe:rsons, resources, communication channels and info:rma. tion flow, and 
instrumentalities) can wield a significant degree of power in determining 
the operational content of policy decisions that is not ordinarily associ-
ated with their fonnal positions. 43 In fact, when the full breadth of 
administrative power is considered we find that organizations "are 
continuously at the mercy of their lower participants. "44 
These studies of lowe~participant group activity thus infonn us 
that we should not expect to find a perfect fit between one's position 
in an organization's hierarchical chain of command and the amount of 
power an individual possesses within the policy process. Recognizing 
this apparent mismatch, Lawrence Baum has proposed that "instead of viewing 
any power possessed by lower participants as aberrant, we may begin with 
the assumption that they alone will determine the content of the policies 
they execute."45 Thus, rather than starting with the basic assumption 
that the superior-subordinate relationship is such that implementing 
43 David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of wwer Participants in 
Complex Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly,7(Dec. 1962), 349-64. 
44 Ibid., p. 351. 
45 ~nee Baum., "An Organizational Theory of Judicial Impact." Ohio 
State Uni ve:rsi ty (mimeo); quoted in Van Meter and Van Hom, "The Policy 
Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," p. 4_56. 
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agencies are guided by explicit directives from policy-makers and that 
they will consequently act in a manner consistent with policy objectivesr 
we should instead "discover the forces which counteract autonomy :rather 
46 than taking them for granted. " 
One cannot then understand the politics of implementation without 
first recognizing that there are many instances when those charged with 
carrying out policy are accorded substantial latitude. This is especially 
evident in areas :where public employees (such as social worlters, teachers, 
police officers, inspectors, judges, parole officers, and the like) are 
oftentimes required to use discretion in their inte:ractions with citizens. 
Such ind.i vi duals effectively mci.ke policy ehenever they are free to choose 
not only from among alternative means but even from among alternative ends. 
Thus, it is their behavior, and not that of the policy-developer, that 
should set the focal point in understanding the problematic nature of the 
implementation process. 
When it is finally admitted that many implementers (or lower partici-
pant groups) do indeed ultimately make policy, then it only seems na.tu:ral 
for implementation analysts to focus on those who are charged with ad-
ministering policy :rather than on those who are said to fo:rmally make and 
convey it. Or, as Michael Lipsky has cryptically proposed, implementers 
often enjoy such substantial latitude that "studies of implementation 
should be turned on their heads. "47 Instead of focusing on how policy-
46 Ibid. 
47 ~el Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementa-
tion on its Head, " in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha. Weinberg ( eds.) , 
American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1978), 
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makers can achieve their initial objectives, policy analysts should focus 
on how the processes of implementation are experienced by policy deliverers. 
Thus, "rather than considering them at the end of a policy chain, the 
policy deliverers would instead be seen as primary actors. ,4a 
This is not meant to suggest that those who carry out policy are in 
all instances free to deviate from the path prescribed by their superiors, 
but rather that there are numerous conditions when both inter- and extra.-
organizational control mechanisms are so weak that assumptions of hier-
archy and authority cannot be· taken for granted. This would seem to be 
the case when policy implementers (1) operate under conditions of wide 
discretion; (2) operate within a context of multiple objectives and the 
policy in question is not salient enough to warrant strict monitoring by 
superiors; and (J) confront proposed shifts in ongoing practices to which 
they have formed particular preferences.49 When any of these conditions 
prevail, policy implementers will be found to wield substantial power in 
both blocking realization of intentions of policy-makers and in deciding 
what should actually transpire based upon their own policy predispositions. 
Given this extensive and well-developed body of theoretical and 
case study material devoted to analyses of bureaucratic decision-making 
containing repeated documentation of the increasing power of bureauc:racies 
in processes of policy implementation, policy analysts have nonetheless 
failed to capitalize on such findings in contemporary detenninants re-
search. That is to say, given the recognized power of bureaucracies in 
determining the operational content of public policies and thus in deter-
mining the ultimate outcomes of policy decisions, we should expect to find 
48 Ibid., p. J98. 
49 ~· , p. 399-LK>O. 
the systematic inclusion of bureaucratic or organizational variables in 
deteminants research. Wi trout such consid.era tions, deteminants re-
search can neither hope to analytically specify the nature of the impact 
bureaucrats have come to realize on the policy process nor improve upon 
its less than successful attempts to fashion a powerful positive theory 
of policy formation. Only by escaping from its previously held theoreti-
cal and metmdological commitments can deteminants research improve 
upon the present instability of its findings, increase the explanatory 
power of its research designs, and formulate an analytic model of policy 
fom.a.tion without the prescriptive sterility of past efforts. This can 
be accomplished only by incorporating elements of bureaucracy and bureau-
cratic behavior in future modelling efforts. 
If the influence of bureaucrats in the policy process is as great 
as we believe it is, then why have bureaucratic or organizational vari-
ables been consistently underrepresented in deteminants research? Surely 
part of the blame must be placed on the researchers, themselves, for 
slavishly following the theoretical and methodological predispositions 
of their disciplines, even though traditional methods have failed to tell 
us very much about the ultimate determinants of policy outcomes. However, 
determinants analysts need not shoulder the entire blame. Organiza tionaJ. 
theorists, for their part, although willing to extol the importance of 
bureaucracy, have been reluctant to identify the dimensions of bureau-
cracy and bureaucratic behavior that may be respmsible for observed 
variations in policy outputs. Is the size of bureaucracy important? Its 
age? Its degree of centralization? Formalization? Professionalization? 
Complexity? Autonomy? By failing to specify those aspects of bureaucracy 
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most likely to affect policy outputs, organizational theorists have given 
little or no significant guidance to determinants researchers. 
If researchers are to improve the explanatory power of available 
modelling efforts and simultaneously correct for their past theoretical 
and prescriptive sterility, both theoretical and methodological changes 
are in order. Now although some such changes require at most minor 
modifications in present definitions of a policy determinant or somewhat 
more complex causal modelling of the policy process which links initial 
policy decisions with that policy's ultimate performance, the explanatory 
strength of most modelling efforts can only be improved by (1) reexamining 
the empirical foundation of those underlying assumptions regarding the 
hiemrchical arrangement of actors in the policy process, (2) expanding 
the definition of a power-holder to include those indi viduaJ.s capable of 
deciding a policy's opemtiona.l content via processes of implementation, 
and (3) including variables hypothetically related to each phase of the 
policy process within methodological designs. 
On the one hand, although major modelling efforts have taken root 
within a large body of determinants research, most studies continue to 
suffer from an unmistakable lack of theoretical significance. Though re-
searchers have long sought to identify those factors responsible for 
specific policy outputs, they have succeeded neither in systematically 
specifying the nature of the linkages among variables nor in explaining 
the ultimate outcomes of governmental activities. Within narrowly 
dmwn disciplinary boundaries, economists and political scientists alike 
have attempted to measure the influence of various factors on the policy 
choices of decision-makers and to predict a community's policy position 
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given its particular level of economic and political development without 
first specifying the exact manner in which variables interact. The ovel."-
riding emphasis on prediction ra. ther than explana. tion has precluded 
systematic causal modelling and had even encouraged many to make rather 
serious inferences on the basis of spurious :relationships. 
When it is further taken into considers. tion that the possibility of 
environmental determinism suggested qy most researchers has yet to explain 
almost an average of two-thirds of the variance in most output categories, 
we begin to question not only the appropriateness of present :research 
designs but even the manner in which many variables are li tera.lly thrown 
into the analysis with no thought to their theoretical significance. Also 
questionable is the reluctance of most political scientists to include 
bureaucratic or organizationaJ. variables in their determinants :research. 
Rather than abiding by the belief that socioeconomic conditions set the 
policy agenda of governmental units, :researchers should have at least 
considered the possibility that although the level of economic development 
supplies the re.sources necessary to a1 ter present levels of policy outputs, 
such political and bureaucratic variables as partisanship and profession-
alism may provide the initial motivation. Though such factors may lack 
an independent and direct impact on policy outputs, they could nonetheless 
serve a contributing function.50 Their inclusion in determinants research 
could only then increase the explanatory power of most modelling efforts. 
Secondly, :researchers must divorce themselves from assumptions of 
hierarchy and authority in organizations which are not empirically supported 
50 See, Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation ~n Organiza-
tions," American Political Science Review, 64 (1969)? 111-126. 
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with direct reference to the policy process. The ina.bili ty of environ-
mental conditions to explain all of the observed variation in and between 
output categories and the tendency of communities with dissimilar polit-
ical structures to pursue different policy options had naturally urged 
many researchers to extol the importance of politics on things political 
and to consequently include cha:racteristics of fonnal decision-making 
bodies in detennina.nts research. Although there may exist many situations 
when environmental conditions are so compelling that decision-makers are 
not free to choose from am.ong assorted policy a1 terna. ti ves, :few policies 
receive formulation in complete isolation from the political climate. 
This being so, differences in political characteristics may explain some 
degree of variation in policy outputs. But such differences are not those 
which are commonly included in most modelling efforts. 
Determinants researchers, and here we are referring primarily to 
political scientists, have concentrated major attention on policy conflicts 
inherent in legislative bodies. Recognizing that every policy has both 
its supporters as well as its det:ractors, researchers have sought to 
measure the impact of specific legislative characteristics and political 
conditions on the policy-making process. With the underlying assl.Ullption 
that policy decisions grow out of conflict and bargaining within fomal 
decision-making bodies, researchers have given inordinate conside:ration 
to elected public officials and characteristics of the electoral process. 
In so doing, they have assl.Ulled that elected officials occupy positions of 
highest authority in the policy process. It is held that once policy is 
made and its exact output level detemined, legislators delegate mundane 
administ:ra ti ve details to public bureauc:racies. Thus, in te:ons of the 
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setting of initial policy outputs, characteristics of administrative 
bodies as well as administrators, themselves, are considered relatively 
unimportant. 
Now although it is true that bureaucrats do not maintain fomal 
positions of policy-making authority, ever-increasing delega. tions of power 
from legislators to administrative bodies has given bureaucrats such an 
independent voice in deciding the ultimate conduct of political activity 
that administrative policy-making can no longer be viewed as some sort 
of deviation from the general pattern. Indeed, there now appears to be 
no question that for public bureaucracies the task of policy-making has 
assumed parity with that of policy implementation. Modelling efforts 
based on assumptions of hierarchy are theoretically suspect and when de-
void of variables representative of bureaucratic organization and behavior 
they are equally methodologically deficient. 
Third, even if researchers investigating the detenninants of policy 
outputs suddenly picked up the clew that bureaucrats do have an impact 
on policy decisions and proceed to include bureaucratic or organizational 
variables in their analyses, present models would still be unable to ex-
pl~in a significant degree of output variation without expanding the 
usual definition of deteminant. For the most part, when measuring the 
impact of certain political characteristics on the policy process, re-
searchers have only considered features of govermnental units that can 
be measured independently from an output attribute. For example, the 
impact of such governmental characteristics as party dominance, electoral 
activity, reformism, and legislative structure have been investigated in 
a manner unrelated to the given outputs. Researchers have assumed that 
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characteristics of the governmental unit are important without specifying 
the nature of the relationship. Only after strong correlations are found 
do researchers hypothesize a.s to why certain relationships exist. Most 
often the same pattern develops when environmental conditions are given 
the hypothetically independent status. 
Now, given these considerations, suppose researchers interested in 
explaining inter-state variations in welfare benefits find that output 
levels increase in direct proportion to increases in the state's level 
of economic development when controlling for both characteristics of the 
governmental unit and for attributes of bureaucratic organization. A 
strong case would then no doubt be made for the independent impact of 
economic conditions on the level of state welfare benefits. In fact, the 
same conclusion would be d:ra.wn for any one of the three assumed independent 
variables if a. strong correlation was found between one and some output 
level when controlling for the other two. Certainly few would quarrel 
with conclusions proposed by such a study. Let us suppose, however, that 
output levels were found to differ even in states with similar economic, 
political, and bureaucra. tic characteristics • In such an instance, the 
usual definition of determinant would be found wanting. 
Under such conditions researchers would see the need to expand the 
usual definition of determinant to include not only characteristics of 
the economic environment, governmental unit and bureaucratic orga.niza. tion, 
but also characteristics of the choice si tua.tion. Such variables a.s "need" 
and "output uncertainty" fall into this ca. tegory since they characterize 
the relationship that may exist between a given governmental unit and 
policy output, and thus proVide referents outside the governmental or 
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economic unit. Characteristics of the choice si tua.tion should especially 
be included as potential determinants in all cases whe:re certain geographic 
regions with like governmental and socioeconomic conditions pursue quite 
dissimilar policy options. 
Finally, and even more gennane to the issue presently at hand, 
determinants researchers may very well be investigating a series of 
questions that are both theoretically and prescriptively sterile. Though 
detenninants analyses have increased our understanding of the policy-
making process by alerting us to those factors which may ultimately de-
termine both the initial setting of policy objectives and the establishing 
of specific output levels, they have not focused attention on what really 
seems to matter to both policy-makers ansi policy affectees, namely, did 
the policy achieve its initial objectives, and, if so, at what cost? The 
answer to these questions is dependent on one's a.na.lysis of policy out-
comes rather than policy outputs. When the focal point is changed in 
this fashion, identification of key policy detenninants must necessarily 
center on the administrative rather than the governmental or socioeconomic 
unit. By failing to broaden their definition of policy determinant to 
include characteristics of the administrative organization, detenninants 
analysts have been unable to fonnulate a truly functional model of the 
policy process able to account for sizeable output variations within and 
between specific policy areas and governmental units. 
Though it may be asserted that detenninants anaJ.ysis has not specif-
ically focused on individuaJ. power resources, per se, and thus should not 
be too critically reviewed for failing to document the significant power 
potential of bureaucrats in determining policy outcomes, the contention 
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tha.t bureaucrats are ultimately the holders and exercise~ of power in 
national, state, and community affairs has not received ~ documentation 
necessary to support the charge even by those studies spe~ifically con-
cerned with community power structures. Instead., various theoretical 
and methodological constraints have also operated within ..,-the power studies 
litera tu:re contributing to rather questionable portfolios of community 
power holders. Indeed, either a large and growing body 0 -.:f theoretical 
and case study literature supportive of our claim is seri<::JOUSly mistaken, 
or community power studies have approached their research - project from a 
rather shaky foundation. In order for the power studies :::;::literature to 
balance its findings with what organization theorists ha.~ fully documented 
concerning the power capacity of bureaucrats, several c~es must be 
made in the manner in which "power" is conceptualized and ..;. ultimately 
operationalized in present studies of community power strr-=uctures. 
Though exceptions do exist, most studies concerned .- with locating 
the source of political power in American society can be • categorized in 
one of two principal theoretical perspectives, each of wh~,t:tich is dependent 
upon distinct methodological approaches. On the one hand,.a are studies that 
start with the premise that there exists in all societies s a small class 
of individuals that can ultimately be identified as the "••true power-
holders" because of their dominant voice in making decisi.,..Lons affecting 
and binding upon the general public. This "elitist" view~ of American 
society holds that power is held by the few woose will p::('"';X"9vails over that 
of the many. Opposing this perspective is the opinion th.(:lB. t though it may 
be the few who actually make policy decisions, the exact composition of 
this "power class" varies from one issue area to another. _ Those holding 
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this view are appropriately temed pluralists because they see power as 
a resource that is dispersed among a broad range of groups that exercise 
a certain degree of influence in specific policy areas. 
Though each perspective has a number of proponents that employ dif-
fering methodological strategies, both are led by individuals who strongly 
voice one particular approach for identifying conununi ty power-holders. 
For example, as noted in Chapter III, paving the way for most elitist 
interpretations of American political life is the reputational approach 
as developed by Floyd Hunter. Researchers following this particular ap-
proach have been led by the growing knowledge that an eve:r.-increasing 
proportion of political activity is perfonned by "political outsiders" 
and tha.t such individuals inevitably exercise significant power over 
policy decisions affecting the political, economic, and social life of 
area residents. In recognizing the inability of the traditional focus 
on political institutions and elected officials to account for the growing 
influence of political outsiders, Hunter and others sought some means by 
which the true "power" behind the "scenes" could be identified. In so 
doing, these researchers posited the opinion tha.t the affairs of every 
city are in some way managed by a select few woo are perceived by others 
as capable of exercising power either directly or indirectly within the 
community. And, furthermore, their ultimate degree of influence is so 
great that they inevitably acquire a certain reputation for power. It ha.s 
thus been asserted that an individual's reputation can be used as the 
identifying factor in gauging the location of political power in any one 
particular community. 
Though it cannot be denied that such an approach differs markedly 
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from studies centered on sociaJ. class, public office, and institutional 
position, and in so doing uncovers a body of power-holders significantly 
different from those identified by earlier approaches, its theoreticaJ. 
and methodological foundations are such tha.t the power potential of 
public bureaucracies have not been adequately identified. First, by 
starting with the assumption tha.t a power class does in fact exist and 
tha.t it can be identified by the reputations of its members, reputation-
alists ha.ve taken for granted that which they should have instead sought 
to prove. Secondly, the precise location of political power is an 
empirical problem and thus one that must be approached by examining 
particular actions and/ or inactions tha. t affect the policy process, 
rather than by acquiring a subjective measure of one's degree of power 
by rank-ordering individuals in certain "high-power,low-power" categories 
on the basis of individual perceptions • "Real power" and "reputed power" 
cannot be treated as if synonymous. Thirdly, and more importantly, the 
power studies literature, in gene::ral, and reputationalists, in particular, 
assume tha.t once consensus is reached among the ruling group conceming 
the direction of community activities, the struggle for control of policy 
development is complete. Though the reputationa.l approach may identify 
individuals who are publicized as key personnel in the policy-making 
process, in so doing it is methodologically suspect because it treats 
consensus-building in policy formulation as the end rather than the be-
ginning of the process. The fact that public bureaucracies not only 
provide many of the innovating ideas in American government but also most 
often have the ability to modify, if not make, policy in the p:rocess of 
implementation and program administration and thereby determine a policy's 
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operational. content, goes unnoticed in studies employing the reputationa.l 
approach. Since their activities are not ordinarily publicized and their 
positions not subject to public election and accountability, bureaucrats 
fail to gain the reputation for power accorded elected officials and 
individuaJ.s of highly publicized status. 
This is not to suggest that the leading methodology of the elitist 
perspective is wholly inadequate, but rather that certain key elements are 
missing from its design. First, increasing delegations of policy-making 
authority to public bureaucracies has shattered the myth tha. t adminis-
trators merely follow faithfu:J.ly the directives of elected officials. 
Since the power they do hold almost invariably goes unnoticed or is seen 
as directly related to specific policy instructions of others, or even 
as a temporary aberration, they do not attain the sort of reputation 
that others can perceive. Thus, when using the reputationa.l approach, 
researchers must be careful not to equate power as reputedly exercised in 
the making of policy with that which ultimately arises when policy is 
administered. Secondly, reputationa.lists cannot assume that an individual's 
power potential is constant across all policy sectors. Thus, if the re-
searcher asks a number of knowledgeable people to name the power-holders 
in their cqmmunity, how can one be sure that they are identifying persons 
with power in all policy areas, in some, or in a single, highly publicized 
instance? An effort must be made to determine the degree of power exer-
cised by certain individuals in specified policy areas. And, thirdly, 
due to the unpublicized nature of most administrative .activities, re-
searchers need to employ their specific methodology with key members of 
the bureaucracy. This can be accomplished by (1) distributing the 
questionaire to all public bureaucrats who are in a position to identify 
key power-holders within their specified area of expertise, and by (2) 
segregating policy activity into specific issue-related categories and 
then proceeding to question both key community influentials and adminis-
trators responsible for implementing policies in those issue-areas. How-
ever, even when researchers do proceed that one step further and consider 
the reputations of key policy administrators, there still exists the 
danger that so-called "power-holders" may only be perceived as such be-
cause of their leadership position within the administrative body and 
not because of their deteminative role in policy development and per ... 
fo:rma.nce. Thus the relationship between one person's behavior and 
another's perception of that behavior must be empirically determined. 
This can only be accomplished by examining the total political activity 
of public bureaucrats, i.e., their advise-giving functions, interpretations 
of policy decisions, and ultimate application of policy directives. 
The suggestion that researchers employing the reputationaJ. approach 
expand their list of respondents to include members of bureaucracy and to 
then attest to the validity of their findings by considering the specific 
policy behavior of reputed power-holders in the policy environment has 
received at least partial consideration in the type of decisional analy-
sis undertaken by members of the pluralist persuasion. In brief, plural-
ists have sought to show that the specific make-up of individuals and 
coalitions committed to and directly involved in particular policy decisions 
varies from one issue area to another, and in so doing, have demonstrated 
that power very often appears to be dispersed among a broad range of 
individuals, groups, and institutions. Starting with the belief that the 
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exercise of power must be examined in its insti tutiona.l setting, pluralists 
have sought to identify power-holders by tracing the historical develop-
ment of particular policy decisions from the setting of the political 
agenda to the specification of policy output levels. In so doing, they 
have attempted to identify those individuals most prominent in the decision-
making process. 
Though decisional analysis has allowed researchers to identify those 
individuals actively engaged in processes of agenda-setting, decision-
making, and output specification, like the reputationa.l methodology, it 
has treated policy formulation as the end rather than the beginning of 
policy development. Bureaucrats have not been identified as key policy 
levers even by decisional analysts because they, too, have been constrained 
by a rather limited definition of their subject, power. Since researchers 
are most often inte-rested in conflicts inherent in the formulation of 
policy decisions they have failed to consider the ways power is exercised 
by those individuals and institutions responsible for applying policy 
and therefore for bringing about initial objectives. Even when policies 
have been enacted, various administrative constraints may prevent execu-
tion of the decision in the manner prescribed by policy-makers. If re-
searchers are to fully address the nature of power relations in the 
American governmental process, they will need to trace the total sequence 
of the policy process from issue specification to policy outcomes. Only 
by examining the activities of bureaucrats can researchers begin to under-
stand the full power capa.ci ty of policy administrators in translating 
initial policy decisions into explicit and meaningful outcomes. And, 
since governments are most often judged by what they deliver rather than 
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by what they promise, the increasing :role of public bureaucracies must 
take on a.d.d.ed significance in studies of the American policy process. 
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